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0.c. Abstract 
 
Much affected by viewing the Yugoslav Wars’ ruins, I resolved to study 
archaeology in conflict.  I wanted to explore archaeology’s role in conflict and 
archaeologists’ responsibilities in conflict zones; but unable to conduct such work in 
Kosova/Kosovo, I went to Cyprus.  Drawing together professional documentation 
and public education, professional and community interactions and interviews, and 
cultural heritage site visits, I researched the destruction of community places, the 
looting of cultural heritage, and the coping strategies of archaeologists.  The key 
questions of this thesis are: is it legal and ethical to conduct archaeological work in 
occupied and secessionist territories?  How is public knowledge of cultural heritage 
looting and destruction constructed?  What are cultural heritage professionals’ 
responsibilities for knowledge production during conflict?  How ought cultural 
heritage professionals to combat the looting and illicit trading of antiquities? 
I have addressed these questions by concentrating upon cultural heritage 
workers’ narratives of looting and destruction from 1955 until the present in 
professional discussion and mass education.  First, I argue that archaeologists have 
misinterpreted international law, and through boycotting and blacklisting of rescue 
archaeology in northern Cyprus, harmed both the profession and the cultural 
heritage.  Second, I argue that cultural heritage workers have been unwillingly co-
opted, or actively complicit in the conflict, in the production of nationalist histories, 
and thus nationalist communities, therefore in the reproduction of nationalist 
conflict.  Third, I argue that cultural heritage workers have knowingly contributed 
to the conflict and its destruction, through their nationalist policies on the 
paramilitary-dominated illicit antiquities trade.  My conclusions are: that an ethical 
antiquities policy would cut funding to and thereby reduce conflict-fuelling 
extremist activity; and that, where they have the freedom to practice it, professional 
and ethical archaeologies of destruction would promote intracommunal and 
intercommunal peace. 
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0.h.i. Greek-English letters 
 
 Transliterated: Pronounced: 
Α/α a a 
Β/β v v 
Γ/γ g throaty “g” 
Δ/δ d like “th” in “then” 
Ε/ε e e 
Ζ/ζ z z 
Η/η i like “i” in “ski” 
Θ/θ th like “th” in “thin” 
Ι/ι i like “i” in “ski” 
Κ/κ c/k k 
Λ/λ l l 
Μ/μ m m 
Ν/ν n n 
Ξ/ξ ks ks 
Ο/ο o like “o” in “job” 
Π/π p p 
Ρ/ρ r r 
Σ/σ/ς s s 
Τ/τ t t 
Υ/υ y like “i” in “ski” 
Φ/φ f/ph f 
Χ/χ ch  like “ch” in “loch” 
Ψ/ψ ps ps 
Ω/ω o o 
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0.h.i.1. Greek-English letter combinations 
 
 Transliterated: Pronounced: 
ΑΙ/αι ai like “ai” in “laid” 
ΑΥ/αυ af/av like “af” in “daft”, or “av” in “have” 
ΕΙ/ει ei like “ei” in “receive” 
ΕΥ/ευ ef/ev like “ef” in “deft”, or “ev” in “ever” 
ΟΙ/οι oi like “i” in “ski” 
ΟΥ/ου ou like “ou” in “you” 
ΓΓ/γγ gg g/ng 
ΓΚ/γκ gk g/ng 
ΜΠ/μπ mb/mp b/mb/mp 
ΝΓ/νγ ng ng 
ΝΓΚ/νγκ ngk ng/nk 
ΝΤ/ντ nd/nt d/nd/nt 
 
0.h.i.2. Cypriot Greek-English letter combinations 
 
 Transliterated: Pronounced: 
ΤΖ/τζ tz j 
ΤΣ/τσ/τς ts ch 
ΣΕ/σε, ΣΙ/σι se/she, si/shi shi/she 
ΧΕ/χε, ΧΙ/χι che/chi che/chi, she/shi 
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0.h.ii. Turkish-English letters 
 
 Transliterated: Pronounced: 
Α/a a a 
Β/b b b 
C/c c j 
Ç/ç ç like “ch” in “chin” 
D/d d d 
E/e e e 
F/f f f 
G/g g g 
Ğ/ğ ğ silent, vowel-lengthener 
H/h h h 
I/ı ı like between “b” and “r” in “brrr” 
İ/i i i 
J/j j j 
K/k k k 
L/l l l 
M/m m m 
N/n n n 
O/o o like “o” in “job” 
Ö/ö ö like “er” in “errr” 
P/p p p 
R/r r r 
S/s s s 
Ş/ş ş sh 
T/t t t 
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U/u u like “oo” in “too” 
Ü/ü ü like “ew” in “few” 
V/v v v 
Y/y y y 
Z/z z z 
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0.i. Intellectual autobiography 
 
Conducting ethnographic research, Northern Irish anthropologist Andrew 
Finlay (2001: 65) identified himself as a ‘non-sectarian, secular socialist’, and 
behaved as if others recognised that; but others categorised him as ‘a Protestant’, and 
altered their behaviour and information.  Thus, Finlay (2001: 71) encouraged 
‘intellectual autobiography’, to enable readers to compensate for researchers’ and 
research participants’ identities’ and experiences’ influences upon their practices and 
interactions.  Here, I will briefly present my own intellectual autobiography. 
 
I grew up in a non-religious, white-collar English family.  I studied BA 
Archaeology and Prehistory at the University of Sheffield (2000-2003), where I first 
engaged with archaeological theory and ethics, and wrote my dissertation on 
Objective Morality in Archaeological Interpretation: Confronting Injustice in 
Education. 
Excavating in a Greek village in the summers, I visited Balkan cultural heritage 
sites and was greatly affected when I found a Bosnian War ruin in Sarajevo 
graffitied, ‘write about us: stop [an]other genocide’.  Then, I did MA Cultural 
Heritage Studies at University College London (UCL), during which I further 
studied cultural heritage destruction and ethics, and peace education at historic sites, 
such as the Anti-War Museum9 in Berlin.  However, in the shadow of the Iraq War 
and poor Iraqis’ antiquities looting, my dissertation asked, is there a Human Right to 
Loot? 
 
I won an ESRC 1+3 MSc/DPhil research studentship, writing up the (2004-2005) 
MSc research proposal on Placing Cultural Rights: Resolving Conflicts over Cultural 
Heritage – Querying Cultures’ Rights and Archaeologists’ Responsibilities at the 
                                                 
9 Anti-Kriegs-Museum. 
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University of Sussex, planning to develop a human rights methodology for 
archaeology in conflict zones. 
After a disheartening feasibility study for research in Kosova/Kosovo, I decided 
to conduct my fieldwork in Cyprus.  During and after Greek language training at the 
University of Cyprus, I explored the ethics and legality of archaeological excavation 
in occupied and secessionist territories; but there were problems with access and 
trust, so I sought an alternative project.  Fearing that studying Turkish at a Turkish 
Cypriot institution would cause me to be blacklisted for supposed recognition of the 
Turkish Cypriot administration, I attended the University of Ankara’s language 
school (TÖMER) in Turkey instead.  While there, I read up on destruction of 
cultural heritage in Turkey, and visited places destroyed in historic and recent 
conflicts, or at risk of destruction through development.  There, though, my camera 
and my governorship10 and gendarmerie11-approved research permit were 
confiscated by a paramilitary intelligence unit (JİTEM)12 and, after repeated 
questionings and searches, and straightforward intimidation and instruction, I was 
compelled to leave south-eastern Turkey.  I returned to Cyprus. 
Partly because I was committed to making my original project work, and partly 
because I did not want to reproduce propaganda, or to produce a literature analysis 
of it, I had avoided researching the destruction of cultural heritage in Cyprus; but 
my interest newly piqued by the history of destruction in Turkey, I began studying 
it in Cyprus.  Then, finally, when some cultural heritage workers transparently lied 
to me about the destruction of cultural heritage, and some other cultural heritage 
workers ignorantly dismissed or denied my claims of that destruction, I found a 
viable research subject. 
My DPhil became a matter of Interrogating Archaeological Ethics in Conflict 
Zones: Cultural Heritage Work in Cyprus.  I not only verified and falsified cultural 
heritage destruction claims, but I also studied official and unofficial treatments of 
                                                 
10 Vâlilik. 
11 Jandarma. 
12 Jandarma İstihbarat ve Terörle Mücadele (Gendarmerie Intelligence and Anti-Terror). 
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cultural heritage, the construction of archaeological knowledge and the production 
of public memory, for example in Representations of a Suppressed UNESCO Report 
in Histories of Cultural Heritage Destruction (Hardy, 2009c). 
I had not wanted to repeat or synthesise existing knowledge of the looting of 
Cyprus; but both intentionally and accidentally, I found and pieced together entirely 
new and otherwise neglected fragments of information about the intertwined nature 
of the destruction and looting of Cypriot cultural heritage.  I perceived significant 
flaws in the professional and public understanding of the illicit antiquities trade, and 
consequently in archaeologists’ evaluations of their professional ethics.  I gathered 
information on, for instance, Treatment of Cultural Heritage in Cyprus, 1963-1974 
(Hardy, 2008b; see also Hardy, forthcoming)13. 
While studying destruction material for my thesis, looting research continued to 
affect my work, as when I discussed Cypriot Antiquities Rescue from the Turkish 
Deep State at the World Archaeological Congress’s International Conference on 
Archaeology in Conflict (Hardy, 2010).  Turkish Cypriot nationalists took advantage 
of the opportunity to slander and libel me, and to try to trigger a nationalist 
campaign against me (e.g. Anonymous, 2010; A. Atun, 2010).  The TRNC’s (at least 
at one time) honorary representative who misrepresented my research at the 
conference, Kufi Seydali (2010), later publicly warned me that, ‘[o]f course, you may 
continue to deliver your polit[ical]-thriller but you will never be quite sure that I 
will not be listening to you’. 
The anonymous post included long, close paraphrasings of Seydali’s conference 
comments; and it was in the Turkish Forum, where Seydali is a member of its Senior 
Advisory Board Committee, and the chairman of its Advisory Board Committee on 
Issues of Turkish Cyprus and Western Thrace.  At the same time, the forum post 
referred to Seydali in the third person; and there are many word-for-word 
transliterations of Anonymous’s English in the internet forum one day into Ata 
Atun’s Turkish in the (Cypriot and international) newspapers the next day.  So, it is 
                                                 
13 This conference paper is to be published as Destruction, Theft and Rescue of Archaeological 
Artefacts in Cyprus, 1963-1974 (Hardy, forthcoming). 
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probable either that Seydali was Anonymous and the forum post was “astroturfing” 
(fake grassroots campaigning); or that Atun was Anonymous and the forum post was 
the first draft of his newspaper column, though its anonymous authorship still 
suggests astroturfing.  (If Anonymous were a third person and had sent his forum 
post to Atun for him to use it, that would still mean that Atun had used it without 
attribution or acknowledgement.) 
In the conference paper, I repeated the victim’s family’s claims that Greek 
Cypriot undercover antiquities police agent Stephanos Stephanou had been ‘beaten 
heavily and interrogated’ in Turkish Cypriot police custody (Katerina Liasis, cited by 
Brennan, 2008), and concluded that Stephanou had been ‘murder[ed]’ by the 
‘Turkish deep state’, which ‘operate[d] outside and beyond Turkish state control’ 
(Hardy, 2010).  Anonymous/Atun perverted my words and alleged that I had said 
that Stephanou was ‘tortured to death by Turkish Cypriot police’ (Anonymous, 
2010), ‘polis tarafından… ölene dek işkence yapılmış’ (A. Atun, 2010).  
Subsequently, during the abortive media campaign in Turkish Cypriot, Turkish, 
German Turkish and British Turkish Cypriot newspapers (and online), one Turkish 
Cypriot nationalist warned me that he planned ‘to inform our Criminal Department 
of the TRNC Police HQ to interrogate you upon your arrival to North Cyprus’.  
Naturally, that made me wary to return, either to meet personal contacts or to access 
published sources for this work, or to conduct further research in the future.  Yet 
that is just one example of the circumstances in which, and the reasons for which, I 
did this research.  Now, it is necessary to explain in detail the background, context, 
subject and aim of this work.  
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1. Theoretical framework 
 
In this thesis, I explore: the politics and ethics of archaeological work in conflict 
zones, from boycotting and blacklisting to excavation, research and education; and 
the practice of managing and combating the illicit antiquities trade.  The very act of 
doing the research generated material and understanding: I ran the risk of the black 
list, and endured state, para-state and (un)professional interference in professional 
work; I made difficult ethical decisions (and, in some cases, made concessions).  
Thus, my methodology and practice were not unrealistic, ideal models for others; 
they were my own informed and continually reformed approaches to subjects, 
interactions with sources, and presentations of findings.  My experiences and actions 
not only produced new information, and corrected or refined existing knowledge of 
Cypriot cultural heritage destruction, but also produced, and became, evidence of 
how to do (or, how not to do) cultural heritage work in conflict zones.  This 
information may help archaeologists who will work with divided communities, in 
occupied and secessionist territories, or with individuals or institutions that 
frequently or widely violate human rights.  By identifying best practice – and worst 
– in cultural property protection, I hope to support professionalism in archaeological 
work in conflict zones.  By showing the social and educational roles of negative 
cultural heritage, both in triggering conflict and in maintaining or restoring peace 
and coexistence, I hope to encourage and support ethical cultural heritage treatment, 
and non-forensic human rights archaeology.  By examining archaeologists’ and 
antiquities police’s efforts to minimise looting and its impact upon scholarship, I 
hope to improve the effectiveness of those efforts, in order to enhance protection of 
communities’ cultural heritage, and thereby the means with which they understand 
their past and negotiate their future. 
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1.a. Interrogating archaeological ethics 
 
Until relatively recently, archaeologists had largely concentrated on political 
issues and when they had considered ethical issues (the standards, codes, or norms of 
moral action (Resnik, 1998: 14)), they had concentrated on relationships between 
archaeologists and Indigenous peoples and between archaeologists and antiquities 
collectors (Meskell and Pels, 2005: 1; Pluciennik, 2001b: 2-3).  Yet, there had long 
been discussions of professionalism (e.g. Dixon, 1913: 563-564; cf. Wylie, 2002: 28-
29), political (mis)interpretation (e.g. Childe, 1933), and the relationship between 
archaeology and the state (e.g. Jacquetta Hawkes and Grahame Clark in the 
Conference on the Future of Archaeology, 1943: 64; 70, cited in Evans, 1995: 315), 
without explicit categorisation of the debates as ones of professional ethics or social 
responsibility; these disprove declarations that archaeologists had not long 
considered themselves a public community with public responsibilities (e.g. 
Knudson, 1984: 251).  Since then, there have also been more recent, explicit 
contemplations of professional behaviour as an ethical activity (e.g. Green, 1984; 
Vitelli, 1996). 
Now, archaeologists, anthropologists, philosophers and others do not only 
examine relations between cultural heritage workers and communities, and assess 
the ownership and stewardship of archaeological materials.  They also explore 
gender, intellectual property rights, bioethics, the merits of utilitarian, duty and 
virtue ethics, and the role of archaeology in war and discord.  They weigh 
professionalist against advocatory archaeological practices, and the responsibility to 
produce knowledge for society against the responsibility to include communities in 
the production of that knowledge.  (For examples of all of these archaeological 
ethics, see Pluciennik, 2001a; Scarre and Scarre, 2006; Vitelli and Colwell-
Chanthaphonh, 2006; Zimmerman, Vitelli and Hollowell, 2003.) 
Yet still, archaeologist Yannis Hamilakis (1999: 62) has complained that ‘the 
politics of archaeological activity itself’ – particularly the practice of archaeological 
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work (as opposed to the interpretation of archaeological material) – ‘is a topic rarely 
discussed systematically’.  Moreover, despite the expanding literature, and the 
‘evolving archaeological ethic’ (Wylie, 2003: 9), archaeology has variously been 
placed in a time of crisis (Pollock, 2003), in which the political and ethical choices it 
makes will be critical to its role in society, or it has been seen to be experiencing its 
own ethical crisis, over how to combat the illicit antiquities trade (Renfrew, 2000), 
how to produce and represent archaeological knowledge (Webmoor, 2007), or how 
to decide towards what and whom it has responsibilities (Hamilakis, 2003). 
Certainly, the discipline of archaeology is currently navigating a course – or, 
rather, courses – that will set its direction(s) through crucial political and ethical 
terrains.  This may be particularly important, because archaeology is one of the 
‘moral sciences’ that enable us to understand what humans do and why (Carman, 
2001c: 220).  As such, it may be helpful briefly to review past archaeologists’ 
navigation of professional politics and ethics, in order to understand what they did 
and why, and which problems and options current archaeologists have. 
 
1.a.i. Linguistic imperialism 
 
These discussions are hindered by languages barriers in international 
archaeology; and consequently, choices are impaired.  Most international 
archaeological conversations are made in a few “international languages” – first 
English, but also French and German.  Even if neither the authors nor the areas 
discussed are from the English-, French- or German-speaking worlds, they have to 
speak in those languages to take part in those conversations.  That limits the 
development of archaeology (Bernbeck, 2008; Hansen, 2008; Kristiansen, 2001), first 
in the “big three” linguistic research communities, because they cannot access 
information produced outside of them, then in the other linguistic research 
communities, because the information has not been translated for them to be able to 
access it. 
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Where there are multilingual publications, they may still be primarily written in 
English, French and German, which even dominate non-European archaeologies, 
like Egyptian archaeology (Hansen, 2008: 171), with a minority of papers by local 
archaeologists in their first language; yet, they may nonetheless offer an opportunity 
both for self-reflection within the powerful archaeological communities and for the 
marginalised to answer back to the dominant. 
Now, there are even smaller archaeological communities’ counter-hegemonic 
presentations of their – non-Anglo-American – political and ethical debates (e.g. 
Karlsson, 2004a), not only in order to inform the international debates dominated by 
British and American archaeologists, but also as an ethical endeavour in and of itself, 
to dislocate that domination (Karlsson, 2004b: 17), even if they have to compromise 
and speak in the dominators’ language for both the influential and the marginalised 
to listen, or merely to be able to hear. 
 
1.b. Archaeology as politics and morality 
 
In the 1980s, postprocessual archaeologists Michael Shanks and Christopher 
Tilley insisted that ‘archaeology… is always a politics, a morality’ (1987a: 212) and 
sought ‘a place for the ethical, for values…. the subjective and political’ (1992: xviii).  
Yet archaeologists had always recognised or, at least, had always been able to 
recognise that their work was a political and a moral endeavour, even if many often 
denied it, either naively or deliberately. 
For example, in 1905, because professional archaeologists identified Great 
Zimbabwe as Black African cultural heritage, and therefore identified the land as the 
inheritance of the Indigenous peoples, they ‘so angered local [Settler] whites’ that 
they couldn’t work there again for another twenty-four years (Trigger, 1984: 362).  
Strikingly, this was so even though the archaeologists were themselves racists and 
actually agreed with the white settlers – their argument was over the quality of the 
architecture (cf. M. Hall, 1995: 35-38; Trigger, 2006: 196-200): the white settlers 
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thought the Bantu had a “prepubescent” intelligence too low to have built the great 
site (R. N. Hall, 1909: 13), while the professional archaeologists thought the Bantu 
had intelligence sufficiently low to have built the ‘infantile… pre-logical’ structures 
(Caton-Thompson, 1931: 103). 
A couple of years after Gertrude Caton-Thompson made that assessment of the 
Zimbabwe culture and the Bantu community, in the year Adolf Hitler became 
chancellor of, then dictator over, Germany, Vere Gordon Childe (1933: 410) warned 
colleagues that, ‘[i]n the name of these [nationalist and racist archaeological] 
theories men [sic] are being exiled from public life and shut up in concentration 
camps, books are being burned and expression of opinions stifled’. 
Supposedly, postprocessual archaeology was a reaction against anti-political, 
processual archaeology; and Shanks and Tilley (1992: 63; who defined themselves as 
postprocessualists) criticised Grahame Clark (whom they categorised as a 
processualist) for his implicit support for ‘social hierarchy and inequality’ and his 
‘right-wing nostalgic longing for a pre-industrial order of cultured elite and 
contented commons’.  Yet, during the Second World War, Clark had declared 
archaeologists’ responsibility ‘to bring to the common man [sic] everywhere a 
realization of his inheritance as a citizen of the world…. an overriding sense of 
human solidarity such as can come only from consciousness of common origins’ 
(Clark, 1943: 113, cited by Evans, 1995: 316).  Shanks and Tilley (1992: 63) declared 
that his work had ‘nothing to do with critical reflection’; yet, again during the 
Second World War, Clark had (albeit understandably exaggeratedly) contemplated, 
‘[w]e [British] are years behind [in method], but where has it led Germany, and 
where would it lead us?’ (Clark, 1943: 70, cited by Evans, 1995: 315). 
So, in tracing the developing understanding of archaeological work as political 
and moral work, it is not possible to identify at what time archaeologists first 
became aware of their political and ethical responsibilities; rather, it is necessary to 
comprehend archaeologists’ continually developing awareness of their 
responsibilities, in order to understand the current crisis of responsibility. 
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In doing so, the discussion frequently comes from or goes to the English-
language archaeological research communities of Britain, the United States, 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand, but this is not (solely) a reflection of linguistic 
imperialism; the discussion frequently began in or became central to those countries, 
because of the political and military imperialism and colonialism that they gave 
birth to or that gave birth to them; furthermore, with larger academic and 
commercial archaeological communities, they have louder voices in the discussion. 
Britain having given birth to colonial settler societies, and the Unites States 
having been born as one, Britain and the United States both having continued to 
practice imperialism and to use archaeology to support those imperialisms, they have 
thus created problems to which their archaeologists have needed to find solutions. 
 
1.b.i. Culture-historical archaeology 
 
During the development of amateur antiquarianism into professional 
archaeology, between the middle of the Nineteenth Century and the middle of the 
Twentieth Century, there was common acceptance of the ‘general validity of a racist 
approach’ (Trigger, 2006: 35), despite the contrary stances of naturalists like Alfred 
Russell Wallace and Marxist archaeologists like Childe (Trigger, 2006: 170; 346-348). 
In this culture-historical archaeology, archaeologists (including Childe) 
conceived of cultures as different, homogenous societies, distinguished by their 
social traditions, and they studied the expansion and contraction, the rise and fall of 
these societies (rather than internal cultural distinctions, political struggles, etc.). 
 
1.b.ii. Processual archaeology 
 
Appalled by nationalists’ appropriation of archaeology to legitimise totalitarian 
states, and to explain and justify their violence – exemplified by the Nazis (Arnold 
and Hassmann, 1995), but also practiced by the Soviets (Shnirelman, 1995), the 
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Maoists (Tong, 1995) and others – archaeologists rejected ethnocentric and 
nationalist interpretation (Trigger, 2006: 35; see also Evans, 1995: 312; Wailes and 
Zoll, 1995: 21). 
Subsequently, processual archaeology developed in the Cold War-fighting 
United States of the 1960s and 1970s, in which socialist and feminist interpretations 
were suppressed because of fear of McCarthyist purges of “anti-Americans” 
(Pauketat and Loren, 2005: 11; see also Patterson, 1995: 104-105).  It conceived of 
culture as adaptation to the environment, and environmental change as the primary 
cause of cultural change (Binford, 1962: 318; 1964: 439). 
Since it intended to make archaeology scientific, processualist archaeology 
reduced being ethical to being scientific (Pluciennik, 2001b: 1).  Processualists 
rejected any politicisation of archaeology – or, rather, ‘fully aware’ of archaeology’s 
political nature, they ‘systematically denied’ it anyway (Díaz-Andreu, 1995: 39) – 
and adopted supposedly value-free, scientific analyses of economic and ecological 
processes, the hidden values and unavoidable politics of which were exposed by 
postprocessualist archaeologists (Kohl and Fawcett, 1995b: 14-15). 
 
1.b.iii. The archaeology of slavery, racism, repression and resistance 
 
Pushed by the Civil Rights Movement, pulled by Charles Fairbanks’ plantation 
archaeology – excavations of sites of slavery – and supported by the 1966 (U.S.) 
National Historic Preservation Act, African American archaeology began in the late 
1960s, contradicting the dominant processual archaeology’s anti-political position; 
but it was only recognised as a subdiscipline when consciously political, 
postprocessual archaeology emerged from Britain in the 1980s and 1990s (Ferguson, 
1992: xxxv-xxxix). 
As archaeology is inherently political, both in its practice and in the knowledge 
that it produces, there is no choice between political and apolitical archaeology; 
there is only a choice between which politics is practiced and produced.  Every time 
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we study and present material evidence of inequality (of race, class, gender, 
sexuality, etc.), we choose between two alternatives, as characterised by Terrence 
Epperson (1999: 103) in his research into sites of racist repression and resistance: ‘we 
can either continue to recreate and re-enact “race,” or we can join in the anti-racist 
struggle’.  Kristna Jennbert (2004: 328) held the similar opinion that ethics was a 
matter of ‘dignity, fairness and responsibility’. 
 
1.b.iv. Postprocessual archaeology 
 
This political, postprocessual archaeology insisted that archaeological work was 
always already a political enterprise (Shanks and Tilley, 1987a: 212; see also Tilley, 
1989: 105), because artefacts were not natural data, like fossils, but materials 
produced and manipulated by actors influenced by and actively negotiating their 
social, cultural, economic and political circumstances, and those artefacts were 
subsequently interpreted by archaeologists situated in their own circumstances 
(Shanks and Tilley, 1992: 107-111).  So, the “archaeological record” was not a fossil 
record of ethnic groups’, ecological populations’ or economic classes’ struggles, but 
evidence of human social practice.  For her part, philosopher Linda Patrik (1985: 55-
56) proposed that archaeological evidence could be conceived of as both a “historical 
record” of expressions of individuals’ and groups’ thoughts and actions, and a “fossil 
record” of the systems within which they thought and acted – or indeed as no form 
of “record” at all. 
In some forms, however, this political postprocessualism embodied an absolute 
relativism that conceived of all interpretations as equally true because none was 
true, because all archaeological interpretations were merely political negotiations.  
Bruce Trigger (1995: 263) complained that they aimed ‘to disempower political and 
intellectual elites by affirming the relativism… (… Shanks and Tilley, 1987a, 
1987b…)’, but that they freed the elites to manipulate the past and at the same time 
disabled their victims, who needed the truth to achieve equality and social justice; 
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moreover, he pointed out that, regardless, ‘[i]t is absurd to maintain that there are no 
empirical limits to the manner in which archaeologists can responsibly interpret 
their data’ (Trigger, 1995: 265). 
In a revised edition of one of the texts that Trigger had criticised, in the new 
preface and appendix responding to the criticisms, Michael Shanks and Chris Tilley 
(1992: 256) insisted that they believed that ‘the past is real,… not just our fiction’, 
and it is true that they had previously stated that ‘some pasts are inferior to others’ 
(1992: 245-246); but their criteria for choosing between those pasts appeared to be 
archaeologists’ ‘biases, slants, values, politics, projects and aspirations’ (1992: xviii), 
and they had accepted ‘multiple pasts produced actively in accordance with ethnic, 
cultural, social and political views, orientations, and beliefs’ (1992: 245). 
Shanks and Tilley explicitly rejected ‘a correspondence theory of truth, i.e., the 
notion that propositions are either true or false by virtue of the state of the world’ 
(1992: 244), and imprisoned ‘knowledge and truth’ in ‘language games which play 
with and represent “reality”’ (1992: 261), wherein ‘“Reality” in quotation marks 
means “what is believed to be real”’ (Collin, 1997: 70 – original emphasis), rather 
than what is real. 
While they appealed for it ‘not to be taken in a grossly literal reading’, they did 
state (and reiterate) that ‘we must choose between alternative pasts on political 
grounds’ (1992: 256 – emphasis added), or, in other words, that we cannot choose 
between alternative pasts on empirical grounds, that there were no empirical limits 
to archaeological interpretation after all, or at least that those empirical limits were 
minimal.  Archaeologist David Anthony (1995: 88) warned that, ‘[i]f we abandon 
our [empirical] standards…, we abdicate any right to exclude explanations that 
promote bigotry’. 
The coincidence of social, political and economic developments and 
communities’ intervention with the intellectual, political and personal interests of 
archaeologists (which were also in part products of those developments) led to more 
archaeologists considering the politics and ethics of their work explicitly. 
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1.b.v. Nationalist, colonialist and imperialist archaeologies 
 
Archaeological theorist Bruce Trigger (1984) identified three major types of 
archaeology – nationalist, colonialist and imperialist – rooted in the situations in 
which the discipline grew in each place; the most common form is nationalist 
archaeology, conducted to build national unity and pride, to claim political and 
geographical sovereignty, or to undermine class conflict (Trigger, 1984: 356-360). 
Colonialist archaeology is practiced by colonial settler communities to excuse 
control of colonised land, or subjugation or displacement of colonised people 
(Trigger, 1984: 360-363).  Anti-colonialist and anti-capitalist archaeologies explore 
not only the systems of capitalism and colonialism, but also the existence of 
capitalist and colonial relations before the birth of those systems, making sense of 
simultaneous and separate processes of demographic, economic, cultural and 
political colonialism, historicising contemporary power relations (e.g. Lyons and 
Papadopoulos, 2002). 
Imperialist archaeology is performed by internationally dominant states to 
naturalise their dominance (Trigger, 1984: 363-368).  Contrary, disruptive, anti-
imperialist archaeologies analyse modes of domination, exploitation and resistance, 
experiences of inequality and identity, and their transformation through social 
action (Miller, Rowlands and Tilley, 1989; see also Bond and Gilliam, 1994; McGuire 
and Paynter, 1991). 
As part of these anti-imperialist archaeologies, Susan Kus (1995 [1989]: 153) 
proposed ‘an archaeology of bread and circuses’, ‘to understand… how and at what 
cost the state is willing and able to “buy” the consent of its members, and… if and 
when an official ideology of “social contract” and “social praxis” can be employed for 
the unofficial goals of protest and revolution’. 
Indeed, to Trigger’s (1984) three alternative archaeologies, Neil Silberman added 
‘an “archaeology of protest” that springs from forces that oppose the nation-state’ 
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(1995: 261 – original emphasis), from the archaeology of slave resistance and 
rebellion (Singleton, 1985), to the archaeology of anti-nuclear, anti-Cold War 
activism (Schofield and Anderton, 2000), to the archaeology of anti-capitalist 
struggle and class war (Faulkner, 2005; Ludlow Collective, 2001). 
 
1.b.vi. Academic freedom, human freedom 
 
The eleventh Congress of the International Union of Prehistoric and 
Protohistoric Sciences (IUPPS) was due to be held in Southampton in England in 
1986, but as the struggle against Apartheid in South Africa and Namibia intensified, 
trade unions, activists and archaeologists got involved to prevent the participation of 
South African and Namibian cultural heritage workers, in order not to appear as if 
they recognised the regime or accepted its practices. 
The local council insisted upon a boycott of the Apartheid regimes and the local 
archaeologists agreed, but the IUPPS and other archaeological organisations, such as 
the Society for American Archaeology (SAA), denounced the boycott for denying 
academic freedom (Gero, 2000).  As American Archaeologists Against Apartheid 
pointed out, their colleagues’ objections to the boycott were illogical, because 
Apartheid denied academic freedom both within and outside South Africa and 
Namibia (Patterson and Kohl, 1986: 319).  The local archaeologists proceeded to 
hold the first World Archaeological Congress (WAC). 
Conference organiser Peter Ucko (1987: 5) insisted that ‘to discuss the issue of 
academic free speech [was] almost an obscenity in the context of South Africa, 
where the majority of the population lack[ed] far more fundamental freedoms than 
that of discussion’.  This was an argument for a political, ethical archaeology 
grounded in human rights, with an understanding that human rights frequently 
conflicted, but that they could not be considered equal and relativised, that there 
was a hierarchy of human rights, determined from human need, and that some civil, 
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political, economic, social and cultural freedoms were more fundamental than 
others. 
While it was still often referred to as “politics”, the actual substance of the debate 
was manifestly ethics, ‘the weight given to… academic freedom vis-à-vis other 
human rights’, ‘the principle of human rights in an institutionally racist society 
versus the principle of academic free speech’ (Ucko, 1987: 224; 226), ‘the social 
responsibility of the profession’ (Neal Ascherson, cited by Ucko, 1987: 239).  While 
which politics and which ethics archaeologists practiced was and is still strongly 
contested, that they promoted a politic and an ethic could no longer be denied.  
Therefore, now, it may be helpful to study responses to ethical dilemmas in 
archaeologies of nationalism, violence and destruction. 
 
1.c. Politics and ethics of archaeology 
 
1.c.i. Nationalism 
 
One of the most productive fields of enquiry has been the relationship between 
archaeology and nationalism (cf. Atkinson, Banks and O’Sullivan, 1996; Díaz-
Andreu and Champion, 1996; Kohl and Fawcett, 1995a; Meskell, 1998), which has 
been consolidated by archaeologies of ethnicity (e.g. Jones, 1997), cultural identity 
(e.g. Graves-Brown, Jones and Gamble, 1996), and “difference” and social exclusion 
(e.g. Hubert, 2000). 
Although archaeologists diverge over whether nationalist archaeology can ever 
be acceptable, ‘ethnically inspired archaeology’ for multiculturalist movements and 
anti-colonial struggles (Kohl and Fawcett, 1995b: 5; see also Trigger, 1995: 277; 
Wailes and Zoll, 1995: 22), or whether nationalism is always ‘offensive…, linked to 
the instinct of aggression’ (Fleury-Ilett, 1996: 201), they have converged on the need 
to challenge exclusive, supremacist misinterpretation. 
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After archaeologists’ confrontation with Apartheid, the Soviet Union dissolved 
and its Balkan and Caucasian successor states descended into conflict or collapse: 
archaeologists saw that nationalist interpretations of archaeology excused and 
encouraged ethnic cleansing (Kohl and Tsetskhladze, 1995: 169), and ‘[m]emories, 
real and imagined, sustain[ed] the civil conflict… as much as any weapon’ (Kaiser, 
1995: 99). 
Aware that nationalist archaeological interpretation fuels the fires of conflict and 
war (Kaiser, 1995: 99; Kohl and Fawcett, 1995b: 11; Silberman, 1995: 249; 256), and 
that nationalist archaeologists are even driving some of the conflicts (Chernykh, 
1995: 143), anti-nationalist archaeologists challenge both the ‘nationalist crazies’, the 
‘little fascists’ whose myths encourage conflict (Chernykh, 1995: 147; see also Kohl 
and Fawcett, 1995b: 4), and the relativists whose rejection of standards facilitates it 
(Anthony, 1995: 85; Chernykh, 1995: 148; Kohl and Tsetskhladze, 1995: 169).  They 
insist that there are both empirical standards for evidence (Kohl and Fawcett, 1995b: 
5; Silberman, 1995: 251; Trigger, 1995: 265), and ethical ‘minimum universal 
standard[s]’ for interpretation (Kohl and Fawcett, 1995b: 8 – original emphasis); and 
that archaeologists bear a moral duty to implement both (Anthony, 1995: 93; 
Silberman, 1995: 251; Trigger, 1995: 279). 
Historian Eric Hobsbawm considered that it was nationalist thought and action 
that imagined the nation and established the state (1992a: 10), and that ‘historians 
are to nationalism what poppy-growers in Pakistan are to heroin-addicts’ (1992b: 3), 
but archaeologists Philip Kohl and Clare Fawcett (1995b: 13) felt that, sometimes, 
historians and archaeologists more closely resembled ‘the pushers of these mind-
bending substances on urban streets, if not the mob capos running all stages of the 
sordid operation’. 
 
Archaeologists found their professional, political and moral obligations united in 
responsible archaeology (Anthony, 1995: 93; Kohl and Fawcett, 1995b: 18; 
Silberman, 1995: 251; Trigger, 1995: 278): because nationalist archaeology 
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misunderstood the nature of the archaeological record (Trigger, 1995: 273), 
archaeologists who fulfilled their professional responsibility by disproving 
nationalist myths also fulfilled their political and moral responsibility by 
invalidating the justification for nationalist violence. 
Coinciding with at least some parts of Indigenous archaeology (cf. Zimmerman, 
1997: 93), anti-nationalist archaeology judged that it could be both professional and 
ethical, by documenting even politically inconvenient archaeological evidence, 
which could be misused to begin or prolong the persecution of a disadvantaged 
community, but simultaneously challenging any misuses made (Trigger, 1995: 278). 
Although archaeologist Jean-Paul Demoule (2002: 18) observed that some 
archaeologists played ‘a very active, and sinister, political role’14 in Nazi Germany, 
anthropologist Bettina Arnold and museum worker Henning Hassmann (1995: 73) 
noted that many ‘were unwilling or unable to do anything’.  Some archaeologists 
have cautioned that these matters should remain matters of personal choice (Lillios, 
1995: 68; Price, 2004: 54) and the complexities of individuals’ positions and the 
public invisibility of some of the private pressures they endure affirm that caution. 
At the same time, however, not all archaeologists are equally limited or 
pressured; some operate relatively freely and independently; and these differences 
within the profession can be productive.  Some of my information and support came 
from unfree archaeologists, who told me things I could not have learned myself in 
my peripheral position, and who said things through me that they could not have 
said themselves (while keeping their central position). 
 
1.c.ii. Conflict archaeology, forensic archaeology 
 
Helle Vandkilde (2003: 128; 136) felt that archaeologists had either ignored or 
idealised violence until the wars of the 1990s made it impossible to do either, 
whereupon it quickly became a subdiscipline in its own right.  This led to increased 
                                                 
14 ‘[U]n rôle politique très actif, et sinistre’ (Demoule, 2002 : 18). 
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work in twentieth-century conflict archaeology (e.g. Schofield, Johnson and Beck, 
2002; Schofield and Cocroft, 2007), including a study of the United Nations Buffer 
Zone in Cyprus as primarily cultural heritage of the Cold War (Kyriakides, 2007), 
rather than as equally or primarily cultural heritage of the intercommunal conflict. 
While a distinct subdiscipline of archaeology (beyond the scope of this thesis), 
what could be categorised as a form of twentieth-century conflict archaeology is the 
forensic archaeological excavation of mass graves, human rights archaeologies of 
“institutionalised” human rights abuses (Ferllini, 2007).  Forensic human rights 
archaeology actually began a decade before archaeologies of violence, in 
investigations into human rights abuses committed during the 1976-1983 Dirty War 
in Argentina (Juhl, 2005: 24), but it too became established after the wars of the 
1990s, when the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia (hereafter, ICTR and ICTY) employed Physicians for Human Rights 
(PHR) to excavate mass graves in Rwanda, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina (Hunter 
and Cox, 2005: 160).  It is now so distinct and so established that it has become the 
subject of anthropological enquiry, in “archaeographies” of forensic archaeology (e.g. 
Crossland, 2002). 
The bicommunal Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus (CMP) is supported 
by the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team (EAAF)15 that first dug at the human 
rights mass graves investigations in Argentina, but the excavations in Cyprus are 
humanitarian exhumations to find out what happened to those who went missing 
during the conflict (CMP, 2010: 1) and to return the dead to their families for burial, 
rather than forensic excavations to identify crimes and their perpetrators. 
While forensic archaeology involves unique and incredibly complex 
considerations of ethics and negotiations of politics, relevant to this discussion of the 
responsibilities of archaeologists in conflict zones is the point that forensic 
archaeological evidence makes it ‘impossible... to claim that these recent holocausts 
never existed’ (Saunders, 2002: 113). 
                                                 
15 Equipo Argentino de Antropología Forense. 
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Without ignoring or downplaying the political and ethical minefield within 
which forensic human rights archaeology operates, forensic archaeologists’ 
humanitarian focus on the recovery of lost bodies, and/or their legal focus on the 
search for evidence of crimes, somewhat protects their work (if not their results) 
from political abuse.  Nonetheless, ultimately, forensic archaeology’s standards are 
achieved and upheld because of forensic archaeologists’ principles, their personal 
rejection of and their institutional independence from political influence. 
 
The value of forensic archaeology in disproving denials of ethnic cleansing could 
be extended to conflict archaeology more generally.  It is telling that, despite the 
practice of twentieth-century conflict archaeology and mass grave exhumations in 
Cyprus, and archaeologies of the medieval abandoned villages (e.g. Grivaud, 1998), 
there has been no archaeological investigation of the modern “abandoned” villages, 
the villages from which Cypriots were expelled by militaries and paramilitaries, and 
indeed in and around which they were massacred and dumped in mass graves. 
Archaeological heritage manager John Carman (2001c: 220) has advocated a 
‘“moral” archaeology’ to enable us to comprehend and critique violence.  This moral 
archaeology can be seen in work like Novak’s (2006) identification of domestic 
violence in the archaeological record but, as Novak (2006: 239) noted, ‘as early as 
1910, Elliot-Smith and Wood-Jones attributed healed cranial and forearm fractures 
in Nubian female skeletons to wife beating’. 
Carman did say that this “moral archaeology” was ‘not to impose prescriptions on 
others… but to open us up to the alternatives available to us’ (2001c: 237), so it 
might otherwise be called an “archaeology of morality”, but he also called upon 
archaeologists to revive the experience of ‘bloody slaughter’ in order to ‘reverse’ the 
memorialisation of the First World War that had obstructed critique of that war 
(2001b: 2; 3), and other contributors to Carman’s (2001a) volume insisted that 
‘violent behaviour… demands a moral response’ (Tarlow, 2001a: 141), so perhaps 
what was called for were “moral archaeologies of morality”, the study of past moral 
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worlds from different moral perspectives, united by their long-term, socially-
contextualised interpretation of material evidence of violence.  Conflict 
archaeologists both metaphorically and literally dig up hidden wrongs. 
 
Indeed, while the mass grave exhumations are archaeology of the Cyprus 
Conflict, there is no modern conflict archaeology in Cyprus: there is study of ancient 
warfare, but not of modern; there is study of medieval village abandonment, but not 
of modern.  Nevertheless, despite the lack of cultural heritage research into the 
conflict, there are massive (frequently, cultural heritage worker-written) political 
campaigns about the destruction of cultural heritage in the conflict.  In this study, I 
will use the results of conflict archaeology research to query the historical narratives 
of the communities, professionals, and institutions who discuss cultural property 
destruction, and I will use the experience of conflict archaeology research to 
comprehend the practice of archaeology in Cyprus.  Thence, balancing 
archaeologists’ responsibilities and freedoms, I will explore the ethics of 
archaeological work in Cyprus. 
 
1.c.iii. Destruction 
 
Cultural heritage has always been attacked, damaged and destroyed in conflict 
and long-established logics of destruction – profit, revenge, subjugation – remain.  
Yet the rise of nationalism gave birth to increasingly violent, exclusive identity and 
interest groups, who sought to establish ethnically homogeneous territories and for 
whom, because all territories have been historically heterogeneous, ‘[n]othing less 
than the destruction of past historical identities [was] needed’ (Chapman, 1994: 122).  
Indeed, ironically, it is partly as a result of the recent invention of ethnic identity 
that wherever it is imagined is “pure” is in fact ethnically mixed. 
As international relations scholar Martin Coward (2009: 43) explains, the 
nationalist destruction of cultural heritage constitutes ‘urbicide’, the destruction of 
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the possibility of the knowledge of past heterogeneous community, and of the 
possibility of the future existence of heterogeneous community.  Thus, while all sites 
of communal life may fall victim to urbicide, because ‘what is determinative of 
ethnicity is history, or rather specific parts of the past as they exist in the present’ 
(Kaiser, 1995: 116 – original emphasis), cultural heritage sites are particularly 
vulnerable, especially those sites that were built before the emergence of ethnic 
identity, which almost inevitably visibly embody the heterogeneity violent 
extremists wish to eliminate. 
 
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall (one of the relatively few occasions on which 
the destruction was popular internally and internationally), Babri Mosque in 
Ayodhya has been torn apart, the National Library in Sarajevo has been bombed and 
burned, the Old Bridge in Mostar has been blasted, Joseph’s Tomb in Nablus has 
been smashed, the Buddhas in Bamiyan have been blown up and the National 
Museum in Baghdad has been ransacked. 
In addition to the many, many thousands killed, raped or disabled and the 
millions displaced in the wars in the former Yugoslavia (Rechel, Schwalbe and 
McKee, 2004: 540), thousands of homes, monuments, civilian buildings, religious 
buildings and museums and galleries were deliberately damaged or destroyed 
(Riedlmayer, 1996: 88; Šulc, 2001: 162).  In the 1998-1999 war, 70,000 of Kosovo’s 
500,000 homes were reduced to rubble and 207 of its 609 mosques were damaged or 
destroyed (Herscher and Riedlmayer, 2000: 111-112); and in the postwar strife 
between 1999 and 2004, another 730 homes (UNMIK, 2005: 1), and 156 of its around 
1,400 Orthodox churches were damaged or destroyed (Philp, 2007).  Occupied Iraq’s 
descent into civil war was “announced” by the bombing of al-Askari Mosque 
(Ghosh, 2006; North, 2006). 
Supported by conflict archaeologist John Chapman (1994: 122), anthropologist 
Joel Halpern (1993: 6) identified ‘a need for an ethno-archaeology of architectural 
destruction’, which would document the logic and practice of urbicide.  While 
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Halpern’s (1993) original call for action was only rarely answered directly (e.g. 
Brown, 1998: 71; Chapman, 1994: 122; de Condappa, 2006: 6), Chapman’s (1994) 
example was followed by others (e.g. Coningham and Lewer, 1999: 857), and its 
establishment as a field of study is clear in Juliana Nairouz’s (2008) 
ethnoarchaeology of clearance in Palestine and Yannis Stavridopoulos’s (2008) 
research into the destruction of Slavic monuments in Greek Macedonia.  My 
research has involved study of architectural destruction, and does address two 
interrelated crises: the dilemma over knowledge and respect; and the dilemma over 
professional responsibilities and humanitarian duties.  However, unfortunately, 
there is insufficient space to present a history of cultural heritage destruction in 
Cyprus. 
 
1.d. Archaeology in crisis 
 
1.d.i. A crisis of rescue and loss 
 
Archaeology professor Lord Colin Renfrew (2000: 15) found antiquities looting 
to be the greatest threat to archaeology, but he also found the antiquities collecting 
that drove the looting to be aided and abetted by archaeologists and other cultural 
heritage workers, thus constituting a crisis in the profession.  Cultural heritage 
workers were split between those who believed that by working with antiquities 
collectors, they could rescue information that would otherwise be lost, and those 
who believed that by working with antiquities collectors, they would encourage the 
antiquities trade and lose even more information. 
“Looting” is a greatly debated term, which could be used, for example: by 
dominant society to refer to those locals’ excavations that are profit-driven and, 
under state law, illegal (Atwood, 2006; Braden, 2006); or by Indigenous peoples to 
refer to archaeologists’ excavations that are, in community opinion, immoral 
(Deloria, 1992: 595-596; Ferguson, 1996: 71).  While some categorise most of what is 
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commonly referred to as looting as “theft”, and reserve “looting” for those acts of 
theft committed in states of emergency or anarchy, still “looting” retains its 
everyday meaning of “extensive and unselective theft”, a synonym for ransacking, 
plundering, and pillaging. 
Criminologists Simon Mackenzie and Penny Green (2007: 2) define looting as 
‘tak[ing antiquities] illicitly from the ground, or from their place as an integral part’ 
of an ancient site, for whatever reason.  Despite being cited by Mackenzie and 
Green, archaeology professor Lord Colin Renfrew (2000: 15 – emphasis added) 
appears to have a slightly more refined definition of looting as the ‘illicit, 
unrecorded and unpublished excavation of… antiquities for commercial profit’, 
which seems to acknowledge a distinction others have made between collecting as a 
‘hobby or family activity’ and the ‘looting industry’ (Atwood, 2006: 34).  
Nevertheless, both archaeologists and cultural policy experts speak of the ‘looting’ of 
the Iraq Museum (e.g. Polk and Schuster, 2005; Rothfield, 2009). 
Depending upon the time and place, the activity judged most destructive may 
vary between looting (Renfrew, 2000: 15), agriculture and development (Ali and 
Coningham, 2001: 30; Canouts and McManamon, 2001: 99-101); but undocumented 
digging is destructive, and whenever collectors’ craving for antiquities is fed by 
looters (and forgers), knowledge – the very possibility of knowledge – of local and 
global pasts is lost (Renfrew, 2000: 9; see also Gill and Chippindale, 1993).  Rich 
individuals take advantage of poor ones and rich nations amass the heritage of poor 
ones, leaving them still poorer economically and the world poorer socially and 
culturally. 
Aside from individuals and institutions with their own financial interests in 
perpetuating the illicit antiquities trade (Watson, 1997), some cultural heritage 
workers and institutions fund it by purchasing antiquities that are unprovenanced 
(without a collecting history), unprovenienced (without proof of scientific 
recovery), or definitely looted (Lundén, 2004: 220-226; Watson and Todeschini, 
2006).  Some professionals and institutions collude in it by doing work on private 
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and public collections of unprovenienced antiquities that increases the value of 
those collections, thus incentivising collecting (and its consequent looting); and in 
the cases of some universities and museums, by purchasing unprovenienced 
antiquities, which incentivises, funds and underwrites looting (Renfrew, 2000: 16; 
see also Lundén, 2004: 226-234; Muscarella, 2000: 12-15). 
Mayan antiquities specialist Clemency Coggins (1998: 56) more sharply rendered 
the illicit antiquities trade as 
 
the bargain employment of a gang of impoverished looters in 
a remote country, the devastation of a cultural heritage, a 
happy collector and an enriched dealer, and finally, perhaps, a 
tax-deductable role for the object in the local museum, where 
the citizenry gets to subsidize the entire operation. 
 
There have now been wide debates between collectors and dealers of antiquities, 
and archaeologists and conservators (e.g. Tubb, 1995; Robinson, Treadwell and 
Gosden, 2006).  Echoing archaeologist Ricardo Elia’s (1993: 69) observation that 
‘collectors are the real looters’, Renfrew (2000: 74) has rightly insisted that ‘it should 
become widely understood and agreed among academics… that it is unethical and 
immoral to aid and abet the sale of illicit antiquities’, whether by authenticating 
collected objects as geographically, chronologically and culturally-located 
archaeological artefacts, by publishing or citing unprovenienced antiquities as 
exemplary and instructive finds, or by purchasing unprovenienced antiquities (or 
receiving them as tax-deductable gifts). 
Archaeology professors Arlen Chase, Diane Chase and Harriot Topsey (2006: 24) 
believed that ‘[r]esponsible museums and individuals’ had now recognised that 
obligation not to aid and abet the illicit antiquities trade; yet the loss of cultural 
heritage continues, and some powerful and respected public museums and cultural 
heritage workers continue to aid and abet the trade.  However, Cyprus is not only an 
46 
 
exemplary victim of the illicit antiquities trade; it is also an exemplary practitioner 
of disastrous antiquities policy, as I will reveal in my discussion of looting and rescue 
during the conflict. 
 
1.d.ii. A crisis of professional responsibilities and humanitarian duties 
 
Surveying archaeologists’ actions before and during the war on Iraq, Yiannis 
Hamilakis (2003: 107) concluded that there was an ‘ethical crisis in archaeology’, 
because of the ‘principle, now codified in the codes of ethics of most Western 
archaeological organisations, that our primary ethical responsibility is the advocacy 
for and stewardship of the archaeological record’, rather than advocacy for the 
communities who produced and inherited that cultural material.  Agreeing, in 
principle, with Hamilakis’s (1999: 70) prioritisation of ‘the present and the “public”’ 
over ‘preservation of past material remains’, archaeologist Kostas Kotsakis (1999: 98) 
observed that precisely in order to challenge inequality and injustice, 
‘archaeologists… need the grounding of material evidence’ that is being eroded 
daily. 
In certain emergency situations, archaeologists may suffer a crisis over conflicts 
between communities’ cultural and economic rights.  Konstantinos Politis (1994: 15) 
observed that they ‘had difficulty in condemning the villagers of Safi [in Jordan] for 
robbing ancient sites in a desperate effort to feed their families’ (even if, eventually, 
cultural heritage tourism could be a solution to both problems (cf. Politis, 2001: 
267)).  Nevertheless, in many situations, the question is not whether or not it is 
responsible and just to protect cultural heritage, but how cultural heritage may be 
presented responsibly and justly.  Archaeologist of capitalism Mark Leone (1999: 7) 
conceived of archaeological materials as ‘levers for freedom’, which would provide 
us with information on the nature of unfreedom, inequality and injustice, in order to 
be able ‘to argue to those in a dominant position that the evils of the world are their 
fault’ (see also Leone and Potter, 1999). 
47 
 
Near Eastern archaeologists Susan Pollock and Catherine Lutz examined the 
political role of cultural heritage during the UN-mandated war to end Iraq’s 
occupation of Kuwait in 1991 and the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq in 
2003.  Pollock and Lutz found archaeological material commodified as economic 
resources and fetishised as precious objects of intrinsic value even without their 
cultural meaning (1994: 276), and archaeological knowledge used to justify war 
(1994: 274).  Shanks and Tilley (1987a: 191) complained about critical archaeology 
that was ‘political but without any politics’, which tried to correct bias, but not to 
change society.  However, often it is situational or informal: there is no polemic; 
there is no specific politic, or ethic; but there is professional, situational opposition 
to commercialisation, nationalism and militarisation, subsumed under a generic 
archaeological responsibility (e.g. Kohl and Fawcett, 1995a).  Pollock considered that 
archaeologists’ responsibilities went ‘well beyond’ condemning the destruction of 
cultural property, to challenging nationalist and other exclusionary uses of 
archaeology, even at the risk of being ‘used as an expert to espouse viewpoints with 
which one adamantly disagrees’ (2003: 122).  It is those diverse responsibilities I 
wish to explore. 
 
1.d.iii. A crisis of knowledge and respect 
 
Timothy Webmoor (2007) believed that archaeologists were in crisis because 
they had to choose either to make scientific interpretations or, as for instance the 
World Archaeological Congress’s First Code of Ethics required, to ‘recognise 
indigenous methodologies for interpreting… indigenous cultural heritage’ (WAC, 
1990: Art. 6).  Considering the problem to be primarily epistemological (Webmoor, 
2007: 227-228), Webmoor (2007: 237) proposed a pragmatic archaeological 
epistemology, a ‘Darwinian/naturalized’ – or, alternatively conceived, a 
Capitalist/marketised – knowledge, wherein the ‘causal constraints of reality’ would 
spontaneously “select” truths in the ecosystem/market of ideas, so that ‘broadly 
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useful truths serving the practical needs of society w[ould] emerge’.  He gave the 
example of archaeologists ‘universally utiliz[ing] the map despite [it] being a relative 
(i.e. “western”) medium… [b]ecause our experience with maps is that… they work’ 
(Webmoor, 2007: 235 – original emphasis). 
Yet this expected “natural selection” is ill-conceived; there is no “blind 
watchmaker”; it is a matter of ethics – and external reality – after all.  Nationalists 
use ethnic cognitive maps to guide their divisive and destructive behaviours, because 
their experience is that those maps work.  Archaeology cannot simply ‘meet a 
democratic range of purposes’, including ‘economic benefits’ and a ‘contribution to 
national identity’ (Webmoor, 2007: 238), when public truth is not established by 
mere reality.  “Useful truths” are consciously selected by those striving to gain or 
maintain profit and power, deliberately misrepresenting what is useful as truth in 
order to enrich or empower themselves or their communities, and simultaneously in 
order to disenfranchise and disempower others. 
The causal constraints of reality are contrary to and subjugated to the practical 
needs of powerful interest groups within society: cultural heritage with propaganda 
value is appropriated (Michael, 2003: 81-82; Silberman, 1995: 259; Stritch, 2006: 
183); cultural heritage with commercial value is commoditised (Michael, 2003: 81; 
Silberman, 1995: 259); and unprofitable or inconvenient negative heritage is ignored 
(Knapp and Antoniadou, 1998: 33; Silberman, 1995: 260). 
 
How to balance knowledge and respect is not an idle question: for example, the 
Aboriginal Australian Barunga-Wugularr community in Jawoyn Country insists that 
archaeologists ‘must listen to and accept the directions that they are given’ 
(Wiynjorroc, Manabaru, Brown and Warner, 2005: 326; see also Smith and Wobst, 
2005: 392).  An Indigenous American cultural heritage institution, the Hopi Cultural 
Preservation Office, ‘severely restricted the dissemination’ of the results of an 
archaeological survey ‘because its Hopi advisers objected to a “public release which 
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would make [the report] available for scholarly research outside the auspices of the 
Hopi tribe” (Tarlow 2001[b]: 253)’ (Cooper, 2006: 132). 
Indeed, the World Archaeological Congress Committee on Ethics’ (WACCE, 
2007) Draft WAC General Code of Ethics requires that ‘[p]ermission should be 
obtained from the affected community or communities’ for research and 
publication, and concomitantly that ‘[s]hould permission be refused that decision is 
final and should be respected’.  Those articles may be expected to be accepted, 
because they are derived from principles accepted in the World Archaeological 
Congress’s (WAC, 2006) Tamaki Makau-rau Accord on the Display of Human 
Remains and Sacred Objects, but in the Draft General Code, archaeologists would 
have to get permission to display any object, to document or publish any data or 
representations. 
While communities recognised by the Tamaki Makau-rau Accord ‘may include, 
but [are] not limited to, ethnic, racial, religious, traditional or Indigenous groups of 
people’ (WAC, 2006), materials claimable under the Accord are limited to human 
remains and sacred objects, which somewhat restricts the potential for bigots’ and 
extremists’ exploitation of the Accord; yet, by (apparently) giving any affected 
community veto over any archaeological work, WAC may empower nationalists to 
suppress work that exposes their lies and proves their violence.  Archaeologists 
Claire Smith and Martin Wobst (2005: 394) believed that archaeologists had an 
‘obligation’ to promote Indigenous peoples’ agendas, but they went beyond even 
that with their hope that archaeologists’ agendas would ‘look indistinguishable from 
the agendas of the societies with whose past they work’ (see also Webmoor, 2007: 
238). 
As the role of archaeology in nationalism, violence and destruction clearly 
demonstrates, archaeologists’ cooption may lead to attacks upon, rather than the 
consolidation of, the ‘social justice and human rights’ Smith and Wobst seek to 
promote.  It is, of course, understood that Smith and Wobst work in an Australian 
context, and that they do not mean to open up archaeology to political misuse, but 
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as prehistoric archaeologist David Anthony (1995: 85; 88; 93) explained, supporting 
or lending credibility to “harmless” myths (like eco-feminists’ misinterpretations of 
prehistory) provides a platform and a legitimacy to harmful ones as well. 
 
The World Archaeological Congress currently adopts situational ethics (cf. 
Smith, Meskell, Tomii and Huber, 2007).  As Knudson (1984: 244) characterised, 
working up from the moral consensus established by UNESCO’s 1970 Convention 
on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer 
of Ownership of Cultural Property, a situational ethicist assumes the benefit of 
cultural heritage conservation, then makes ethical choices on a case-by-case basis, 
‘pragmatically and relatively’. 
Yet this “pragmatic”, “relative” approach is generating contradictions in WAC 
policy and practice, and divisions in its membership, some of whom fear its ‘co-
opt[ion]’ by multinational corporations (Haber, 2009a: 5; Ronayne, 2008b).  For 
example, WAC accepted funding for and help in organising a conference from the 
Irish National Roads Authority (NRA), an employer a WAC member accused of 
unprofessional practices, some of which went unreported by other archaeologists 
who ‘fear[ed] being sacked, blacklisted, or bullied out of their profession’ (Ronayne, 
2008b; for details, see also Ronayne, 2008a). 
Despite WAC’s commitment to Indigenous rights and social justice, when Rio 
Tinto Zinc (RTZ) sought a relationship with WAC, WAC applied for (and received) 
funding from RTZ (Smith, 2008), a company accused of Indigenous Papuans’ ‘human 
rights violations and… environmental damage’ (Wardhana, 2007).  WAC considered 
acting as ‘trusted brokers’ between the mining company and the affected 
communities, and ‘censored’ a journal article of a member of its own Committee of 
Ethics (Haber, 2009b: 41), Alejandro Haber (2009a: 5), who argued that WAC should 
instead be ‘[n]etworking local resistances’ to RTZ. 
It is notable that, even before these controversies, President Claire Smith (2007) 
had said herself that, ‘[i]f we are to tackle the challenges of a more ethical 
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globalisation, we have to integrate a human rights framework into our practices and 
policies, with a consequent emphasis on shared responsibilities’.  It may or may not 
be ethical for archaeologists to make individual, situational agreements with 
disadvantaged communities; but as historical archaeologist Sarah Tarlow (2001b: 
256) observed, 
 
far right and neo-Nazi groups could employ the WAC Code of 
Ethics as legitimating their own racially exclusive and 
discriminatory political claims….  [T]he principle that, for 
example, “the indigenous cultural heritage rightfully belongs 
to the indigenous descendants of that heritage” (WAC 
principle 5) is one which they would certainly recognise and 
espouse. 
 
Indeed, it could be said that to require nationalists’ consent for archaeologists’ 
work would be absurd, because relationships between archaeologists and nationalist 
communities should be problematical; it could be said that archaeologists should 
expect nationalists to object, even if they should still try to work with nationalists, if 
for no other reason, then because it would make anti-nationalist work easier and 
more effective. 
 
Archaeological work may be designed to benefit communities financially as well, 
as it is in Belize (Bawaya, 2006: 159), and may also be used to reinforce community 
unity and pride, as it has been in anti-colonial struggles and decolonising processes, 
like in Egypt (Trigger, 1995: 272), but it is archaeologists’ responsibility to protect 
and promote the truth (Anthony, 1995: 88; 93), and any economic or political utility 
must be subservient to and derived from historical truth.  As virtue ethicist David 
Cooper (2006: 133) observed, archaeologists cannot promote both their own genuine 
beliefs and others’ contradictory genuine beliefs, because it is inaccurate and 
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insincere (see also Wylie, 2003: 5).  Anyway, if they do not interpret the material 
evidence faithfully, there do not need to interpret the material evidence at all; thus, 
they do not need, indeed, they cannot continue, to be archaeologists. 
Anthony (1995: 93) insisted upon a ‘[s]ocial responsibility’ to tell truths and 
disprove lies.  Anthropologist and museologist Larry Zimmerman, who elsewhere 
advanced communities’ sometimes superior claims to stewardship of cultural 
heritage (cf. Zimmerman, 1989), concurred with Anthony.  Zimmerman (1997: 92) 
defended ecological archaeological explanations of the massacre and scalping of most 
of the inhabitants of an Indigenous American village – as the culmination of a 
conflict over scarce resources between the fourteenth-century ancestors of the Sioux 
and the Arikara tribes – because it was archaeologists’ responsibility to challenge 
inaccuracies in anyone’s history.  Zimmerman (1997: 93) also explained, however, 
that archaeologists had an equal responsibility to avoid creating contrary 
stereotypes; so, in his case, they had to break down the stereotypes of both the 
“Noble Indian” and the “Savage Indian”. 
 
Where cultural heritage workers cannot fulfil their social responsibilities, they 
may be morally obliged to refuse either to conduct research or to publish (at least 
some) results.  Archaeologist Joseph Winter’s humanistic ethic often resembled the 
professional ethic, wherein being scientific was being ethical, but Winter insisted 
that archaeologists ‘not compromise those [others’] rights in our attempts to obtain 
knowledge for the greater good of humanity’ (1984: 45), and that ‘[t]he scientific 
method… cannot decide which ends should be met and which alternatives should 
be used’ (1984: 44).  This could be taken as a justification for the boycott of or non-
cooperation with certain individuals and institutions, or the choice not to conduct 
certain research or publish certain results, as archaeologists may have to refrain from 
producing knowledge in order not to violate, or cause or contribute to the violation 
of others’ rights.  Yet again, archaeologies of nationalism, conflict and violence with 
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many equally-affected communities are not as straightforward as Indigenous 
archaeologies with individual or few primarily-affected communities. 
If an archaeologist cannot get permission from one victim community to conduct 
research within another (perceived aggressor) community and thus refuses to work 
(say, with that community’s institutions), they may be complicit in the violation of 
that community’s cultural rights and in the collective punishment of a community 
not responsible for the acts of extremist elements or state structures.  And if an 
archaeologist cannot get permission from one affected community to publish 
research into another (victim) community and thus refuses to publish (say, evidence 
of the victim community’s suffering at the hands of extremist elements or state 
structures within the uncooperative community), they may be complicit in the 
violation of that community’s cultural rights and in the denial of gross human rights 
abuses. 
 
Archaeologist Paul Healy (1984) categorised ethical responsibilities to host 
governments, to foreign scholars and to the foreign public; and though he did 
recognise ‘undue [academic or financial] pressure’, nonetheless he rejected 
“pragmatic” agreements to unethical contracts as ‘complicity through cooperation’ 
(1984: 126).  He appeared to accept that local archaeologists might be forced to 
‘adhere rigidly to… the “party line”’, and warned foreign archaeologists that the 
consequences of a moral stand might be the loss of the contract, or, more seriously, 
‘trouble’ for local partners of foreign teams (1984: 126), in which case, foreign 
archaeologists’ duties to their research partners might effectively render them as 
unfree as those local partners.  Having reviewed the historical development of 
archaeological politics and ethics, and identified the ethical crises of contemporary 
archaeology, I will now explain my contribution to archaeological politics and 
ethics. 
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1.e. My contribution to archaeological politics and ethics 
 
In my exploration of bicommunal cultural heritage work, I delineate how ethical 
and legal cultural heritage work can be conducted in divided societies, and how 
archaeologists use the law to realise or prevent that work.  Examining the ethics and 
legality of rescue archaeology in occupied and secessionist territories, I identify the 
different types of archaeology being done in northern Cyprus, and scrutinise the 
archaeologists’ ethical and legal defences for their work.  In doing so, I expose the 
effects of the boycott and black list upon the Cypriot archaeological profession and 
its scholarship.  Researching archaeologists’ and other cultural heritage professionals’ 
work upon cultural heritage sites, and writings about those places, I uncover cultural 
heritage work that has hidden damage and destruction, and archaeological writings 
that have denied violence by omission or commission.  Investigating looted 
antiquities’ rescue from their looters and smugglers, and from the art market, I 
reconstruct the process and impact of antiquities policy.  Through that 
reconstruction, I am able to determine the practical consequences and ethical 
validity of the policy, and to work out ethical alternatives. 
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2. The Cypriot context 
 
2.a. A brief history of Cypriot community and conflict 
 
Cyprus is an independent Eastern Mediterranean island in the European Union 
(see map 1).  It is a tight-knit community, where the village or neighbourhood is 
important and the family is central; strangers may receive exceptional hospitality or 
may be abruptly excluded, but if they are accepted into a circle of friends, they will 
experience familial closeness.  Before it was a product economy of farming villages, 
mining villages, and port towns; now it is a service economy with a large tourist 
market in mountain villages, historic towns, seaside resorts and ancient ruins.  Yet it 
is also a historic site of power struggles, population movements, community change, 
and mass violence.  Decades after acute and chronic intracommunal, 
intercommunal, and international violence, the island remains divided and 
occupied, its peace kept by the United Nations (see map 2); thus, it is an ideal site for 
the study of cultural destruction and archaeological ethics. 
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Map 1: continental map of Cyprus 
 
 
Map 2: administrative map of Cyprus 
 
Culture has become so politicised in the conflict that it is difficult to summarise 
even prehistory; nevertheless, a very basic historic outline will show just how 
politicised culture has become.  Nationalist historians teach their own community’s 
‘continuity and tie to territory’ as ‘historically and scientifically proven’, but others’ 
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identities as ‘fictitious, mythical, and a product of propaganda’ (Constantinou and 
Papadakis, 2001: 134).  A historical geography of the Cypriot community will expose 
how inaccurate nationalist beliefs are; and an outline of the Cyprus Conflict will 
provide the skeleton on which to put the flesh of my research. 
 
2.a.i. A historical geography of the Cypriot community 
 
Possibly twelve thousand or more years ago, South-West Asian crop-and-stock 
managing communities visited the island (cf. Steel, 2004: 24; Vigne et al., 2009: 
16135); certainly they settled it by 11,700-10,500 B.P. (cf. Croft, 2002: 173; Vigne et 
al., 2009: 16136), and they developed a distinct culture.  By 4,800-4,300 B.P., there 
was new interaction and influence between Cypriot and South-West Asian farming 
communities (Steel, 2004: 117); and by 3,650 B.P., Cyprus was integrated into the 
Eastern Mediterranean economy (ibid.: 143). 
 
2.a.i.1. Mycenaean Hellenisation? 
 
Hellenist nationalists argue that Cyprus was colonised by Greeks first, and the 
Cypriot people has remained Greek ever since (cf. Bryant, 2004: 194).  Both local 
and foreign philhellenes have ‘widely accepted’ the great change between 3,250 and 
3,050 B.P. (or 1,300-1,100 B.C.E.) as proof of Aegean Mycenaeans’ aggressive 
invasion, colonisation and Hellenisation of Cyprus (Leriou, 2002: 3).  And the 
philhellenes’ archaeological claims work as political claims: if the Mycenaean 
community Hellenised the island, Cyprus is Greek.  ‘Cyprus is Greek for 3000 years’ 
has become a slogan for nationalist organisations like the Cyprus Action Network of 
America (CAN, 2009), and nationalist community groups like Cyprus is Greek on 
Facebook.  In fact, archaeological evidence demonstrates ‘hybridisation’ of 
international cultures, not Hellenisation of the Cypriot community (Steel, 2004: 
193).  Nonetheless, Greek archaeologist Anastasia Leriou (2002: 18) has accepted 
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that a depoliticised, de-ethnicised archaeology of Late Bronze Age cultural change 
‘cannot be achieved’: archaeologists can only ‘open’ the historical narratives, and 
thus the community’s opportunities to understand themselves in non-nationalist 
ways. 
 
2.a.i.2. Many rulers, myriad communities 
 
In his comprehensive four-volume History of Cyprus, British historian George 
Hill (1940; 1948a; 1948b; 1972) documented the evolution of the Cypriot 
community.  The many, mixed and hybridised cultures of the island, which Hill 
recorded, refute both communities’ nationalists’ claims of the Hellenisation or 
Turkification of Cyprus.  Passing over the Persian-Phoenician and Hellenistic 
Egyptian Ptolemaic powers’ later arrivals on and irregular or partial rules in the first 
millennium B.C.E., from the beginning of Roman rule in 58 B.C.E. until the end of 
British rule two millennia later in 1960 C.E., Cyprus was a subject of foreign rule, 
overwhelmingly of one or another greater power, and it was a victim of those 
greater powers’ games.  Throughout two millennia of Cypriot subjection, the greater 
powers and/or the Cypriots occasionally indulged in internationally standard forms 
of mass violence, typically during or immediately after changes in regime (or 
attempts to change it). 
Cyprus also became home to many communities (as it had become home to a 
Jewish community in the Ptolemaic period), for many reasons, from slavery to trade 
to refuge.  (Some, like soldiers, would have been temporary residents; but when the 
temporary community is 12,000 men for 30 years, as it was for the Syrian Emirate’s 
Arab garrison, inevitably some would have had relationships with locals and 
settled.)  Under Roman rule (58 B.C.E.-395 C.E.), Christian Armenians arrived.  
During the Byzantine and Islamic period (395-1185), there came Aramaic Christian 
Mardaites, Muslim Arabs, Jacobites, Syrian Christians, diverse refugees from 
iconoclastic violence, Maronites, more Armenians, and Catholic Latins.  There was 
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no significant population change during the brief tyranny of Isaac Comnenus (1185-
1192). 
By the beginning of Frankish rule (1192-1489), British historian Sir George Hill 
(1948a: 1) found ‘no trace’ of any permanent Arab Cypriot community, but he did 
find Arabic place names, like Kantara and Komi Kebir (ibid.: 1n2), and there are 
other even more obvious places like the Rock of the Arab16 in the Kyrenia 
mountains, and sites like the Mosque of the Arabs17 in Nicosia, and the Christian-
and-Muslim-venerated Church of St. Arab18/Mosque of the Arab19 (Papalexandrou, 
2008: 268).  Accordingly, the Arab Cypriots may have assimilated into another 
community.  Nevertheless, later Frankish Cypriot raids captured and imported 
‘Saracens’ (probably Syrian Arab Muslims) (Arbel, 2000 [1993]: IX – 161), so even if 
the old Arab community had been assimilated, there was a new Arab presence; and 
at least some of the Greek and Jewish slaves traded through Cyprus were freed there 
(Arbel, 2000 [1993]: IX – 156-157; 158).  Apparently, the Orthodox Syrians 
assimilated into the Greek Orthodox community.  During Frankish rule, Latin 
Catholics and Armenians continued to come, and the Armenian Cypriot community 
converted from Orthodoxy to Catholicism; furthermore, many Venetians, Genoese, 
Pisans, Catalans, and Germans arrived, as did Palestinian, Syrian and Armenian 
Franks.  There were Bulgarian, Greek, Romanian Greek and Tatar ‘slaves, serfs’ (Hill, 
1948a: 390); and ‘Black Genoese [freed slaves]’ remained (Hill, 1948a: 10n3), 
including ones from Sudanese and Ethiopian communities, Circassian and Tatar 
communities (Arbel, 2000 [1993]: IX – 165; Jennings, 1987: 290-292).  Under 
Venetian rule (1489-1571), ‘Arnauts [Albanians]’ came (Hill, 1940: 260), whom the 
British imperial commissioner of Limassol, Lord-Lieutenant Roland Michell (1908: 
751), identified as a syncretic Christian-Muslim community; they built a mosque in 
                                                 
16 Arap Taşı. 
17 Araplar Camii. 
18 Agios Arapis (Άγιος Αράπης); or Ekklisia Agiou Arapi (Εκκλησία Αγίου Αράπη); more recently, it 
has been named after Saint Therapon (Agios Therapon (Άγιος Θεράπων)). 
19 Arap Camii; more recently, it has been called Turabi Tekkesi. 
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Limassol, Arnaut Mesjidi.  Macedonians, Coptic Egyptians, Ethiopians/Nubians, and 
Roma came too, at least some of whom were Christian (cf. Jennings, 1993: 394). 
 
2.a.i.3. Ottoman Turkification? 
 
Following the Greek Cypriot nationalists’ Mycenaean foundation myth, there is 
the Turkish Cypriot nationalists’ Ottoman foundation myth: Turkist nationalists 
argue that Cyprus was conquered by Turks last, and the Cypriot land has become 
Turkish since then (cf. Bryant, 2004: 196).  There was a Cyprus is Turkish Party 
(KTP)20; there is a Turkish Cypriot nationalist Facebook group called Cyprus is 
Turkish since 1571; Turkish nationalists consider Cyprus ‘Turkish soil since 1571’21 
(Melis, 2008); and regardless of the fact that it was British soil from 1878 until 1960, 
and independent thereafter, ‘Cyprus is Turkish, will stay Turkish’22 (ibid.; cf. Bryant, 
2004: 196-197, on logics of both communities’ claims).  Turkish nationalist journalist 
Sadi Somuncuoğlu (2010) believed that ‘the statement that “Cyprus is Turkish [since 
1571]” is not a slogan; it is a sociological, historical and cultural fact’23. 
Ironically, the evidence for Ottoman liberalism is evidence against the 
Turkification of the island.  In 1566 and 1569, Orthodox Christian Cypriots had 
unsuccessfully invited Ottoman conquest (Kyrris, 1973: 155); then, through the 
course of 1570-1571, the Ottoman Empire conquered the Venetian Empire’s Cypriot 
colony.  In 1571, Venetian Senator Giacomo Diedo acknowledged that Cypriots had 
endured ‘slavery’, then sneered that they had helped the Ottoman army because the 
Cypriots ‘flatter[ed] themselves that they might find better luck under a new master’ 
(cited in Cobham, 1908: 92; see also İnalcık, 1973: 119-120; Kyrris, 1973: 157); 
indeed, Pafos Castle was captured by Bulgarian, Greek and Tatar serfs/slaves (Arbel, 
2000 [1993]: IX – 161).  Still in the Twentieth Century, before serious 
                                                 
20 Kıbrıs Türktür Partisi. 
21 ‘1571’den... Türk toprağıdır’ (Melis, 2008). 
22 ‘Kıbrıs Türktür, Türk kalacak’ (Melis, 2008). 
23 ‘“Kıbrıs Türk’tür” sözü bir slogan değil; sosyolojinin, tarih ve kültürün belirlediği bir gerçektir’ 
(Somuncuoğlu, 2010). 
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intercommunal conflict developed, even Greek Cypriot nationalists publicly 
recognised that the Ottoman Empire had ‘saved’ the Greek Orthodox community 
(legislative councillor Ioannis Kyriakides, 18th June 1903, CO 69/17: 347, cited in 
Nevzat, 2005: 49). 
Like every other contemporary military, the Ottoman army committed 
atrocities, here against the Latins and collaborating Orthodox.  (Naturally, I do not 
defend such barbarous acts.  I merely note that they were standard practice for 
keeping power at that time; they were not automatically evidence of a desire to 
eliminate other communities.)  The Ottoman administration also expelled or 
converted its Latin enemy (the expelled including thousands of enslaved Venetian 
soldiers (Jennings, 1993: 240)), and converted Latin churches to Ottoman mosques.  
Yet the Ottoman Empire freed the (predominantly Orthodox Cypriot) serf-slaves – 
more than 80% of the population – and restored the Cypriot Orthodox Church 
(Jennings, 1993: 240; Spyridakis, 1963: 54-55): the Cypriot Orthodox archbishop 
became the both spiritual and political leader of the island, the ethnarch, the ‘real 
Governor’, who ignored the Ottoman governor, the muhassıl (Lacroix, 1853: 82, 
cited in Cobham, 1908: 463; see also Kyrris, 1973: 155); and the ethnarch had an ally 
and equal in the Orthodox Cypriot interpreter and tax officer, the dragoman (Luke, 
1973: 79; see also Nevzat, 2005: 62-64). 
The primary social divisions were class conflicts, not religious tensions (Pollis, 
1979: 49-50): the local religious (majority Christian) and imperial administrative 
(majority Muslim) elites fought amongst themselves for power over the poor, and 
Christian and Muslim peasants struggled together against the oppressive elites 
(Kitromilides, 1977: 40).  Indeed, the harsh repression of the Greek Cypriot 
revolution of 25th March 1821, for example, was not standard Ottoman policy; it was 
the Muslim Cypriot administrators’ opportunistic attack on their rivals, the Cypriot 
Orthodox Church (Koumoulides, 1973: 149-150). 
After the Ottoman conquest, not 30,000 (e.g. Spyridakis, 1963: 54), but fewer 
than 4,000 Ottoman military forces stayed on the island (cf. Jennings, 1993: 214).  In 
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order to replace the Black Death-depleted, war-ravaged population, and the 
displaced Catholic Cypriot communities, thus to improve the economy (not to 
Turkify the island), both Muslim (Kızılbaş Alevi Türkmen) and Christian Ottoman 
communities were resettled there (Hill, 1972: 18-20; Jennings, 1993: 214; 232; 
Nevzat, 2005: 50-52).  Girolamo Dandini visited the island in 1596 and 1597 and 
estimated its entire Muslim population as 12,000-13,000, ‘most’ of whom were 
converts, not settlers (1685 [1656], cited in Cobham, 1908: 182).  (Corroborating that 
number, Joannes Cotovicus visited the island in 1598 and 1599 and estimated its 
male Muslim population as 6,000 (1619, cited in Cobham, 1908: 197); in addition, 
those numbers seem to fit with tax records (Jennings, 1993: 197).) 
Under Ottoman imperial rule (1571-1878), individuals were categorised by 
religious community24, and treated differently because of that differential treatment.  
There was a trend towards conversion to Islam, but it was evidently not simply a 
sign of fear and oppression, not simply a cover for secret Christianity (crypto-
Christianity), because there was also Muslim-Christian conversion.  
Correspondingly, the syncretic Christian-Muslim Linobambaki25 Cypriot community 
grew under Ottoman rule; by the end, there were more Linovamvaki Cypriots than 
Latin Cypriots (cf. Baker, 2003 [1879]; Michell, 1908: 754; see also Bryant (2004: 65), 
whose archival research suggested the Linovamvaki community was ‘about twice’ as 
large as Baker’s and Michell’s guesstimates of 1,200-1,500).  (Again, it cannot have 
been mere political or economic convenience, because while the Linovamvaki 
community shrank under British rule, nevertheless it continued to exist.) 
Ottoman Jews settled on the island (e.g. Jennings, 1993: 224).  Also, the island 
continued to be a site of exile, as liberal Babist sect Muslims were relocated there, 
and similarly Muslim Circassians.  Likewise, it was a place of exile or escape for 
political communities; for example, first Turkish reformists escaping Ottoman rule, 
then Ottoman revivalists escaping Turkish rule, fled to the island (An, 2005b: 10-11; 
                                                 
24 Millet. 
25 Phonetically, it is transliterated “Linovamvakoi (Λινοβάμβακοι)”, which means Linen-
Cottons/Linsey-Woolseys (two different materials woven into one); sometimes they were categorised 
as Crypto-Christians. 
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Bryant, 2004: 33).  The Mevlevi Muslim community continued through the British 
period, but by the end, Islamic historian Charles Beckingham (1957a: 82) saw no 
Bektaşı, Kadiri or Nakşıbendi Muslims, and heard that the Babist Muslims had 
assimilated into the Turkish Cypriot community.  British historian Sir George Hill 
(1972) did not note any significant population change under British imperial rule 
(1878-1960); but obviously a British colonial community was established.  Like the 
Ottoman Empire, the British Empire was international and multicultural; for 
instance, the first British occupation troops were Indian Army soldiers (Borowiec, 
2000: 20). 
 
2.a.i.4. British divide and rule? 
 
A large majority of Greek Cypriots greatly blame, and a majority of Turkish 
Cypriots somewhat blame, British colonial government’s (1878-1960) policy of 
divide-and-rule26 for the Cyprus Problem (cf. Hadjipavlou, 2007: 354); the policy’s 
influence is noted in Greek Cypriot government documents (e.g. ROCMOI, 1999: 3), 
and Turkish Cypriot school textbooks (e.g. Samani, Oğuz ve Baki, 2006: 19, cited in 
Vural and Özuyanık, 2008: 148).  That could seem counter-intuitive, since British 
colonialism ended the religious divisions of Ottoman imperialism, under which 
Christians had to pay special taxes, wear certain clothes, and obey other religion-
specific rules (cf. Nevzat, 2005: 53n151).  Moreover, historiographers have referred 
to a British colonial ‘refusal’ to recognise Greek Cypriots as ethnically Greek 
(Michael, 2005: 4), and historians have recorded that individuals were categorised as 
religiously-X or linguistically-Y Cypriots, but not as ethnically-Z Cypriots, or as 
geographically-Cypriot Greeks or Turks (cf. Demetriadou, 1998: 176). 
Certainly, in the Legislative Council, there were Christian Cypriots and Muslim 
Cypriots, alongside British colonials.27  However, in official documents, British 
                                                 
26 In Greek, “diaírei kai vasíleve (διαίρει και βασίλευε)”; in Turkish, “böl ve yönet”. 
27 Between 1878 and 1882, the council had a British government majority with an appointed Cypriot 
minority; then it had an elected Cypriot majority between 1882 and 1931 (9 Christians, 3 Muslims, 
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Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies Winston Churchill identified ‘Greek’ (and 
‘Moslem’) populations (1907, cited in Akgün et al., 2005: 10), and British Governor 
Ronald Storrs (2006 [1932]: Para. 60) identified (‘Greek Orthodox’ and) ‘Turkish’ 
villages.  Indeed, in an official memorandum, British Colonial Secretary Arthur J. 
Dawe explicitly acknowledged not only the existence of ‘[t]he Divide and Rule 
System’28 but also its dependence upon ‘keeping alive the racial hostilities’ between 
‘Greeks’ and ‘Turks’ (CO 883/8, 29th April 1929: 105, cited in Nevzat, 2005: 335).  So, 
ethnic identities were officially recognised, if only for the British Empire to be able 
to exploit them, in order to perpetuate the colonial occupation.  Cypriots’ religious, 
linguistic and ethnic identities were conflated; and religious leaders were confirmed 
as ethnic leaders. 
Nevertheless, Cypriots could defeat divide-and-rule: the Legislative Council’s 
nine/twelve Christian Cypriots and three Muslim Cypriots could form a majority 
against its six/nine British colonials.  Indeed, the Cypriot members did vote together 
in their economic interests (An, 2005a: 1), or two Turkish Cypriots would support 
the British minority, but one would absent, thereby protecting the Greek Cypriot 
majority (Nevzat, 2005: 124); thus, they defeated British colonial policy.  At the very 
least, the Cypriot councillors forced the British Empire either to be inventive, to 
incite nationalist demands for intercommunal non-cooperation (cf. An, 2005a: 1), or 
to behave straightforwardly, to impose its will through Royal Order (e.g. Storrs, 
2006 [1932]: Para. 5).  On other occasions, the logic of divide-and-rule would be 
disproved by intracommunal divisions, as one team of both Christians and Muslims 
against the British would align themselves against another team of both Christians 
and Muslims allied with the British (Nevzat, 2005: 124).  The Turkish Cypriot 
councillors voluntarily supported the British colonials when and ‘[p]robably 
because’ Greek Cypriot proposals for reform included demands for enosis 
(Demetriadou, 1998: 337). 
                                                                                                                                               
and 6 Britons between 1882 and 1925; 12 Christians, 3 Muslims, and 9 Britons between 1925 and 
1931; cf. Beckingham, 1957a: 69); after the October 1931 riots, an appointed Advisory Council was 
established in 1933. 
28 ‘The Divide et Impera System’ (CO 883/8, 29th April 1929: 105, cited in Nevzat, 2005: 335). 
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The British colonial administration wanted universal non-nationalist education 
on the island (Bryant, 2004: 161); yet even after the Greek Cypriot uprising of 1931 
elicited repressive colonial policy, the colonial authorities only interfered in 
education after ‘provocation’ (ibid.: 164).  Education continued to be controlled by 
nationalist institutions; Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot school textbooks were 
official Greek and Ottoman/Turkish school textbooks (An, 2005b: 10; Bryant, 2004: 
162).  During this period, first the Orthodox Church, then also the Ottoman Empire, 
and later the Turkish Republic, as well as activist communities, managed or funded 
institutions, clubs, societies and newspapers, which promoted Christian Hellenism, 
Islamic Ottomanism, or secular Turkism. 
So, the Greek Orthodox Church and its allies trained Orthodox Cypriots as 
Cypriot Greeks, ‘apostles of the Great Idea’29, the unification of Cyprus (and all other 
supposedly Greek territories) with Greece (Foni tis Kyprou30, 2nd March 1901, 
translated and cited by Bryant, 2004: 144).  Similarly, Ottomanist institutions, like 
the Unity and Progress Club (ITC)31, trained Muslim Cypriots as Muslim Ottomans 
(cf. An, 2005b: 10-11).  Then, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of 
the Turkish Republic, schooling from the ‘motherland,.... Turkey’, educated Muslim 
Ottomans as Cypriot Turks (Söz, 19th March 1931, translated and cited by Bryant, 
2004: 176).  Implicitly acknowledging the diversity of the community while trying 
to eliminate it, school signs urged children, ‘let’s talk Turkish’32 (cited in 
Beckingham, 1957b: 170).  Turkish Cypriot nationalists ‘reproached’ Galinoporni’s 
hoca for praying with local Orthodox priests and its villagers for offering the priests 
hospitality, because their ‘behaviour contradicted those who declare[d]’ coexistence 
impossible (Eleftherotypía, 5i Aprilíou 1958, translated and cited by S. Theodoulou, 
2001). 
                                                 
29 I Megali Idea (η Μεγάλη Ιδέα). 
30 Η Φωνή της Κύπρου. 
31 İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, in Ottoman Turkish; in Republican Turkish, Birlik ve İlerleme 
Derneği. 
32 ‘Türkçe konuşalım’ (Beckingham, 1957b: 170 tarafından belirtilen). 
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Unlike in India, where British colonial authorities precisely classified, controlled 
and concretised minute differences within the country riven by religion, ethnicity, 
language, and caste (e.g. Cohn, 1996: 55; 100; 110), it appears that in Cyprus, the 
authorities carelessly conflated diversity.  At the same time, local nationalist 
communities actively intimidated individuals into conforming to appropriate sets of 
identities, exemplified by the need for Linovamvakoi to become either Greeks or 
Turks (cf. Bryant, 2004: 64-66).  Thus, the Ottoman Empire’s Greek-speaking 
Orthodox Christians became the British Empire’s Greek Cypriots, and the Ottomans’ 
Ottoman/Turkish-speaking Muslims became the Britons’ Turkish Cypriots; the 
Armenian, Latin and Maronite Catholic communities maintained their existing 
ethno-religious community identity. 
By the end of British rule, more than 570,000 Cypriots lived in six towns and 619 
villages (cf. maps 3a-8); 77.1% of the population were Greek Cypriot (including the 
constitutionally-recognised minority communities, which consisted of 4,000 
Armenian Cypriots, 1,100 Latin Cypriots and 2,752 Maronite Cypriots), 18.2% were 
Turkish Cypriot (including the unofficial minority communities, which comprised 
an unknown number of Linovamvakoi and 520 Roma), and 4.7% were Other (e.g. 
British) (cf. Cucó, 1992: 17).33  Notably, massive cultural, linguistic and religious 
diversity had been reduced to seven ethno-religious communities.  All communities 
have diverse origins; recognition of a community’s diversity is not denial of that 
community’s existence and identity; indeed, the denial of that community’s 
diversity is a denial of that community’s identity. 
Place names like Arab Village34 (an Arabic-speaking Syrian Maronite settlement 
(Beckingham, 1957b: 169)), Syrian Village35, and Circassian Village36 demonstrate 
that, for generations, minority communities identified and/or were categorised 
primarily as those religious, linguistic, geographical or cultural minorities.  While 
                                                 
33 Including the communities in the British Sovereign Base Areas (BSAs), 77.7% were Greek Cypriot, 
18.1% Turkish Cypriot, and 4.2% Other (Cucó, 1992: 17). 
34 (Klepini/)Arapköy. 
35 Syrianochori/Siryanohor. 
36 Tzerkezoi/Çerkezköy. 
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many minority communities may have shrunk through emigration (like Jewish 
Cypriots, the last of whom died in Cyprus in 1960 (Roman, 2001: 29)), many 
minority Cypriots must have stayed and, over generations, assimilated into the 
remaining community groups.  So, the Greek Cypriot community includes people of 
Coptic Orthodox and Syrian Orthodox ancestry; the Turkish Cypriot community 
includes people of Babist Muslim and Muslim Circassian ancestry; the Latin 
community will include individuals of Palestinian, Syrian and Armenian Frankish 
ancestry; the Armenian and Maronite communities will include individuals of 
Mardaite ancestry; and the Linovamvaki community will include some of Arnaut 
descent; furthermore, all of the recognised communities will include people 
descended from converted members of all of the other communities; and there was 
and is intermarriage. 
British colonial authorities contributed to the simplification of identities through 
their passive failure to recognise differences within and between Greek-speaking, 
Orthodox and Hellenic communities, and within and between Ottoman/Turkish-
speaking, Muslim and Turkic communities; the British also contributed through 
their active attempts to distance the recognised “Greek” and “Turkish” communities 
from each other.  However, Cypriot nationalist movements consciously denied or 
erased diversity within their own community, and actively estranged each 
community from the other.  Indeed, divisive colonial structures only functioned 
during divisive nationalist activity: when one Cypriot nationalist movement 
promoted its nationalist ideals, it caused the other community’s representatives to 
use the British system to protect their own nationalist aspirations.  Thus, instead of 
compromising, or uniting in an anti-colonial struggle, both communities struggled 
against both the British occupiers and their Cypriot neighbours. 
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Map 3a: village map of peninsula, Famagusta district (from ROCDLS, 1960). 
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Map 3b: village map of plains, Famagusta district (from ROCDLS, 1960). 
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Map 4: village map of Kyrenia district (from ROCDLS, 1960). 
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Map 5: village map of Larnaca district (from ROCDLS, 1960). 
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Map 6: village map of Limassol district (from ROCDLS, 1960). 
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Map 7: village map of Nicosia district (from ROCDLS, 1960). 
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Map 8: village map of Pafos district (from ROCDLS, 1960). 
 
2.a.ii. An outline of the Cyprus Conflict 
 
Having explored the evolution of the Cypriot community, it is possible to chart 
the implosion of that community.  Now, I will outline the development of the 
Cyprus Conflict, to provide a framework for understanding the detailed historical 
discussion in later chapters. 
As the Hellenist nationalist campaign developed, there were intercommunal 
disturbances late in the Nineteenth Century, and intercommunal riots early in the 
Twentieth Century; but afterwards, the tension eased quickly.  In time, however, 
Hellenist nationalist elements in Greece and Cyprus formed a secret Greek/Greek 
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Cypriot para-state37; in parallel, Turkist nationalist elements in Turkey and Cyprus 
established an equivalent, secret Turkish/Turkish Cypriot deep state38. 
On 1st April 1955, the Hellenist para-state began a paramilitary campaign for 
enosis39, union with Greece, which Colonel George Grivas’s National Organisation 
of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA)40 led.  Consequently, the Turkist deep state began a 
paramilitary campaign for taksim, partition of the island, which Volkan41, later 
reformed as the Turkish Resistance Organisation (TMT)42, led.  Initially, the 
Hellenist para-state waged a terrorist campaign against the property and personnel 
of the British colonial state (EOKA’s victims including the colony’s Greek Cypriot 
and Turkish Cypriot personnel).  In response, the Turkist deep state conducted a 
violent campaign against the property of the Greek Cypriot community, to 
discourage their nationalist support, and to encourage the nationalist activity of the 
Turkish Cypriot community.  Soon after, both paramilitaries began silencing the 
moderate voices within their own communities; then they started attacking each 
other’s communities. 
On 7th June 1958, TMT committed a fake EOKA attack to excuse a violent 
“reaction”, causing two months of intercommunal violence, during which thousands 
of Cypriots were driven from their homes.  Eventually, there was a Greek Cypriot-
Turkish Cypriot ceasefire on 4th August 1958, a Greek Cypriot-British ceasefire on 
9th March 1959, and the birth of the independent Republic of Cyprus43 on 16th 
August 1960; however, neither the enosist Hellenist para-state nor the taksimist 
Turkist deep state accepted independence. 
                                                 
37 To parakratos (το παρακράτος). 
38 Derin devlet. 
39 I enosis (η ένωσις). 
40 Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών (ΕΟΚΑ)). 
41 Volcano. 
42 Türk Mukavemet Teşkilâtı. 
43 In Greek, “i Kypriaki Dimokratia (η Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία)” (KD (ΚΔ)); in Turkish, “Kıbrıs 
Cumhuriyeti” (KC). 
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The paramilitaries continued to plot and, on 21st December 1963, the Hellenist 
para-state, through the EOKA successor paramilitary named the Organisation44, 
nicknamed Akritas, provoked a clash then started nearly nine months of 
intercommunal violence, in which about 200 Greek Cypriots, but about 25,000 
Turkish Cypriots, became refugees.  The United Nations Peacekeeping Force In 
Cyprus (UNFICYP) arrived on 13th April 1964, but a ceasefire was only agreed on 
10th August, after a Greek Cypriot paramilitary attack on strategic Turkish Cypriot 
villages so severe that the Turkish military intervened. 
In the following years, political violence – overwhelmingly right-on-left – 
continued, but intercommunal peace prevailed.  In Greece on 21st April 1967, the 
Greek para-state held a coup and established a military junta, the Regime of the 
Colonels.  Then in mid-November, the Greek Cypriot paramilitary provoked a clash.  
The clash provided an excuse for the Greek Cypriot National Guard to attack 
strategic Turkish Cypriot villages between 15th and 19th November.  Turkey 
threatened to intervene militarily, so the Greek Junta removed then National Guard 
leader Grivas from the island. Subsequently, on 29th December, the Turkish Cypriot 
leadership declared itself a transitional administration until the achievement of a 
lasting peace.  In 1971, an enosist faction of the Greek Junta/para-state and former 
EOKA leader Grivas started building underground army EOKA B, which started 
fighting President Makarios’s government in 1973. 
On 15th July 1974, the Greek Junta-backed Greek Cypriot paramilitary held a 
coup against the Greek Cypriot government.  On 20th, the Turkish deep state 
directed the Turkish Cypriot paramilitary-assisted Turkish military invasion of 
Cyprus; on 22nd, there was a Greek/Greek Cypriot-Turkish/Turkish Cypriot 
ceasefire, and on 23rd, both the Greek junta and the Greek Cypriot coup regime fell.  
Nevertheless, between 14th and 16th August, the Turkish military conducted the 
second phase of its invasion and occupied the northern Cypriot territory still held 
today.  The vast majority of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots on the “wrong” 
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side fled or were forced to move to the area under their own ethnic group’s 
administration, and the Green Line between the communities remained closed. 
On 13th February 1975, the Turkish Cypriot transitional administration declared 
itself the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC)45; and on 15th November 1983, it 
made the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus (TRNC)46, which the United Nations judged invalid and illegal.  
Hence, the Turkish Cypriot community has endured political non-recognition, and 
economic and cultural embargo.  Interfering with or preventing access to money, 
materials, education/training, and support, the cultural embargo has threatened not 
just the contemporary condition of cultural heritage in northern Cyprus, but the 
very capacity of cultural heritage workers in northern Cyprus to be able to conserve 
or restore historic buildings.  There have been decades of negotiations, bicommunal 
programmes, and the opening of the Green Line on 23rd April 2003; there have been 
successive peace plans, including the most recent failure of the United Nations’ 
Annan Plan on 24th April 2004; and there was a period where both sides’ 
administrations were controlled by political parties historically opposed to conflict 
and division; yet that period is over, and Cyprus remained divided, its communities 
estranged.  The power and freedom of pro-reunification movements questioned, the 
political will of both communities doubted, high-level gossip is about resignation to 
partition. 
 
2.b. Cypriot archaeology 
 
Professional archaeology evolved in parallel with the Cyprus Problem.  
Antiquarians, archaeologists and institutions bent, broke, or cheated the regulations 
of the Ottoman and British administrations, in order to excavate, collect and/or 
trade as many artefacts as possible (e.g. di Cesnola, 1991 [1878]: 66; 120-127; 146-
148; 171-176; cf. Given, 2001: 255; 259; Jerome Farrell, 1909, cited in Merrillees, 
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2005: 196-198).  Study of historiography, participation and work reveals how 
archaeologists were influenced by the conflict, and how they influenced it.  
 
2.b.i. Historiography 
 
The historiography of Cypriot archaeology is important, because it explains 
Cypriots’ understandings of their histories and identities, and thus the influence of 
archaeology upon community relations and conflicts.  During the British colonial 
period, the experience and expectation of nationalism became so naturalised that 
cultural heritage workers interpreted all material remains as the remains of ethnic 
groups, and presumed ‘exclusive and antagonistic.... racial rivalry’ between any two 
ethnic groups (Given, 1991: 185).  Colonial officials and archaeologists ignorantly 
misinterpreted or knowingly misappropriated archaeological evidence to prove their 
empire’s right to rule Cyprus (Given, 2002: 420). 
According to archaeologist Michael Given (1998: 11-15), following British 
colonial policy, British colonial archaeology passed through three stages: an initial, 
colonial Orientalist belief in a primitive, Oriental Cyprus in need of domination 
(1878-1900); a subsequent, popular philhellenic recognition of an educated, Hellenic 
Cyprus, which logically undermined the British Empire’s claim to the right (and 
need) to rule (1900-1930); and consequently, a unitary Cypriotist desire to suppress 
archaeological evidence that could be appropriated by divisive nationalists (1930-
1960).  In their Orientalist belittlement of Cypriots, British imperialists obsessed 
over the “degenerate” Aphrodite goddess cult and her assimilation into “primitive” 
Cypriot tradition as the Milk-Giving Virgin47, but that generated evidence for the 
Hellenist narrative of Greek cultural continuity (cf. Given, 2002: 425-426), even 
though she was actually a syncretic Near Eastern-Cypriot goddess introduced to 
Greece (Webb, 2003: 15).  The united Near Eastern-Cypriot origins of Aphrodite 
recognised, she is still the Greek Cypriot government’s and Greek Cypriot 
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archaeologists’ symbol of the birth of 3200 Years of Cypriot Hellenism (e.g. 
Hadjisavvas, 2003; Papadopoulos, 2003). 
In their Cypriotist attempt to suppress ethnic nationalism, British colonial 
authorities promoted a fabricated ancient, indigenous ‘Eteocypriot’ ethnic group 
(Given, 1991: 186), which would establish the historical reality of a Cypriot nation 
and thus the political justification for a (still colonised) Cypriot state.  Yet the myth 
of the Eteocypriot nation was assimilated into the myth of the Mycenaean invasion 
(Leriou, 2007: 19): British Empire-licensed archaeologists narrated an ancient 
history of an indigenous Cypriot nation assimilated into a colonising Greek nation 
(e.g. Gjerstad, 1948: 432-433); and thus the Cypriot community was supposedly 
scientifically proved to be Cypriot Greek.  Since then, the process of the 
Hellenisation of Cyprus has been questioned (e.g. Catling, 1973), but both publicly 
and academically, the reality of the Hellenisation of Cyprus remains fundamentally 
unchallenged (Leriou, 2002: 3-4; 2007: 3-4; 22-23; e.g. Karageorghis, 2003).  So, 
archaeologies of Cyprus remain Hellenist nationalist archaeologies. 
 
2.b.ii. Participation 
 
Participation in the production of knowledge may be as instructive as 
historiography, because it reveals the influence of Cypriots’ relations and conflicts 
upon the profession.  The four most important (potential) splits in the profession are 
between communities of class, politics, gender, and ethnicity; but since the former 
two are not (significant) splits, I will focus upon the latter two.  Gender inequity in 
Cypriot archaeology has been systematically analysed (cf. Webb and Frankel, 1995); 
unfortunately, the most significant, ethnic inequity has not.  There has been no 
specific study of the history of ethnic participation; nonetheless, it is possible to 
reconstruct that history from notes within various archaeological and historical 
studies, and information in certain professional documents. 
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There are no data on the class origins or political allegiances of Cypriot 
archaeologists; but enough can be known to exclude them as professional splits.  As 
for class, archaeology has always been a middle-class profession elsewhere (cf. 
McGuire, 2008: 100-101; 104; Trigger, 2006: 19-20), and it is possible to affirm that 
(indirectly) in Cyprus.  On the data available, despite access to free university 
education in their respective “motherlands”, the vast majority of Cypriot 
archaeologists achieved their highest degrees elsewhere, primarily Britain and 
France (cf. Alphas and Pilides, 2008: 43); the ability to pay for that education 
indicates middle-class status.  As for politics, it could be impossible or unethical to 
discuss archaeologists’ allegiances, because they are unknown or private; but 
fortunately, it is ultimately unnecessary.  The consistently nationalist narratives of 
Cypriot archaeology show that no non-nationalist archaeologists have successfully 
changed the historical understandings that the profession teaches to the public. 
(Even Eteocypriotism eventually consolidated Hellenist nationalism.)  So, even if 
there are non-nationalist Cypriot archaeologists, the Cypriot archaeological 
community functions as a nationalist community.  The significant splits are in 
gender and ethnicity. 
It was and is common for women to work on archaeological sites in Cyprus; but 
for a long time their presence was largely as workers.  Mirroring the patriarchal 
domestic division of labour, normally, men were archaeologists, technicians, 
supervisors, foremen and excavators, and women were spoil transporters, cooks, 
caretakers and cleaners (cf. Hogarth et al., 1888: 164; Karageorghis, 1999a: 49-51); 
men produced, and women disposed of their waste.  Historically low participation 
by women as archaeologists – ‘rather than... direct discrimination’ – led to 
consequently few publications by female archaeologists (Webb and Frankel, 1995: 
96).  But their low participation was caused by previous direct discrimination, and 
continued indirect discrimination.  Cypriot women were discouraged from 
becoming archaeologists, and female archaeologists were discouraged from working 
in Cyprus: while the first female dig director in Crete was Harriet Boyd Hawes in 
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1900 (Allsebrook, 2002: 94), the first female dig director in Cyprus was Joan du Plat 
Taylor in 1938 (Bolger, 2003: 201); du Plat Taylor had also been the first female 
government archaeologist – Cyprus Museum Assistant Curator – in Cyprus in 1932 
(cf. Åström, 1971: 30).  Nevertheless, women have formed a numerical majority in 
the Department of Antiquities since 1995 (Alphas and Pilides, 2008: 30-31; by their 
ages, they have also made up the majority of the profession since about then).  In 
simple numbers, females appear to have finally achieved approximately equal 
participation (cf. Webb and Frankel, 1995: 95-97 – figs. 2-4; see also Bolger, 2003: 
206 – table 8.1), but they are under-visible in co-authored and collaborative work 
(cf. Bolger, 2003: 209-211 – tables 8.4-8.6).  In addition, women are still under-
represented in the senior levels of the profession (cf. Webb and Frankel, 1995: 98; 
100 – fig. 6).  Furthermore, proportionally, Cypriot women’s publication has actually 
declined (from about 1 in 3 between 1969 and 1979 to about 1 in 5 between 1981 
and 1991; cf. Webb and Frankel, 1995: 97 – fig. 4).  Moreover, there are huge 
divisions within the discipline: crudely, women tend to do things, men tend to do 
theory; and within artefact studies, women tend to do pottery and archaeobotany, 
men tend to do metals and archaeozoology (cf. Bolger, 2003: 207 – tables 8.2-8.3; see 
also Webb and Frankel, 1995: 101). 
Domestic burdens weigh more heavily on women than men, and they interfere 
with archaeological fieldwork even more than with other disciplines’ work (Webb 
and Frankel, 1995: 103), so they limit female archaeologists even more than they do 
anthropologists, let alone other academics, and push women into flexible – but 
insecure and unsupported – jobs within the industry, like artefact studies.  
Nonetheless, women are most disadvantaged by “avoidable” inequities; their roles 
include the ‘dishwashing’ (Dommasnes, Kleppe, Mandt and Næss, 1998: 119), the 
essential but ‘invisible service[s]’ (Karouzou, 1984: 27, translated and cited by 
Nikolaidou and Kokkinidou, 1998: 248), which are either not published at all, or 
used unaccredited within others’ works, or written by the women then published by 
the institution (e.g. museum catalogues).  This phenomenon is most easily seen in 
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the work of academic couples, where the men were the well-known dig directors, 
and the women were the ‘largely unacknowledged’ “dig wives”, who administered 
the excavations as well as their homes (Dever, 2004: 162).  Also, women’s 
cumulative disadvantage generates additional stress that further inhibits their work 
(Webb and Frankel, 1995: 104).  Perhaps most perversely, women’s under-
recognised or completely unacknowledged excavation-digging and artefact analysis 
enables men’s career-advancing dig-directing and theoretical observation (ibid.: 
104).  Nevertheless, women are relatively well-represented in Cypriot archaeology, 
compared with women in other countries’ archaeologies; and they are very well-
represented within Cypriot archaeology, compared with Turkish Cypriots. 
 
Given the Hellenist nationalist narrative of Cypriot archaeology, under-
representation of Turkish Cypriots in the profession might be expected.  However, 
while early Ottomanist ideology had dismissed cultural histories from the pre-
Islamic Age of Ignorance48, from the middle of the Nineteenth Century, European 
Classical studies and archaeologies within the Ottoman Empire piqued Ottoman 
intellectual curiosity (Erciyas, 2005: 180-182).  Furthermore, the subsequent, early 
twentieth-century nationalist Turkish History Thesis49 argued that the ancient 
Turkish nation was the founder of Civilisation, ancient Turkish culture was the 
ancestor of every succeeding one in Anatolia/Turkey, and therefore that the modern 
Turkish nation was the inheritor of all historic cultures in Anatolia/Turkey (Erciyas, 
2005: 181-183; 186-187).  An adopted daughter of then President Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk and a co-founder of the Turkish Historical Society, Ayşe Afet İnan narrated 
the modern Turkish nation’s continuous Anatolian ancestry ‘from Hittites until 
today’ (9th January 1936, cited in İnan, 2005: 141, translated and cited by Baysal, 
2007: 20-21).  While still suffering the 1980 coup regime’s ban on political 
participation, former Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit argued that the medieval 
Turkish Seljuk state ‘internalised... Greek..., Byzantine’, and other cultures in 
                                                 
48 Jahiliyya. 
49 Türk Tarih Kurumu. 
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Anatolia, and that these ‘roots’ grew the ‘tree’ of the modern Turkish nation (1984: 
21, translated and paraphrased by Konuralp, 2009: 110).  This historical narrative led 
to active Turkish practice of Hellenist archaeology and history at least since the 
1930s (cf. Erciyas, 2005: 183-185).  Nevertheless, the Turkish Cypriot community 
became estranged from Cypriot archaeology. 
Foreign scholars knew and studied (an albeit Oriental(ised)) Cyprus for its role in 
ancient Greek and biblical histories (cf. Karageorghis, 1999a: 18; Leriou, 2007: 6-7).  
Their presence, archaeological focus and colonialist narrative were unexceptional; it 
occurred throughout the Middle East and North Africa (Trigger, 2006: 73).  What 
was exceptional and significant was the impact upon the internal Cypriot ethnic 
composition of the profession.  First of all, it is notable that Cypriots were 
incorporated at all, whereas, for example, neither Egyptians nor Iraqis were brought 
into those British colonies’ professional archaeological communities in significant 
numbers (Trigger, 2006: 73).  Furthermore, the ancient-Greek-speaking Christian 
Classical scholars tended to live and work with co-religionists, with whom they 
could communicate – Greek Cypriots (Şevketoğlu, 2000a: 122), so the Cypriots who 
were introduced to archaeology tended to be Greek Cypriots.  Different educational 
systems compounded this social exclusion: university study of archaeology required 
school study of ancient Greek and Latin, which were unavailable in Turkish Cypriot 
schools (Karageorghis, 2007: 47), so no Turkish Cypriots who were interested in 
archaeology were able to train as archaeologists.  Thus, already before 
independence, archaeology became a Greek Cypriot profession (albeit with many 
foreign archaeologists visiting for excavation, survey and other work).  For example, 
in the first Annual Report of the Director of Antiquities, Cyprus (ARDAC) in which 
all senior colonial archaeological staff were listed, all except one – 1936-1960 
antiquities director A. H. S. “Peter” Megaw – were already Greek Cypriot (cf. 
Megaw, 1953: 2); the only subsequent senior non-Greek Cypriot staff were two 
British colonial appointments, 1954-1968 Curium Excavation director Joseph Last 
and 1955-1959 Cyprus Survey director Hector Catling (cf. Megaw, 1954: 2; 1955: 2).  
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In a comprehensive survey of Who’s Who in Cypriote Archaeology (albeit only of 
those still active in 1971), there were no Turkish Cypriot archaeologists at any level 
anywhere; the only Turkish cultural heritage worker listed was Istanbul museum 
curator Haluk Köknar Ergüleç, because he published a study of Cypriot sculpture in 
the city’s museums (cf. Åström, 1971: 32).  The Turkish Cypriot community was 
completely excluded from the Cypriot archaeological community. 
Furthermore, the Cyprus Conflict pushed Turkish Cypriots out of those cultural 
heritage professions in which they had worked.  From 1955, the Greek Cypriot 
paramilitary campaign caused the British authorities to form an auxiliary police of 
increasing numbers and improved pay.  Since the British colonial state and the 
Turkish Cypriot community depended upon each other to defeat the campaign for 
enosis, the British colonial auxiliary police was almost wholly Turkish Cypriot 
(O’Malley and Craig, 1999: 21-22; 35-36).  EOKA attacked Greek Cypriot “traitors” 
and infiltrated the security forces, so Greek Cypriot officers had to leave the police, 
and colonial authorities did not trust those who stayed; simultaneously, colonial 
authorities used severe collective punishment, so the Greek Cypriot community 
increasingly chose to support EOKA (Borowiec, 2000: 37).  At the height of the 
EOKA campaign and intercommunal violence in 1958, the antiquities department’s 
two (and only) Turkish Cypriot craft workers – and even their potential 
colleagues/replacements – joined the police (cf. Megaw, 1958: 4; 6).  By the end of 
1959, three of the department’s nineteen craft workers were Turkish Cypriot (cf. 
Megaw, 1959: 6); and despite some difficulties in staffing, there evidently continued 
to be Turkish Cypriot monument custodians and museum assistants (cf. Megaw, 
1958: 6; 1959: 7).  Yet, after the eruption of intercommunal violence in 1963, all 
Turkish Cypriots left government employment (Karageorghis, 2007: 47). 
Nonetheless, other publications show that there were still a few Turkish Cypriot 
cultural heritage workers.  Turkish Cypriot teacher Hakkı M. Atun (1973) was able 
to present and publish research on Ottoman Cypriot cultural heritage (in a Greek 
Cypriot-run conference and book), but he was only able to continue work because 
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he was employed at a Turkish Cypriot institution, the Turkish Lyceum; likewise 
museum worker Cevdet Çağdaş (1973), because he worked at the Cyprus Turkish 
Museum.   Contrastingly, now known for his 1990 history of the Turks in Cyprus, 
then Ahmet C. Gazioğlu was ‘exile[d]’ between 1967 and 1973 for taking an ‘active 
role in representing the rights of the Turkish Cypriots’ during the intercommunal 
violence (Sentürk, 2003).  While proportions of ethnic participation in non-
archaeological cultural heritage professions are unknown, Hakkı Atun, Çağdaş and 
others’ publications suggest that Turkish Cypriots were not actively excluded from 
the professional community; nonetheless, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot 
professionals were estranged by the intercommunal conflict. 
One of the most fascinating – and potentially one of the most significant – quirks 
in the development of the discipline was triggered by the events of 1974.  The 
fighting during the Turkish army’s invasion, and the displacement facilitating the 
Turkish army’s occupation of northern Cyprus, made displaced northern Greek 
Cypriots the greatest victims within their community.  Since then, official policy has 
pressed northern Greek Cypriot refugees to ‘always feel like refugees’ trapped in 
‘non-places’ (Papadakis, 2006: 11; 10).  There is a ‘common nationalist discourse’ in 
which Greek Cypriots refuse to cross the Green Line to the north, because ‘crossing 
means recognizing the illegal’ Turkish Cypriot administration (Dikomitis, 2005: 8; 
9); and refugee communities are exceptionally active in pressuring others not to 
cross either (Loizos, 2008: 65).  Indeed, one of the Famagusta refugee archaeologists, 
Tasoula Georgiou-Hadjitofi (2000: 229), claimed that ‘[a]s a Cypriot, a refugee from 
Famagusta, I speak for the people of Cyprus’, and said that their greatest loss was 
their loss of cultural heritage. 
Historically, Cypriot archaeology had focused upon northern cemeteries.  Thus, 
in the same way that a(n extremely) disproportionate number of Greek Cypriots 
were familiarised with and employed in archaeology in comparison with Turkish 
Cypriots, so a (less extremely) disproportionate number of northern Cypriots were 
engaged in archaeology in comparison with southern Cypriots.  (Echoing this, a 
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disproportionate number of foreign archaeologists had professional and emotional 
connections with northern Cypriot sites, archaeologists and communities.)  
Necessarily, after 1974, work was concentrated on southern settlements (Knapp and 
Antoniadou, 1998: 32).  Attempting to give work to displaced persons, and to help 
them cope with the catastrophe, antiquities director Vassos Karageorghis (2007: 111) 
re-employed ‘all’ of the archaeologists and support staff, and ‘many’ of the labourers 
(possibly all of them, too, except for Turkish Cypriot labourers trapped on the other 
side of the Green Line; and, more grimly, any casualties).  Thus, a disproportionately 
large element of the Greek Cypriot archaeological community became a refugee 
community (and since displaced persons constituted more than a third of the entire 
Greek Cypriot community, it is plausible that refugees formed the majority of the 
Greek Cypriot archaeological community).  In the next section, I discuss how this 
imbalance in participation affected the practice of archaeology in postwar Cyprus. 
 
Recently, a European Commission project profiled the contemporary 
archaeological profession in the Republic of Cyprus (cf. Alphas and Pilides, 2008).  
At least 52 archaeologists and 15 archaeology students (and 437 support staff) are 
employed in southern Cyprus (ibid.: 26; 199); 69% of the archaeologists are women 
(ibid.: 29; in contrast, women are only 29% of the support staff (ibid.: 58)).  Through 
a continued civil service system of promotion by length of service, older male 
archaeologists had continued to control the Department of Antiquities despite the 
younger female majority.  Equally though, through that same system, female 
archaeologists have now inherited the antiquities department; its director is female, 
as are (through an open system of promotion) the vice-chair of the University of 
Cyprus Department of History and Archaeology and the chair of its Archaeological 
Research Unit.  The project team’s review of ethnic diversity, however, was flawed: 
it was in fact a count of nationalities, so it only identified 41 (79%) of archaeologists 
as ‘Cypriots’ (ibid.: 37), and therefore did not reveal Armenian, Latin, Linovamvakoi, 
Maronite, Roma or Turkish Cypriots’ participation or non-participation.  (Greek 
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Cypriot archaeologists told me that a few Turkish Cypriot archaeology students had 
volunteered on Greek Cypriot excavations.)  Probably primarily due to the Greek 
language proficiency requirements, 8 of the 11 non-Cypriot archaeologists are Greek 
(ibid.: 37).  Foreign excavations and surveys vary from year to year, but currently, at 
least 21 foreign teams bring at least 99 professional archaeologists, 201 archaeology 
students, and 44 support staff to the island (ibid.: 186; but their gender and ethnic 
balances were not documented). 
There has been no similar study of the archaeological profession in the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus, and it is incredibly difficult even to estimate.  Gender 
and ethnic ratios are unknown; Eastern Mediterranean University’s Archaeology 
and Art History Department’s staff seems mostly male, but it has had at least two 
female chairs, and the TRNC Department of Antiquities and Museums has had at 
least one female director.  The TRNC’s poverty might imply a disproportionally 
smaller northern Cypriot archaeological community; but the TRNC has invested in 
higher education as a driver and financer of development (Bıçak, 1995: 165; 167).  
Turkish language proficiency requirements would imply ethnically-restricted 
participation in the work of the TRNC antiquities department.  Yet English-
language instruction at northern Cypriot universities has enabled not only Turkish, 
but also European and American archaeologists’ participation in academic 
archaeology.  (Equally, it has enabled one Greek Cypriot media scholar to work 
there; but no Greek Cypriot archaeologists have done so.)  At least four universities 
– Cyprus International University (CIU)50, Eastern Mediterranean University 
(EMU)51, (private) Girne American University52, and Near East University (NEU)53 – 
teach archaeology and cultural heritage.  However, northern Cyprus’s denial of 
southern Cypriots’ access between 1974 and 2003, and a Hellenist professional 
boycott and black list of TRNC-associated professionals and institutions since 1974 
(discussed below), as well as continuing international economic embargoes and 
                                                 
50 Uluslararası Kıbrıs Üniversitesi (UKÜ). 
51 Doğu Akdeniz Üniversitesi. 
52 Girne Amerikan Üniversitesi. 
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travel restrictions upon northern Cyprus since 1983, have all greatly limited 
participation in (as well as the functioning of) the archaeological profession 
(Şevketoğlu, 2000a: 2; 116; 2000b: 53-54; 55-56). 
So, trying to account for all uncertainties, the island’s permanent professional 
archaeological community is probably fewer than 70 archaeologists and 35 students 
(and 600 support staff).  They are not only geographically but administratively 
divided by ethnicity, and they are almost as completely divided since the opening of 
the borders as before.  Despite being a numerical minority since 1995, men 
continued to dominate the profession until this year; and they still have undue 
influence over theory and methodology.  Women now dominate the profession 
numerically and structurally; but they still do more than their fair share of work, for 
less than their fair share of recognition and reward.  Having explored who works in 
Cypriot archaeology and what they teach the Cypriot community, it is worth 
reviewing how the Cyprus Conflict directly affected the practice of archaeological 
work. 
 
2.b.iii. Work 
 
Archaeology during the Cyprus Conflict can be split into four phases: 1955-1959 
mid-conflict archaeology, 1960-1963 inter-conflict archaeology, 1964-1974 mid-
conflict archaeology, and 1974 onwards post-war (but not post-conflict) 
archaeology.  The changes in archaeology between 1955 and 1974 were the severe 
but temporary results of, or responses to, anti-state and inter-communal violence.  
However, the war of 1974, and archaeologists’ reactions, had terrible consequences 
for archaeology. 
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2.b.iii.1. Archaeological work in the midst of conflict, 1955-1974 
 
From the beginning of the EOKA campaign, cultural heritage workers faced 
‘[d]isturbed political conditions,... terrorism and... a state of emergency’ (Megaw, 
1955: 3; see also Megaw, 1956: 4; 1957: 4; 1958: 4; 1959: 6).  While work on one site 
was disrupted by British security forces’ militarisation of Kyrenia Castle (and their 
use of it as a detention camp), in fact a record five foreign teams worked in Cyprus 
in 1955 (Megaw, 1955: 3; 6); but in 1956, obstructed by the conflict on the island 
(and the Suez Crisis war of Britain, France and Israel on Egypt), no foreign teams 
excavated, and local teams were limited (Megaw, 1956: 4; 8).  In reprisal for a 
communal riot, EOKA assassinated the Turkish Cypriot museum custodian of 
Kolossi Castle (who had not even been involved in the riot), and in reprisal for 
cooperation with the colonial antiquities department (in the restoration of his 
monastery), EOKA assassinated the Greek Cypriot abbot of Chrysorrogiatissa 
Monastery, Epiphanis Georgiades (Megaw, 1956: 4).  More historic sites were 
militarised (again as part of the Suez Crisis as well as the Cyprus Conflict), and some 
places were damaged in security searches for EOKA paramilitaries, arms and 
equipment (ibid.). 
In 1957 and 1958, one foreign team restarted its excavation and the local 
archaeologists extended their work, but otherwise the problems persisted and 
worsened (Megaw, 1957: 4; 1958: 4).  Then, in the ‘lawlessness’ of 1958, communal 
riots forced the closure of two museums and the halt of some conservation and 
restoration work (Megaw, 1958: 4; 6); for example, Famagusta’s Greek Cypriot staff 
could not work at all during the summer peak of the unrest; and its repeatedly 
damaged Church of Agios Georgios Eksorinos was walled up); Turkish Cypriots 
displaced from their homes sought refuge at historic sites and thereby damaged 
them (Megaw, 1958: 4). 
Then antiquities director A. H. S. Peter Megaw (1958: 6) acknowledged that ‘all 
staff’ endured ‘grave strains’ during the emergency, but that was too much of an 
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understatement: then assistant curator Vassos Karageorghis (2007: 58) recently 
observed that (exclusively) Greek Cypriot archaeologists and workers endured 
‘curfews, interrogations and maltreatment’.  Nonetheless, where Turkish Cypriot 
cultural heritage professionals and labourers remained, bicommunal cultural 
heritage work returned in 1959 (cf. Megaw, 1959: 6-7); and the arrival of peace and 
independence in 1960 enabled an increase in cultural heritage work, and in 
communities’ cooperation with cultural heritage professionals (cf. Dikaios, 1960: 5; 
1961: 5; 1962: 5). 
The 1955-1959 Archaeological Survey of Cyprus (or Cyprus Survey) had been 
designed to produce a comprehensive list of cultural heritage sites, a Sites and 
Monuments Record (SMR) (Hector Catling, 9th May 2002, interviewed by Cadogan, 
2004: 18); but the conflict prevented the record’s production.  Expected since the 
end of the previous outburst of violence (cf. Megaw, 1959: 10), the eruption of 
intercommunal violence in 1963 and the consequent enclaving of many Turkish 
Cypriot areas prevented the antiquities department’s archaeological survey branch 
from accessing many cultural heritage sites and museums (cf. Karageorghis, 1964: 3); 
conflict-driven looting forced the survey branch to function as a rescue team 
(Hadjisavvas, 2004: 38; 40).  However, while sites and museums in enclaved areas 
continued to be inaccessible, and foreign excavations were initially reduced to a 
couple of trial runs (cf. Karageorghis, 1964: 3-4), local and foreign excavation work 
rapidly returned to normal and even expanded (cf. Karageorghis, 1965: 3; 1966: 3; 
1967: 5; 1968: 3; 1969: 3; 1970: 3; 1971: 3; 1972: 3; 1973: 3-4).  This boom in 
excavation, too, was a product of (a different) conflict: the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War 
drove foreign archaeologists out of Israel and Palestine and into Cyprus (Davis, 1989: 
166).  Notably, this exodus included Dr. Paul Lapp, who refused to excavate in the 
West Bank under occupation (ibid.); likewise, other archaeologists have refused. 
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2.b.iii.2. Archaeological work across lines of conflict, 1974-present 
 
All archaeological and other cultural heritage work in northern Cyprus was then 
‘violently interrupted’ by the 1974 coup and invasion (Karageorghis, 1974: 3), and 
has remained so because of the Turkish army’s occupation.  Three foreign teams 
completed excavations, but three finished early, and nine never started (ibid.: 7-8).  
Sites and museums in northern Cyprus became inaccessible to the island’s entire 
professional archaeological community (ibid.: 4; though formerly enclaved Turkish 
Cypriot areas in southern Cyprus became accessible (Karageorghis, 1975: 7-8)); and 
the Cyprus Museum, in the south but close to the Green Line, was evacuated 
(Karageorghis, 1974: 4; it remained closed for two years (Karageorghis, 1976: 10)).  
Greek Cypriot antiquities director Dr. Vassos Karageorghis and Turkish monument 
inspector Prof. Ekrem Akurgal tried to work together to monitor the condition of 
monuments in the occupied areas, but the Turkish ambassador made it impossible 
and, later, internal Turkish politics left Akurgal powerless (Karageorghis, 2007: 119; 
150).  Still, (at least some) foreign archaeological teams who had been working in 
the north inspected their occupied archaeological sites there, and UNESCO made a 
(restricted) sample survey of cultural heritage sites across the island (Karageorghis, 
1974: 4; 3).  (I discuss the UNESCO survey in much greater detail in the chapter on 
the Subversion of Scholarship, in the Bowdlerisation of Jacques Dalibard’s UNESCO 
reports (5.a).) 
No foreign teams who had been working in the north before the war did so again 
afterwards (Karageorghis, 1975: 10).  The Greek Cypriot antiquities department 
threatened them and their colleagues with international blacklisting for digging in 
the north (cf. Karageorghis, 2007: 118), and gave them licences to dig other sites in 
the south instead (Karageorghis, 1976: 3).  Soon, there were more teams digging in 
southern Cyprus than there had been digging throughout Cyprus before the 
invasion (ibid.: 6-7).  Indeed, the Republic of Cyprus Department of Antiquities 
allowed an American academic association, the American Schools of Oriental 
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Research (ASOR), to establish the island’s only foreign archaeological school (and at 
the time, its only academic archaeological centre), the Cyprus American 
Archaeological Research Institute (CAARI), in order to organise and support the 
massive foreign presence (Davis, 1989: 169; Harris, 1989: 159; Karageorghis, 1978: 3), 
which still now outnumbers the local archaeological community (Alphas and 
Pilides, 2008: 186).  In contrast, northern Cyprus lacks even the most basic tools of 
cultural heritage protection, like an underwater archaeological site inventory 
(Harpster, 2008: 8).  The legal context of cultural heritage work in northern Cyprus, 
and archaeologists’ careful appropriation of international law, have created massive 
practical and ethical difficulties in archaeology in Cyprus. 
 
2.c. International law 
 
In order to understand the changes in cultural heritage work from 1974 
onwards, it is necessary to understand the international law which Cypriot 
archaeologists have used to direct the development of their discipline.  Parts of 
customary international law applicable to all, the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions 
respectively require occupying powers to ‘protect’ and ‘safeguard’ ‘real property’, 
that is immovable property, buildings (IUHPC, 1899: Ch. V, Sec. III, Art. 55; 1907: 
Ch. V, Sec. III, Art. 55).  The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO, 1999) has stated that the 1954 (Hague) Convention on the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict required that powers 
‘occupying territory must preserve cultural property in that territory’.  Yet in the 
relevant clause of the 1954 Hague Convention, which was carefully thought-out but 
poorly worded, the Intergovernmental Conference on the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict only required an occupying power to 
‘support the competent national authorities’’ cultural property protection, and to 
conserve war-damaged sites ‘in close co-operation with such authorities’ 
(ICPCPEAC, 1954a: Ch. I, Art. 5).  The Convention did not explicitly allow the 
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occupying power to work independently.  So, the national authorities of an occupied 
territory could refuse to do any cultural heritage work in the occupied territory, and 
then argue that international law prohibited the occupying power from doing even 
emergency work. 
In its subsequent, carefully-worded but poorly-thought-out New Delhi 
Recommendation, UNESCO urged an occupying power to ‘refrain from carrying out 
archaeological excavations’ (1956: Art. 32).  The 1956 Recommendation explicitly 
banned an occupying power from conducting archaeological site preservation, 
which the 1954 Convention had implicitly required.  So, the occupying power could 
not do emergency archaeological work (theoretically, not even with the consent, or 
indeed upon the request, of an occupied power).  As I will demonstrate, the 
Hellenist archaeological community ignored customary international law, and used 
the letter of the 1954 law and 1956 guideline, rather than their spirit, in order to 
shut down all archaeological activity and most heritage work in northern Cyprus. 
Since 1999, the ICPCPEAC’s Second Protocol to the Hague Convention has more 
judiciously required occupying powers to ‘prohibit and prevent... any archaeological 
excavation, save where this is strictly required to safeguard, record or preserve 
cultural property’, and that cultural heritage work ‘shall, unless circumstances do 
not permit, be carried out in close co-operation with the competent national 
authorities’ (1999: Ch. 2, Art. 9 – emphases added).  The 1999 law enabling 
occupying powers’ rescue archaeology and heritage conservation did make the letter 
of the law embody its spirit; but it was too late for Cyprus.  In 1983, the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) had declared itself independent; and the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC, 1983) had declared the ‘purported 
secession.... legally invalid’.  The occupied territory of northern Cyprus became an 
illegal entity, which the Security Council required ‘all States not to recognize’ 
(ibid.).  As I will show, the Hellenist archaeological community also used the 1983 
Security Council Resolution against the secession of the TRNC to prevent any 
archaeological activity and most heritage work in northern Cyprus.  I will also 
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examine significant exceptions that reveal archaeologists’ careful appropriation of 
international law, and that bring into question both their use of the law and the 
ethics of consequent, contemporary Cypriot archaeology. 
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3. Methods and methodology 
 
Archaeology is a powerful metaphor for correcting historical propaganda, for 
exposing crimes and righting wrongs.  Greek Cypriot anti-nationalist photojournalist 
Tony Angastiniotis observed that ‘leaders must have control of the sources’ in order 
to ‘hide their wrong doings’ (2005: 13), their ‘propaganda machine[s]… burying 
unpalatable truths deep beneath the ground’ (2005: 31); and that communities must 
‘dig the past’ in order to uncover those unpalatable truths (2005: 13). 
I work on the methodological assumption that, although historical truths exist, 
any representation of those truths must select which facts to present, and in which 
context.  Yet some histories deliberately limit their source material and their 
interpretative framework (or simply lie) in an unprofessional and unethical way, in 
order to advance an individual and/or community cause.  Consequently, other 
histories are incidentally limited by their access to data, and their freedom to explain 
that information.  Nonetheless, there has been ‘little attention’ to either methods or 
methodologies in historical archaeology (Archer and Bartoy, 2006: 1). 
As a feminist as well as a human rights archaeologist, I practice a ‘human rights 
methodology: “promoting change by reporting the facts”’ (Thomas, 1993: 83, cited 
by Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 45; see also Nelson, 2004: 11-14).  Like Angastiniotis, I 
dig up the past to reveal wrong doing and to disrupt propagandists’ control of 
information, to give communities the tools to reconstruct their own histories.  A key 
tool I need to give my readers, then, is an understanding of how I did my research, 
how I produced this history of archaeologists’ treatment of historic sites, of social 
violence against community places, and of the illicit trade in cultural objects; and 
why I did it in the way I did. 
 
Although the development of theories and the collection of data happen and 
influence each other simultaneously, primarily theory-driven archaeology may 
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carelessly include, exclude, or interpret data in a way that unjustifiably affirms the 
original theory (Archer and Bartoy, 2006: 5-6). 
I did not have a personal, political or professional interest in validating or 
falsifying any particular claim.  Working with a body of literature and in a 
community of knowledge riddled with as many myths as truths, I could not presume 
the truth of any claim (even one of a trustworthy source).  I used theory and 
methodology to prepare for data collection, used the data to revise my theories and 
methods, and used the most appropriate theories to explain the documented events, 
practices and processes. 
Still, even visible, physical evidence could be misleading; and uninterested 
professional sources could be mistaken.  Not only did I partially refine or wholly 
disprove some non-nationalist professionals’ evidence-based claims; but also 
nationalist locals occasionally corrected my non-nationalist source-led 
interpretations.  (Anthropologists ‘typically exclude’ everything they consider to 
‘undermine the[ir] credibility’ (Argyrou, 1999: S30); but I believe that honesty – to 
the point of the inclusion and discussion of points of confusion, error and self-
censorship – demonstrates credibility, and thereby earns trust in claims of fact.) 
Before I discuss my methods and methodologies, it may help to explain what 
materials I studied, and with which professionals I conducted my research. 
 
3.a. Cultural heritage, and cultural heritage workers 
 
Archaeologists study the material remains of past human activity, the objects, 
buildings and landscapes produced, reproduced and reworked by individuals, groups 
and institutions, as well as all of the other material residues of those actions.  While 
the discipline began as the study of the ancient past, it has broadened its horizons to 
look at all of the human past, up to the present (as even the events of moments ago 
have entered the contemporary past). 
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Public archaeology or community archaeology is that archaeology done in the 
public sphere, with citizens, communities and interest groups, civic institutions and 
the state, negotiating economic and political conflicts (Ascherson, 2000: 2; 
Merriman, 2004: 1-5; Moser et al., 2002: 220; Schadla-Hall, 1999: 147). 
Cultural heritage workers may talk about “archaeological heritage”, “cultural 
heritage” and/or “cultural resources”.  Sometimes, they use the terms 
interchangeably; other times, they distinguish between archaeological sites and 
historic buildings, or between tangible heritage like objects, buildings and 
landscapes, and intangible heritage like music, dance and language (Carman, 2002: 
14-16; King, 2005: 83-87). 
Here, thus, while “archaeologists” are those who primarily study the material 
remains of past human activity, “cultural heritage workers” comprise: archaeologists; 
architectural historians and historical architects; anthropologists, ethnographers and 
sociologists; conservators; community stewards; civil servants; and others.  Those 
workers sometimes occupy more than one position, or move between those fields, or 
work outside their discipline’s boundaries, and, furthermore, may categorise each 
other differently. 
I myself trained and worked in archaeology, then trained and worked in cultural 
heritage, then trained as a social researcher and conducted this socio-legal research 
into archaeology and cultural heritage, partly using archaeological and architectural 
survey techniques and historical and ethnographic research methods. 
Friends, colleagues and locals and I myself found it difficult or impossible to 
“place” me within one professional community or another and, much like 
ascriptions of ethnic identity, I was often categorised negatively.  I was not Greek 
Cypriot, not Turkish Cypriot; I was English, but I was not very English.  I was not a 
historian, not an anthropologist; I was an archaeologist, but I was not really an 
archaeologist. 
My otherness influenced interactions, and variously denied or gave me access to 
information.  My position has been introduced in my intellectual autobiography and 
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will be further explained in the methodology, and the resulting opportunities will be 
explained in the methodology and during the presentation of my data. 
 
3.b. Sources 
 
3.b.i. Library research 
 
Library research is immediately difficult, because publications of the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus are neither published as widely, nor published in as 
many languages, nor stocked in as many libraries, as publications of the Republic of 
Cyprus. For example, I only heard about the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
Presidency Political and Cultural Researches Department’s54 (TRNCPPCRD, 2006) 
Erasing the Past55 just before I left the island in 2008; and I only heard about Hasan 
Fehmi’s (2003) Our Remaining Assets in the South56 afterwards, when I had no 
prospect of going to northern Cyprus to be able to find it. 
Library research is even more difficult because the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus is not internationally recognised, so TRNC publications are not 
internationally recognised, and archaeologists understand TRNC publications cannot 
formally be cited (e.g. Gordon, 2008: 12n31; Knapp and Antoniadou, 1998: 34n1).  
Furthermore, frequently, those publications simply cannot be found outside 
northern Cyprus, or at least outside Cyprus; for copies of the Journal of Cyprus 
Studies delivered to southern Cyprus after I left the island (albeit published the year 
I arrived), I had to read unpaginated and sometimes corrupted articles on electronic 
library websites. 
There are few published sources other than propaganda, however, that discuss – 
or even acknowledge – these and other practicalities.  Thus, there are few 
corroborating sources for the claims of my contacts.  When I comment upon the 
                                                 
54 Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı Siyasi ve Kültürel Araştırmalar Bölümü. 
55 Geçmişi Silmek.  
56 Güneyde Kalan Değerlerimiz. 
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practicalities of work in a divided society, I am commenting only upon the 
practicalities, not upon the cultural heritage workers who have publicly recognised 
them. 
Sometimes sources only identified “a church” or “a mosque”, occasionally by 
describing their location, but that was not always helpful, because many street 
names have been changed; for example, some southern Cypriot streets are now 
named after people and places from ancient Greek mythology, like the Street of Lord 
Ali57 is now the Street of the Valleys58 in Nicosia, renamed ‘after 1974, when almost 
all the Turkish Cypriots were dislocated to the north’59 (Greek Cypriot coffee shop 
owner, cited in Philippou, 2005: 104; see also Papadakis, 2005: 169), and some 
northern Cypriot streets are now named after ‘Turks who fell in battle’ 
(Ormancıoğlu, 1977: 4). 
 
3.b.i.1. Newspaper sources 
 
Throughout the conflict, there have been media reports of destruction of 
community places, most easily seen in their collations within propaganda.  
Naturally, reports of violence against Greek Cypriot places are collated in Greek 
Cypriot propaganda (e.g. ROCPIO, 1997) and reports of violence against Turkish 
Cypriot places are collated in Turkish Cypriot propaganda (e.g. TRNCSCS and 
TRNCDAM, 1986).  Still, there are interesting differences. 
Official, semi-official and unofficial Greek Cypriot propaganda all used 
international sources like the (London) Times and the New York Times more than 
Turkish Cypriot ones like Olay and Ortam, all of those far more than Greek Cypriot 
sources; and they concentrated on the destruction of Greek Cypriot places. 
                                                 
57 Ali Ağa Sokağı. 
58 Odos Tembon (Οδός Τεμπών); Tempea/Tempi (το τεμπέα/τα τέμπη) was a valley in which Greek 
soldiers tried to stop a Persian invasion in 480 B.C.E. 
59 ‘[M]eta to 1974, otan schedon olio oi Tourkokyprioi metakinithikan sto voreio [μετά το 1974, όταν 
σχεδόν όλοι οι Τουρκοκύπριοι μετακινήθηκαν στο βόρειο]’ (Ellinokypria idioktitria kafeneiou, 
anaferetai sto Philippou, 2005: 104). 
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Similarly, unofficial Turkish Cypriot propaganda preferred international to 
Greek Cypriot sources, and Greek Cypriot to Turkish Cypriot ones; equivalently, it 
focused on the destruction of Turkish Cypriot places.  Official Turkish Cypriot 
propaganda, however, seemed to favour Greek Cypriot sources, like the Cyprus Mail 
and the Cyprus Weekly, and, almost exclusively, focused upon refuting Greek 
Cypriot accusations or reflecting them back upon the Greek Cypriot side. 
 
Partly because I moved around frequently and couldn’t build a newspaper 
archive myself, and partly because wherever I was, I could not easily or affordably 
access the paper copies of the majority of relevant newspapers, I largely depended 
upon electronic archives.  Beyond general reading of British, Cypriot, Greek and 
Turkish newspapers, I mined the British Library archives of the Guardian (1821-
2003) and the Observer (1791-2003), the Times (1788-2010) and the New York 
Times (1851-2006), and identified hundreds of potentially relevant stories (amidst 
hundreds more keyword matches).  I searched for articles including the keywords: 
 
“Cyprus”, “bomb”/“bombed”, and “home”/“homes”; 
“Cyprus”, “burned”/“burnt”, and “home”/“homes”; 
“Cyprus”, “destroyed”, and “home”/“homes”; 
“Cyprus”, “bomb”/“bombed”, and “house”/“houses”; 
“Cyprus”, “burned”/“burnt”, and “house”/“houses”; 
“Cyprus”, “destroyed”, and “house”/“houses”; 
“Cyprus”, “bomb”/“bombed”, and “village”/“villages”; 
“Cyprus”, “burned”/“burnt”, and “village”/“villages”; 
“Cyprus”, “destroyed”, and “village”/“villages”; 
“Cyprus”, “bomb”/“bombed”, and “church”/“churches”; 
“Cyprus”, “burned”/“burnt”, and “church”/“churches”; 
“Cyprus”, “destroyed”, and “church”/“churches”; 
“Cyprus”, “bomb”/“bombed”, and “mosque”/“mosques”; 
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“Cyprus”, “burned”/“burnt”, and “mosque”/“mosques”; 
“Cyprus”, “destroyed”, and “mosque”/“mosques”; 
“Cyprus or “Cypriot”, and “antiquities”; and 
“Cyprus” or “Cypriot”, and “looting”. 
 
Unfortunately, I did not have the time to search the Greek-language and 
Turkish-language Cypriot newspapers’ archives, or the English-language Cypriot 
newspapers’ entire paper archive; but I searched for online archive articles including 
the keywords “antiquities” and “looting” (and other variations on the root “loot”) in 
the Cyprus Mail between 2000 and 2010 and in the Cyprus Weekly between 2002 
and 2010 (and official, professional and public citations of those articles). 
Notably, when he searched Greek Cypriot media, Greek Cypriot investigative 
journalist Makarios Drousiotis (2008) did not find ‘one article, one voice of protest, 
or even one piece of information about the 527 houses totally destroyed, or the 
2,000 houses damaged in 103 mixed or Turkish Cypriot villages in the first half of 
1964’. 
Facing the same dilemma I did during my interviews, when journalist Marion 
Stuart (2008) questioned the pseudonymous Greek Cypriot refugee “Costas”, she 
rightly protected his identity; but, thus, she did not identify which Greek Cypriot 
refugee-occupied ‘village halfway between Larnaca and Limassol’ had ‘razed to the 
ground’ 55 Turkish Cypriot homes in 1976, of which only the ‘piles of rubble…. 
remain’. 
Naturally, there were relevant articles that appeared more than once, and 
different articles discussing the same violence against property.  There were also 
articles that discussed another form of violence against property (e.g. British colonial 
forces’ destruction of EOKA bases; EOKA sabotage of British colonial property); 
there were articles that were irrelevant (e.g. EOKA bombings of British military 
personnel in a village or near a home, church or mosque; Palestinian paramilitary 
attacks upon Israeli state property in Cyprus; paramilitary activity in places with 
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Cypriot names in Northern Ireland; even archaeological excavations of Cypriot 
antiquities).  Also, there were very relevant articles that had been damaged in the 
digitisation process (e.g. Young, 1974: 21).  Still, I found hundreds of possibly 
important articles. 
 
3.b.i.2. Online sources 
 
Alongside other official, professional and community sources, online sources 
were both important and convenient.  Online news enabled access, and facilitated 
continuous access, to sources I would not have had otherwise; so, for example, 
Cypriot newspapers could be read in a British village and vice versa.  Community 
forums, discussion lists and weblogs produced their own information, reproduced or 
highlighted other sources, and eased intercommunal, international conversations 
about them.60 
As I will explain later, in conjunction with my research blogging, community 
forums functioned to inform, refine and correct my interpretation.  Online 
community sources also proved communities used the sources and made the claims I 
said they did: by creating a(n electronic) “paper trail” of opinion from propaganda 
and archaeologists to the public, they validated my choices of sources for analysis.  
When I could not repeat informants’ claims without identifying the informant or 
generalising the claim to the point of meaninglessness, online community sources 
provided an alternative source for certain claims, or for analogies for those claims. 
                                                 
60 The alternative would have been spending all day every day trawling through and discussing the 
newspapers in a coffee shop with a highly mixed clientele, when it can be difficult to find a coffee 
shop where members of different political communities mix, let alone ethnic communities.  
Moreover, when a politically mixed coffee shop is found, the opportunities are as limited as the 
customers are moderate.  For instance, I would have been very unlikely to meet one of my key 
informants on the illicit antiquities trade – a Greek Cypriot nationalist – in a mixed coffee shop. 
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3.b.ii. ‘He’s a Turkish friend!’  
 
Thus was the exclamation of a historian of Cyprus when I claimed that the 
Turkish Cypriot village of Aybifan (Ayios Epiphanios) had been destroyed, but my 
only citable sources were ‘TRNC sources’, (although I had first learned of Aybifan 
from an archaeologist in southern Cyprus). 
I grounded my work in archaeological and historical and, to a lesser extent, 
architectural, ethnographic, political and legal studies, but they came from a very 
wide range of primary and secondary sources, from official and semi-official site 
biographies to the testimonies of refugees from those sites; obviously, while I hoped 
that it would give me as extensive a knowledge as possible, for some audiences, the 
very fact that I had consulted certain sources undermined my claims to knowledge 
or even to the capacity for knowledge. 
What all of my sources had in common were primarily scholarly questions of the 
context, knowledge (authority, reliability and verifiability) and identity or voice 
(and language) of sources and their representation and weight in my work, which I 
will look at in relation to my published primary and secondary sources.  There were 
also primarily ethical questions about interpersonal presentation, reception and 
interaction with research participants, which encompassed honesty with, anonymity 
for and attribution to them, which I will look at separately. 
 
All works are researched and written by authors at particular times in particular 
linguistic, social, cultural, religious, political and economic communities, which 
influence what information those authors have access to in the first place and which 
information they choose to use, as well as how they interpret and present or 
suppress that information; it may be obvious, but it is particularly important to 
remember this when studying the history and historiography of violently divided 
societies. 
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One of the greatest limits upon what information authors have access to in the 
first place is their membership of linguistic communities.  During the Ottoman and 
British occupations, international antiquarians and archaeologists were dependent 
upon their own knowledge of ancient, standard (Katharevousa) or Cypriot Greek or 
locals’ knowledge of their languages, as very few knew Ottoman or later standard 
(Istanbul) or Cypriot Turkish (Şevketoğlu, 2000a: 122).  Still now, very few 
international (or, indeed, Greek Cypriot) archaeologists know Turkish. 
 
Moreover, with many of the knowledgeable locals of all communities having 
been made refugees, there was an incidental bias in my sample and weakness in my 
data, as the information was simply inaccessible.  With what felt like a far higher 
proportion of Turkish Cypriots and “Turks” willing to talk with me (or a far higher 
proportion of Greek Cypriots and “Greeks” unwilling to talk with me), there was a 
further bias in my sample and weakness in my data, as I was fed or starved of 
information. 
The problem was worsened by the disproportionate amount of weak information 
and the number of irredeemably “interested” sources I dealt with in the South: 
sometimes, I would receive what could have been interesting leads, but for their 
clear desire to scapegoat one person or another; yet, even when I already had 
circumstantial evidence supporting the scapegoat, most of the time, the scapegoats 
did not trust me to talk with me to clear their own name. 
In the North, the widespread willingness to talk with me provided a greater 
proportion of detailed information from relatively disinterested sources, which 
enabled me more often to confirm or dismiss allegations and insinuations; still, it 
also increased the number of false leads and cold trails. 
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3.c. Informed  consent 
 
Since critical information frequently emerged in casual conversation, and the 
conversation often started spontaneously, I could not practicably get written, 
informed consent for all the information gathered; however, my vaguely-local-
looking, somewhat-language-speaking otherness normally caused the curious 
discussants to ask even before I could tell them.  Finding my way in Larnaca, in my 
first days on the island, one elderly Greek Cypriot woman went through a process of 
telling out loud, rhetorically asking me, ‘are you a kalamaras [literally, one who 
writes with squid ink, a scholar; metaphorically, a Greek]?  No, you’re not.  Are you 
a Turk?  No!…’61  I was often asked if I was a “Charlie (diaspora Greek Cypriot)”, or 
his Turkish Cypriot equivalent. 
Searching for a mosque in Korakou, near the end of my fieldwork, a local Greek 
Cypriot gave me directions then, on my return, told me the history of the site and 
smilingly asked me, ‘is this all going in your report?’  We discussed my project over 
coffee, so he knew my background and my intentions, and I had his permission to 
use his information.  Refugee anthropologist Ruth Krulfeld (1998: 22-24) doubted 
informants’ ability to give free, informed consent when they do not own and cannot 
control researchers’ subsequent use of their information; but there must be a trust 
between researchers and researched, and my informants (and non-informants) 
displayed their trust (and distrust), and carefully controlled what they told me (or 
did not).  (I explain my anonymisation and inclusion/exclusion of personal sources’ 
information later.)  
Krulfeld (1998: 31) practiced ‘negotiation and equal control’ with researched 
communities, in order to restore equality to the relationship between researcher and 
researched, and to protect and promote the human rights of the researched, but also 
warned against researchers ‘being exploited… for personal and political interests’. 
                                                 
61 «Είσαι καλαμαράς;  Όχι, δεν είσαι.  Είσαι Τούρκος;  Όχι!»  
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Community archaeologists Stephanie Moser et al. (2002: 231) wanted ‘local 
people’ to ‘decide what should be displayed and what stories should be told’ (Moser 
et al., 2002: 231); but if locals decided in Cyprus, refugees’ abandoned cultural 
heritage – and its pillage, reuse, damage and/or destruction – would commonly not 
be presented.  Moser et al. (2002: 232) acknowledged ‘tensions’, ‘disagreement[s]’ 
and ‘conflicts’ in the process, but they did not consider the sheer impossibility (let 
alone undesirability) of agreeable work with extremist locals. 
Krulfeld’s partners emerged through her conversation with the community, and 
‘agreed’ to the collaborative ethnographic research (1998: 32); but my research was 
not an act of ethnographic description, and I could not collaborate in my informants’ 
common presentation of false beliefs, or deliberate disinformation, as historical facts.  
It would have been a false community control, if I had selected partners who agreed 
with me; and if I had selected partners who disagreed, it would not have worked at 
all.  Furthermore, I interacted with nationalists, non-nationalists and anti-
nationalists, in various communities, in all six towns and nearly a third of the 619 
villages in Cyprus, on different parts of my work.  Working with differing partners 
across the island could have torn the project apart, while one small group of 
nationalists could have hijacked the project. 
 
3.d. Language and voice 
 
Particularly in the light of Swedish archaeologist Håkan Karlsson’s (2004b: 17) 
challenges to English linguistic imperialism (see also Bernbeck, 2008; Hansen, 2008; 
Kristiansen, 2001), I must recognise that I do not have advanced knowledge of either 
of the other two dominant academic languages, French and German; and, while I 
conducted my research in Cyprus, I cannot speak either Greek or Turkish fluently. 
Still, it must be noted that my non-fluency sometimes gave me access to more 
information than I would otherwise have had, because I was identifiably other and 
outside the conflict, so some parties to the conflict felt free to talk with me.  Indeed, 
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while unthinkingly or uncontrollably mixing Greek and Turkish could negatively 
affect conversations with nationalists, doing so with enclaved Cypriots or refugees 
was often normal, or even desirable. 
Struggling to hold a conversation in Turkish with elderly dialect-speakers, I let a 
Greek word slip out; the local Turkish Cypriot confirmed that I could speak Greek, 
but the refugee continued to speak Turkish, until his local friend hit and reminded 
him, ‘eh, you speak Greek!’62  In another village, a mischievous Turkish Cypriot 
refugee pointed out some nationalist homes nearby, then, despite my speaking 
normally in Turkish, he cheerfully shouted everything in Greek. 
 
Government and professional sources claimed ultimate authority, but their 
claims were so frequently unreliable – even deliberately inaccurate – that I could 
never accept any allegation without corroboration.  Even photographic evidence 
was no guarantee of the accuracy of the accompanying claim. 
Some of my personal contacts were entirely reliable, but gave me information I 
could not verify myself; furthermore, anonymous sources, whether local or 
professional, gave me information that I could present to others, but that those 
others could not verify themselves; moreover, community sources, like villagers, 
often lacked authority within the professional community.  In some cases, I knew 
people for years, but never gained their trust, or indeed gave my own; in other cases, 
a few seconds’ initial joking established a lasting rapport. 
 
I discussed treatment of cultural heritage not only with people whom I had 
sought out for my work, or who had sought me out, whom I would call “research 
participants”, but also with people independently commenting on these issues in 
community forums, on my, their and others’ blogs, and elsewhere.  I would include 
these independent commentators with other “primary sources”, although the 
differences between them sometimes disappeared, as the authors of primary sources 
                                                 
62 ‘Yunanca’yı konuşursun ya’ (yerli Kıbrıslı Türk, 2007: Kişisel İletişim). 
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became research participants, or research participants later published primary source 
material. 
As some research participants requested that I did not cite them publicly, there 
were even occasions where research participants requested that I did not cite their 
public works.  Once, I removed a citation because the participant feared someone 
monitoring my work finding them, their interpreter or their informant through me.  
On another occasion, I was allowed to cite their public work, and they privately 
explained the context of the production of the work, but I was not allowed to cite 
the source of my understanding. 
Occasionally, where an informant was not in a position to make the argument 
themselves publicly, I found published academic sources and used them as proxies or 
analogies, so that I could demonstrate the argument by reference to a confirmable 
case without exposing the informant’s dissent. 
 
3.e. ‘In peacetime, I’ll be your friend but in wartime, I’ll shoot you between the eyes’  
 
Research participants came from a wide range of backgrounds and held an 
equally wide range of opinions.  Sometimes the relationship between me and my 
research participants was friendly and strong, but often it was argumentative or 
confrontational.  Even key informants and I would disagree strongly: they would 
object to some of my sources, data and interpretations and I would challenge theirs, 
but they would continue to supply me with information and I would continue to 
promote it.  I cannot cite it properly without identifying one of my sources, but in 
the very same hour he supplied me with data (knowing that my work was 
bicommunal and cross-border), one key informant also put the details of another 
professional doing cross-border work (in a different discipline) on the internet and 
encouraged compatriots to warn both that professional and his colleagues to work 
only with their own side, or to suffer (collective) boycotting and blacklisting.  
Occasionally, like the end of the active relationship with the Grey Wolf who gave 
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this section its title (about a month after the quoted conversation), contact was 
openly aggressive and broken under the threat of imminent violence. 
 
The identities of my sources’ authors and the types of my sources range very 
widely, from colonial male archaeologists’ excavation data, to postcolonial female 
artefact specialists’ analyses and collaboratively-written site reports, to conversations 
with currently practicing archaeologists, to the personal testimony of locals at and 
refugees from the sites being researched and blog comments by members of the 
diasporas of the affected communities.  Discussions with archaeologists were 
difficult to direct, partly because of personal awkwardness, partly because of 
professional sensitivity, and partly because of the sheer scales of the problem and the 
propaganda about it.  Conversations with archaeologists were always off-site, 
physically and discursively, normally over coffee, and frequently away from other 
archaeologists.  Nevertheless, they were still difficult to conduct because, whether I 
chased after sensitive information with direct questions, or whether I worked 
around to it through roundabout chat, I felt awkward; I was being either impolite or 
untruthful.  Conversations with locals were normally on-site or nearby, while those 
with refugees were normally at or by other communities’ cultural heritage sites; 
because they were chance, site-specific encounters, I was more comfortable in them, 
even when my companions and I argued, or when they blatantly lied to me. 
 
3.f. ‘Gossip, rumour and hearsay’ 
 
The conceptions of my working practice as ‘sitting in kafeneia talking to old 
men’ and of my working material and product as ‘gossip, rumour and hearsay’ are 
worth addressing.  They were friendly jokes between archaeologists about the 
ethnographic methods employed to investigate sensitive subjects and inform 
archaeological analysis, but they had currency because people who were 
understandably unconvinced by word-of-mouth and people who refused to believe 
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or knew but refused to recognise discomfiting truths tried to dismiss, deny or 
discredit the material as gossip, rumour or hearsay.  There was a reassuring ring to 
the occasional appellation of “Other-lover” – ‘Greek-lover’, ‘Turkish friend’, etc. – 
when I talked about my findings; however, as Ted Honderich (2005) noted, just 
because both sides say you’re wrong doesn’t mean you’re right. 
The evidence-based approach to the destruction of community in Cyprus was 
foundational to my research, as it enabled me to distinguish inconvenient facts from 
indefensible fabrications, to begin to fashion a ‘chronicle of events’ and so the 
‘parameters within which any interpretation must fall’ (Eltringham, 2004: 157 – 
original emphasis).  Positively, official, archaeological – archaeologists’ – narratives 
were fundamentally relevant to this research; and negatively, it was very difficult to 
win Cypriot and international archaeologists’ and locals’ trust in order to access 
unofficial narratives; therefore, I took many of my leads from the states’ and their 
allies’ histories of the destruction of cultural property.  It was only by verifying or 
falsifying these accounts that I could take cultural heritage sites’ biographies out of 
the “gossip tense(s)”. 
At the same time, however, when I did get leads from archaeologists and their 
publics, they were given informally or off-the-record, so I anonymised them or, 
when I couldn’t mask them sufficiently, chose not to present them; once, I was even 
given a lead with the caveat that I was being told it because, if I did repeat it, no-one 
would believe me anyway.  This put the inherently piecemeal material that I was 
gathering informally in the category of hearsay, rather than evidence and left it 
open to dismissal and denial or even shrewd accusations of untrustworthy, 
unprofessional or dishonest, unethical work.  Again, it was only by visiting and 
documenting sites that I was able to assess the stories I was told and find evidence 
for or against them; moreover, it was only by doing this that I could bodily and 
materially demonstrate my commitment to truth and justice, which shrewd 
detractors sought to discredit. 
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The importance of ‘gossip, rumour and hearsay’ in my work also cues up one of 
the ethical problems that I faced myself early on: how could I gossip and protect 
archaeologists’ confidentiality (and acknowledge their help)?  As for acknowledging 
archaeologists’ help, I can only hope that those who did not need to remain 
anonymous appreciate my policy of anonymising all those who spoke with me 
informally, in order to prevent anyone from being identified by a process of 
elimination.  As for both gossiping with archaeologists and protecting their 
confidentiality, it is a little more complicated. 
There was gossip and counter-gossip, false gossip to trace the webs of rumours 
and even false gossip to dispel false rumours.  To get gossip, I had to give it; if I 
hadn’t shared my gossip, or hadn’t expressed an(y) opinion on others’, I would have 
been cut out of the circle.  To get or to give gossip, I had to be friends with some 
archaeologists and acquaintances of some others; apart from inserting me into a 
convoluted, ever-changing web of relationships (of friends and enemies, allies and 
rivals), which I was always (and still am) trying to get to grips with, it meant I had 
somewhat ready-made obligations and expectations of trust (and distrust). 
Further complicating ‘gossip’ was the ‘interview’, which different people used as 
shorthand for anything from a casual chat about cultural heritage to a formal 
question-and-answer session about Cypriot archaeological ethics and which, 
regardless, was normally seen as a topic of “publicly private conversation” – more 
gossip.  Occasionally, I needed to talk over particular points of one’s interview with 
a trusted other, either because I didn’t have the requisite knowledge of the site, 
region or period, or because I needed to “test” how one statement or another 
sounded to someone from outside the discussion, or (after due consideration) to gain 
access to people who would otherwise have been inaccessible.  Moreover, sometimes 
the people I had gossiped with on the condition that the information remained 
between us would object to me telling other people the same thing that I had told 
them, because they were concerned that those other people were somehow 
dangerous gossips.  (That was sometimes based upon a misremembering of or a 
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misunderstanding about what was confidential and what was public, sometimes 
upon an unawareness of my deliberations and my, I believe, judicious use of that 
information; sometimes, it simply felt as if the person from whom I had sought 
confidentiality felt hurt by my apparently casual use of the information with 
untrusted others.) 
Plus, besides the existing alliances and rivalries that I was assimilated into, while 
gossiping with some friends or acquaintances about some others, I and the people I 
was gossiping with were being gossiped about by those others; gossiping and being 
gossiped about affected my professional identity and who would talk with me.  
Repeatedly, it was gossip that influenced who would tell me about ethical dilemmas 
that they or others had faced and who would listen to my presentations of the 
destruction of cultural heritage; people would prejudge whether I, my data and my 
interpretations were genuine or uninformed, misinformed or disingenuous. 
Because I could not realise my ambition of (public) community archaeology, I 
did not spend as much time as I had expected ‘sitting in kafeneia talking to old men’, 
or standing by garden fences talking to old women, or even sitting in pubs talking to 
archaeologists; instead, working towards (professional) community archaeology, I 
spent most of it doing library research, or performing site inspections, or simply 
trying to talk to archaeologists.  It was over coffee that many of the unusable or 
unverifiable pieces of information were shared.  Amongst friends and friends of 
friends and displaying knowledge and sensitivity, I could earn people’s trust; there 
was an unspoken understanding when I started a conversation with, ‘since we’re not 
at work, I can ask you this…’. 
It was also in social situations that I was most vulnerable to innocent or 
malevolent criticism, as those who assumed I was repeating unfounded hearsay and 
those who knew I was not could make unreasonable demands of me; I was undone 
more than once by the deceptively simple request to ‘prove it’, when my personal 
sources were anonymous and my material evidence was elsewhere. 
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I sabotaged myself twice over by anonymising my sources as, first, archaeologists 
would assume that it was a smokescreen behind which to hide inadequate research 
or political bias and, second, acquaintances who feared being mistaken for my 
sources would start rumours at key nodes in the networks alleging that they were 
indeed my sources, but that I had misrepresented them. 
 
3.g. Site selection, inspection, documentation, construction and representation 
 
Working alone, I did not have the collective expertise or work-hours of a survey 
team.  I did not use formal survey methods, or have a structured survey 
methodology, because I did not conduct a proper archaeological survey; I visited and 
inspected valuable (important, unusual, or contested) sites, their research value 
determined by sites’ historical significance, public and/or professional concern. 
I conducted “non-proportional quota sampling”, where I focused on 
documenting what had been damaged or destroyed (rather than what had not), but 
tried to record buildings representative of every condition present at the site 
(including what had not been damaged or destroyed) (Orton, 2000: 21). 
I did, rarely, clean soil off partially-submerged material to reveal their surfaces, 
as I did with the inscribed concrete slabs at Pano Koutraphas; I did not expose non-
durable materials and, if I had done, I would have covered them up again.  On one 
occasion, on finding several pieces of the same artefact (fragments of a plate at the 
old town of Van), I gathered them together in order to photograph them; they were 
all from within a two square metre area.  At no time did I collect any material; 
recording was primarily photographic and secondarily written. 
 
3.h. Blogging: ‘another British fucking dogooder…’ (Othiseas, 2010). 
 
Throughout the course of my doctorate, I have maintained a research blog, 
evaluating sources, archiving raw data, appealing for information, discussing 
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developments, and enabling access to academic papers.  Blogging was not prior 
publication, and it was not an attempt to bypass peer review (e.g. Hardy, 
forthcoming); indeed, free, open access ‘increases critical refereeing’ (Garfield, 2000: 
3 – emphasis added).  Not only professionals without access to particular academic 
journals, but also locals, refugees, diaspora – all interested parties, many with the 
expressive language of Othiseas (2010) – are enabled to access my data.  (There have 
been more than 50,000 visits to my niche interest research blog and site photo blogs 
in the past six years.)  
Opening my work and myself up to such scrutiny demonstrates my commitment 
to truth, and thus builds trust.  Beyond the simple matter of access, it is also far 
easier for me and my readers to explore my data together, and to share it with others 
(Moxley, 2001: 63).  Simultaneously, I can refine my research subject and my 
writing style to be appropriate for the affected communities. 
It is also valuable for readers to be able to translate, contribute to, or otherwise 
question my research; but, personally, the greatest opportunity blogging provides is 
for correction.  For example, based upon the mistaken information of a disinterested 
professional in the field, I misinterpreted 1980s Greek Cypriot military graffiti on an 
abandoned and destroyed Turkish Cypriot home as 1960s paramilitary graffiti; 
through a conversation on a bicommunal Cypriot discussion forum, a Greek Cypriot 
nationalist corrected me (DT, 2009; see also Hardy, 2009b). 
I have presented the universal political and ethical difficulties in doing such 
research, explained the basic range of methods (critique of official and professional 
public education, retracing of the genealogy of violence, cultural heritage site 
inspection, and local, refugee, and professional community research), and 
established the basic reasons for the methods (respect of the human rights of 
participants and affected communities, professional and ethical commitment to the 
responsible use of cultural heritage material to protect and promote human rights), 
as well as demonstrated my commitment to professional and community access 
(through research blogging, and participation in community forums). 
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Now it is time to confront the treatment of Cypriot cultural heritage in times of 
conflict, and to evaluate the politics and ethics of cultural heritage workers in 
conflict zones.  As the most critical methodological issues are highly dependent 
upon context for understanding, and have a bearing upon the professionalism and 
ethics of the work, I will address them within the presentation and examination of 
my research data. 
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4. International law, bicommunal work, rescue archaeology and the 
archaeological boycott 
 
After the war of 1974, the Republic of Cyprus Department of Antiquities 
‘appeal[ed]’ to UNESCO to protect cultural heritage in northern Cyprus, but it 
simultaneously approved of (and supported) foreign archaeological teams who 
refused to work there (e.g. Karageorghis, 1976: 3).  Indeed, born and until 1974 
excavating in northern Cyprus, Famagusta district refugee antiquities director Vassos 
Karageorghis (2007: 118) campaigned for a boycott of any archaeological activity in 
northern Cyprus, and orchestrated the international blacklisting of any 
archaeologists associated with work in the occupied areas, even of archaeologists 
who ‘sent a message’ to the Turkish Cypriot antiquities department.  Since 1974, 
there has been rescue excavation in northern Cyprus (e.g. Şevketoğlu, 2002), and 
(albeit chronologically and geographically limited) archaeological survey (e.g. 
Şevketoğlu, 2000a).  However, there have also been interventions preventing (or 
trying to prevent) research and its presentation, publication or citation (Şevketoğlu, 
2000b: 53; 55-56).  The Greek Cypriot administration has complained about the 
‘deserted and abandoned’ archaeological sites being destroyed by ‘[t]he rain, the 
wind and the weeds... plundering and theft’ (ROCPIO, 1997: 35); yet its own 
archaeologists’ boycott and black list have prevented even the most basic 
preservation work, the backfilling of open trenches of discontinued archaeological 
digs (Şevketoğlu, 2000b: 53), and have thereby forced Turkish Cypriot archaeologists 
to leave those sites exposed to decay, erosion and looting. 
In this chapter, I will review the most important examples of bicommunal 
cultural heritage work, noting their official receptions and their consequent progress 
(or lack of it); and then I will explore the key cases of archaeological excavation in 
northern Cyprus since 1974, considering the ethical and legal arguments for 
excavations and their boycotts, and studying their effects upon archaeological 
knowledge through publication and citation. 
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4.a. Bicommunal work under international law 
 
As before the war (e.g. Karageorghis, 1974: 5), UNESCO continued to provide 
expert staff and project financing to the Republic of Cyprus (e.g. Karageorghis, 1975: 
19; 1980: 5; 1981: 4; 5; 1982: 20-21; 1983: 13-14); but the unrecognised Turkish 
Cypriot administration, which lacked its own cultural heritage professionals and 
funding, also lacked international advice or support, so its historic architecture 
decayed.  Greek Cypriot archaeologists claimed that Turkish Cypriot leaders’ non-
cooperation prevented UNESCO working on cultural heritage throughout the island 
(cf. Karageorghis, 1982: 5).  Yet, there was and is bicommunal cultural heritage 
work. 
 
4.a.i. The Nicosia Master Plan (NMP) 
 
In 1977, bicommunal work in Nicosia began to address ‘humanitarian issues and 
basic human needs’ (Demetriades, 1998: 172), including cultural heritage work; on 
24th October 1979, it became the Nicosia Master Plan.  Greek Cypriot President 
Glafkos Clerides and Turkish Cypriot President Rauf Denktaş agreed to informal 
meetings between Nicosia’s Greek Cypriot Mayor Lellos Demetriades and its Turkish 
Cypriot Mayor Mustafa Akıncı.  The mayors echoed the presidents’ titles for 
national negotiations, and met as “representatives” of their city’s communities (ibid.: 
170-171).  In order for the Greek Cypriot state not to recognise the Turkish Cypriot 
administration (for example, by funding it directly), the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) gave money to the World Bank, which gave 
money to the Turkish Cypriot administration (ibid.: 171-172).  This way, the 
Municipality of Venice (and the Government of Italy) funded the Venetian city 
walls’ restoration (ibid.: 173).  After 1983, when the UNDP, the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United States Agency for 
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International Development (USAID) funded work in the TRNC, ‘so that once more 
nobody recognised anyone’, the Central Bank of the Republic of Cyprus paid money 
through an international employee to a Turkish Cypriot contractor in London, who 
then paid the Turkish Cypriot workers in northern Cyprus (ibid.: 174), including for 
historic houses’ restoration (ibid.: 175).  Then Turkish Cypriot President Denktaş did 
temporarily ‘embargo’ bicommunal work (ibid.: 174); but now there is both the 
UNDP-funded Nicosia Master Plan and the EU-funded (island-wide) Partnership for 
the Future. 
 
4.a.ii. The Committee on Missing Persons (CMP) 
 
Indeed, there has even been bicommunal archaeology in northern Cyprus.  
Inter-communal negotiations between 1974 and 1981 led to the (initially 
ineffective) establishment of the UN-sponsored bicommunal Committee on Missing 
Persons in Cyprus, in order to learn the fates of Cypriots who disappeared during 
the conflict (CMP, 2010: 1).  Its decisions are reached through consensus between 
one Greek Cypriot, one Turkish Cypriot, and one International Committee of the 
Red Cross-chosen, United Nations Secretary-General-appointed international (ibid.).  
Bicommunal teams of archaeologists and anthropologists exhume and analyse any 
buried remains of missing persons (ibid.: 2).  Again (if only on 31st July 1997), Greek 
Cypriot President Clerides and Turkish Cypriot President Denktaş (finally) agreed to 
bicommunal cooperation to solve the ‘humanitarian issue’ (cited in Sant-Cassia, 
2007: 194), though on 30th April 1998, the Turkish Cypriot committee member 
stopped the CMP’s work.  Eventually, in August 2006, the Argentine Forensic 
Anthropology Team (EAAF) began preparing the CMP’s Bi-communal Forensic 
Team (BCFT), and in September 2006, began coordinating its exhumations (EAAF, 
2007: 3); since the beginning of 2008, the BCFT has been operating independently. 
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4.a.iii. The World Monuments Watch (WMW) 
 
When (in 2007) Eastern Mediterranean University’s Profs. Allan Langdale and 
Michael Walsh won a place for the northern Cypriot historic city of Famagusta on 
the World Monuments Fund’s (WMF) 2008 World Monuments Watch (List of Most 
Endangered Sites), the Greek Cypriot antiquities department condemned its listing 
as ‘adverse’, without explaining why (antiquities director Pavlos Flourentzos, cited 
in Bahceli, 2007).  Journalist Simon Bahceli (2007) noted that the Republic of Cyprus 
disapproved of ‘any intervention in antiquities which is not officially sanctioned’; 
however, it seems that Famagusta’s entry into the endangered list was adverse 
precisely because it would facilitate international support for the city’s conservation.  
Archaeologists in southern Cyprus told me that the Greek Cypriot antiquities 
department was not asked for permission; but archaeologists in northern Cyprus told 
me that they were never given permission for anything, so there was no point 
asking.  Corroborating that judgement, the subsequent attempt at something like a 
“Famagusta Master Plan” was not approved either.  As in Nicosia, the Famagusta 
plan involved its Greek Cypriot Mayor Alexis Galanos and Turkish Cypriot Mayor 
Oktay Kayalp as the city’s communities’ “representatives”; the Famagusta initiative 
was backed by the UN, and the Leventis, Pierides and Thetis foundations, and 
supported by the European cultural heritage organisation Europa Nostra (Avgousti, 
2008).  It involved at least some individual Greek Cypriot archaeologists and 
historians, for example Anna Marangou, who wanted the ‘authorities to work 
“silently and efficiently”’ (cited in Leonidou, 2007); but seemingly not the Greek 
Cypriot archaeological community.  Remarkably, I know that at least one Greek 
Cypriot invited to the initiative’s meetings refused to attend on the grounds that no 
Greek Cypriots had been invited. 
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4.a.iv. Supporting Activities that Value the Environment (SAVE) 
 
(USAID-funded) Supporting Activities that Value the Environment (SAVE) does 
have a bicommunal cultural heritage team of archaeologists and art historians, 
which did compile a less extensive, more intensive Cultural Heritage Database to 
help preserve Famagusta’s historic landscape.  Yet, having worked in the team as a 
research assistant, I know certain officials or offices tried to frustrate the effort.  
Aware that I knew researchers working in the Archives when I visited, and that the 
project was due to finish the following month, an unfortunate junior Greek Cypriot 
archivist first had to say that they were ‘closed for the holidays’, then ask, ‘could you 
come back in a few months?’  The Republic of Cyprus State Archives (ROCSA, 2007) 
are ‘open to the public’, but when a colleague and I did not follow the state 
archivist’s advice that we ‘should go to the Department of Antiquities [instead]’ 
(because we wanted to go to both), we were required to gain permission from the 
Republic of Cyprus Department of Antiquities to use the State Archives (although 
they are equal institutions in different ministries).  According to the state archivist, 
the Greek Cypriot antiquities director ‘need[ed] some information from [us] before 
he [could] decide whether to grant permission’.  I was informed, via back channels, 
that it was not the Department of Antiquities, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
that was trying to frustrate the team’s work.  Yet when other international 
archaeologists got the World Monuments Fund (WMF, 2007: 10) to list Famagusta as 
one of the 100 Most Endangered Sites in the world in 2008, it was Antiquities 
Director Pavlos Flourentzos who called its listing an ‘adverse development’ (cited in 
the Cyprus Weekly, 2007).  (Nonetheless, he also stated that ‘[t]he Antiquities 
Department and the Foreign Ministry [we]re working together to find the best 
solution’ (cited in Cyprus Weekly, 2007); so it is possible that both of them were 
against the work.) 
Two similar projects the Greek Cypriot Department of Antiquities did support 
were the Famagusta Committee’s (1989) exhibition and catalogue about the history 
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of Famagusta city, and antiquities department archaeologist Sophocles Hadjisavvas’s 
(1991) publication of his 1973 archaeological survey of Famagusta district.  
Famagusta Committee members included the acting antiquities director Athanasios 
Papageorghiou, as well as former director Vassos Karageorghis and later director 
Pavlos Flourentzos, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Education, and 
Minister of Communications and Works (Famagusta Committee, 1989: 2-3), and the 
exhibition was introduced by then President George Vassiliou (1989: 5).  The 
Famagusta Committee’s (1989) exhibition dated the end of 36 Centuries of 
Civilization in Famagusta to the 1974 Turkish invasion and expulsion of the Greek 
Cypriot community, but did not display any artefacts produced after the 1571 
Ottoman conquest, except for Orthodox Christian icons (Famagusta Committee, 
1989: 65-68).  (That history also forgot Greek Cypriot shelling of the Turkish 
Cypriot quarter of Famagusta (cf. MRG, 1976: 12).)  Later antiquities director 
Sophocles Hadjisavvas (1991: 116-122) documented 397 sites, including standing 
churches and other buildings from the post-medieval and modern periods, but not 
one mosque. 
 
4.a.v. Cyprus Temples: unofficial bicommunal cultural heritage work 
 
After the Green Line opened on 23rd April 2003, the southern Cyprus Civil 
Engineers’ and Architects’ Association and the northern Chamber of Cyprus Turkish 
Architects worked together to survey religious buildings on the “wrong” side of the 
Green Line.  The Cyprus Temples project was a 31-member team, supported by the 
UN’s Bi-communal Development Programme (BDP)63, not connected with either 
Cypriot administration.  Explicitly citing the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN, 1948: Art. 18, cited 
in CCEAA and CCTA, 2005), the bicommunal architectural survey team considered 
                                                 
63 The BDP is administered by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), and funded 
by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID). 
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preserving and safeguarding abandoned religious buildings as one of their main 
priorities ‘as Architects’ (CCEAA and CCTA, 2005 – emphasis added). 
The project identified 505 Christian sites in the north, and 115 Islamic sites in 
the south.  As the project created an architectural record, it excluded much 
archaeological and historical information (critically, it frequently excluded the 
causes of harm to buildings, and the dates of deliberate harm – though naturally, 
sometimes, these were simply not known).  Also, the northern survey included 
Christian sites damaged before the conflict (because it included all Christian sites in 
the north), and simultaneously excluded Islamic sites destroyed during the conflict 
(because it excluded all Islamic sites in the north); thus, Cyprus Temples incidentally 
made it easier for manipulative actors to use the project’s survey data in order to 
overplay harm to Christian sites and underplay harm to Islamic sites. 
In addition, as I will discuss later, cultural heritage workers’ restoration 
techniques caused the architects to misunderstand the history and thereby 
misinterpret the condition of conflict-damaged buildings.  Thus, the project 
produced a record incidentally unrepresentative of the impact of the conflict upon 
the communities.  Still, the team’s work was quite comprehensive and its data were 
quite detailed; it set a standard.  Notably, although the architects and civil engineers 
functioned as cultural heritage workers, their project did not involve archaeologists 
or other cultural heritage specialists, and cultural heritage workers have not yet 
done any comparable work; as I will show later, that is indicative of the unique 
circumstances and politics of the archaeological professional community. 
 
4.b. Rescue archaeology under international law in occupied and secessionist 
territories 
 
Evidently, there have been other cases of salvage archaeology in northern 
Cyprus since 1974, for instance the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
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Department of Antiquities and Museums’ ‘rescue excavations’64 in 
Galinoporni/Kaleburnu in 1983 (Kızılduman ve Ülker, 2008), and Eastern 
Mediterranean University’s abortive emergency conservation at Agios Epiktitos-
Vrysi (Şevketoğlu, 2000b: 53); but here I wish to concentrate on three very different 
examples.  I will discuss: first, Cypriot rescue archaeology at Akanthou/Tatlısu; 
second, Turkish research archaeology at Salamis; and third, a particularly 
convoluted case of international excavation at Galinoporni/Kaleburnu.  Following 
the archaeological community’s treatment of these three digs, I will discuss each of 
them and their ethical and legal status in increasing detail.  These examples show 
the interplay between (inter)national politics, professional politics, and professional 
ethics.  They show how mutually influencing events, actions and reactions have 
pushed Cypriot archaeology into a uniquely difficult position (in contrast to all other 
cultural heritage work), and how the profession has effectively paralysed itself.  
Southern Cypriot boycotting and blacklisting have not only prevented ethical 
archaeology in northern Cyprus, and thus forced passive acceptance of 
environmental and human harm to cultural heritage.  The boycott and black list 
have also directly damaged (professional and public) community relations, and thus 
reinforced the conflict (and its consequent harms to cultural heritage). 
 
4.b.i. Cypriot rescue at Akanthou/Tatlısu 
 
Akanthou-Arkosyko/Tatlısu-Çiftlikdüzü is one of the earliest archaeological sites 
on the island, which provides evidence of the Anatolian farmers who first settled the 
island in the Aceramic (Pre-Pottery) Neolithic; it is on the northern coast of the 
Famagusta plains (see map 3b).  It was found in 1996, when a farmer dug pits for his 
agricultural waste, and cut through the settlement.  Initially, (with her colleagues’ 
assistance) a Turkish Cypriot archaeologist in the Department of Archaeology and 
Art History, Dr. Müge Şevketoğlu, conducted a ‘salvage project’ (Şevketoğlu, 2000b: 
                                                 
64 ‘[K]urtarma kazıları’ (Kızılduman ve Ülker, 2008). 
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54), sieving the archaeological deposits the farmer threw away and surveying the 
area (Şevketoğlu, 2002: 100; 2006: 123).  In 1999, the Akanthou/Tatlısu project 
conducted more spoil heap (dug-up and disposed-of soil waste) sieving (Şevketoğlu, 
2002: 101), but also began (ongoing) ‘rescue excavations’ (Şevketoğlu, 2006: 123). 
From 1999 until at least 2004, the Republic of Cyprus Department of Antiquities 
protested about the ‘illegal excavations’ to UNESCO and the World Archaeological 
Congress (Hadjicostis, 2004).  In that time, Dr. Şevketoğlu (2000b: 55) learned that 
northern Cypriot archaeologists were on the Greek Cypriot archaeologists’ ‘black 
list’, and that they would try to prevent any publication.  The year after she 
achieved publication despite the black list (cf. Şevketoğlu, 2000a), Şevketoğlu 
attended a conference on Neolithic Cyprus in southern Nicosia.  According to Greek 
Cypriot and/or international archaeologists, then antiquities director Sophocles 
Hadjisavvas tabled a ‘last minute’ conference resolution with ‘no debate’, criticising 
Şevketoğlu’s use of the Turkish Cypriot name for the village (Christou, 2001); the 
resolution was passed.  Hadjisavvas defended that the resolution was a ‘unanimous 
decision’, but some anonymous participants were ‘appalled’ (cited in Christou, 2001).  
This public acquiescence and anonymous dissent highlights how a hard-line faction 
within the southern Cypriot archaeological community is able to co-opt moderate 
opinion.  In fact, Şevketoğlu merely used the Turkish Cypriot name as well as the 
Greek Cypriot name; in her book, Şevketoğlu (2000a: 123) had advised that 
archaeologists ought to ‘record all known place-names’ to preserve the historical 
information they conveyed.  For example, the renaming of Akanthou was not an 
official Turkish Cypriot or otherwise Turkist nationalist ethnic cleansing of the 
refugee Greek Cypriot community from their village.  Coping with their own 
displacement from their own homes, the Turkish Cypriot refugees who settled in 
Akanthou moved as a village and brought their name for their village with them: the 
southern Turkish Cypriot neighbourhood of Mari/Tatlısu (on the southern coast of 
Larnaca District, see map 5) became the northern Turkish Cypriot village of 
Akanthou/Tatlısu (cf. Goodwin, 1978: 60).  However, antiquities director 
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Hadjisavvas had himself been under pressure: he pointed out that Şevketoğlu had 
presented her work at the conference, and that the Department of Antiquities had 
been ‘attacked because’ it had ‘allowed her to mention illegal excavations’ 
(Hadjisavvas, 22nd May 2001, cited in Christou, 2001).  So, given the resolution came 
a year after the publication (and it is difficult to believe that no-one in the Greek 
Cypriot archaeological community had heard of the publication in the meantime), 
Hadjisavvas may have tabled the “last-minute” resolution to appease criticism of his 
moderate behaviour, rather than to protest Şevketoğlu’s behaviour. 
In a 21st October 2003 press conference (as the curator of an international 
exhibition about Cypriot Hellenism), in response to a question, antiquities director 
Hadjisavvas identified two illegal excavations, in Akanthou and Salamis, on the basis 
of the ICPCPEAC’s 1954 Hague Convention (and that Convention’s 1999 Second 
Protocol), and its 1956 New Delhi Recommendation (cf. CYNA, 2003).  (Due to 
Hadjisavvas’s phrasing, it is unclear whether he claimed the Akanthou excavation 
violated the 1999 Protocol, which permitted rescue excavation in occupied territory, 
or whether he only claimed the dig violated the 1956 Recommendation, which 
banned any dig.)  No-one has denied that Şevketoğlu’s excavation was rescue 
archaeology (not even those who claimed it was illegal).  The first season of work 
may not have been permitted explicitly by the ICPCPEAC’s 1954(a) Convention (or 
its 1954(b) First Protocol), and it may not have followed UNESCO’s 1956 
Recommendation; however, as will be shown later, the Akanthou/Tatlısu excavation 
honoured the spirit of the 1954 Convention, and the 1956 Recommendation has 
been made redundant by the 1999 Second Protocol to the 1954 Convention.  Again, 
the first summer of excavation may have started before the Republic of Cyprus 
signed the Second Protocol on 19th August 1999; but certainly ever since then, Dr. 
Şevketoğlu’s archaeology has been a Cypriot rescue excavation in Cyprus, which 
complies with international law, to which the Republic of Cyprus is a signatory; it 
has been legal as well as ethical.  The same cannot be said for Turkish research at 
Salamis. 
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4.b.ii. Turkish research at Salamis 
 
Ancient Greek mythology tells of Trojan War refugees’ foundation of Salamis, 
Cyprus’s capital city for nearly a millennium; it is on the eastern coast of Famagusta 
District, a little to the north of Famagusta itself (see map 3b).  The archaeological site 
is considered evidence of the initial ‘hellenization’ of the island over 3,000 years ago 
(ICOMOS Cyprus National Committee, 2001: 5).  From 1952 until the Turkish 
invasion of 1974, first the colonial then the independent antiquities department 
excavated the ancient city; throughout that time, the excavation director was Dr. 
Vassos Karageorghis (antiquities director from 1963 until 1989).  The University of 
Lyon’s French Archaeological Expedition to Salamis also dug there between 1964 
and 1974.  After the invasion, the antiquities department’s dig-house was ‘seriously 
plundered’, and according to the ICOMOS Cyprus National Committee (2001: 13), 
the French expedition’s dig-house became ‘inaccessible’.  Yet even southern Cypriot 
media acknowledged that the site was accessible; the only thing that prevented 
archaeologists’ access was their ‘fear’ of being ‘blacklisted’ (Tezgor, 2003). 
In 1998, the Archaeology and Cultural Heritage Research Centre (AKVAM)65 
was established at (northern Cypriot) Eastern Mediterranean University (EMU)66, 
‘with the purpose of research into Salamis’s ancient city’67 (AKVAM, 2008); its 
president was (Turkish) University of Ankara68 Prof. Ahmet Coşkun Özgünel (not 
Özgüner, as Greek Cypriot sources have repeatedly named him – e.g. Hadjicostis, 
2004; ROCDOA, 2005).  Since then, the Turkish Embassy has been funding 
Özgünel’s excavations at the site; they involve Ankara University, AKVAM, and the 
Northern Cyprus Campus of the Middle East Technical University (METU)69 of 
Ankara.  Prof. Özgünel repeatedly asked the University of Lyon to cooperate, but it 
                                                 
65 Arkeoloji ve Kültür Varlıklarını Araştırma Merkezi (AKVAM). 
66 Doğu Akdeniz Üniversitesi (DAÜ). 
67 ‘Salamis antik kentinin araştırılması amacıyla.’ 
68 Ankara Üniversitesi. 
69 Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi (ODTÜ), Kuzey Kıbrıs Kampusu. 
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refused (ROCPRUN, 2001b); however, the reasons for the University of Lyon’s 
choice are unclear.  Apparently, French foreign policy requires ‘archaeologists not to 
work in northern Cyprus’ (Shanks, 2002).  The excavation director of the University 
of Lyon’s nearby French Archaeological Expedition to Enkomi, Olivier Pelon, 
somewhat ambiguously stated that it was ‘impossible... to visit the site officially’ 
(cited in Shanks, 2002).  Nonetheless, even when interviewed in the southern 
Cypriot media, the Salamis Excavations Project70 has not offered legal defences.  The 
project has offered professional justifications: Özgünel’s assistant Hakan Öztaner 
noted they had done preservation work as well as excavation, and insisted that the 
‘worst thing’ they could have done to Salamis would have been to ‘leave it to its own 
fate’ (cited in Tezgor, 2003).  Prof. Özgünel almost naively queried: ‘is it illegal to try 
to preserve a historical site?’ (ibid.).  Yet AKVAM’s (2008) stated aim in 1998 was 
‘research’.  Twelve years later, while he reported the excavation’s restoration 
architect İrfan Aydın’s observations of damage from sea salt, sand, sun and heat, 
Turkish Cypriot journalist Emre Zeytinoğlu (2010: 5) still defined the dig as ‘a 
“research project”’71. 
In this case, interpretation of the law is quite simple, and the southern Cypriot 
campaign against the excavation appears reasonable.  In its official comment upon a 
Violation of Scholarly Ethics, (written by the refugee excavation director (cf. 
Karageorghis, 2007: 173)), the Cyprus National Committee of the International 
Council on Monuments and Sites stated that the University of Ankara had ‘violat[ed] 
all international conventions and recommendations’ (ICOMOS Cyprus National 
Committee, 2001: 13); it explicitly cited UNESCO’s 1956 New Delhi 
Recommendation against excavations in occupied territory (ICOMOS Cyprus 
National Committee, 2001: 16), and elsewhere, then antiquities director Sophocles 
Hadjisavvas (2001: 138) cited the ICPCPEAC’s 1954 Hague Convention as well as 
UNESCO’s 1956 Recommendation.  As unlicensed research digs in 
occupied/secessionist territories, Prof. Özgünel’s excavations do appear to be illegal. 
                                                 
70 Salamis Kazıları Projesi. 
71 ‘[B]ir “araştırma projesi”’ (Zeytinoğlu, 2010: 5). 
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Therefore, the anti-excavation movement had a strong, simple legal case.  In 
2001, the Karageorghis-directed A. G. Leventis Foundation presented an exhibition 
about the excavations in Cyprus and Greece; then, in 2003, Karageorghis introduced 
the exhibition to the European Parliament (where his inaugural speech seems to 
have had the same wording as his ICOMOS text (cf. Karageorghis, 2007: 174)).  The 
Republic of Cyprus Department of Antiquities appealed to UNESCO and the ‘World 
Archaeologists’ Association [sic – World Archaeological Congress]’ (Hadjicostis, 
2004); yet the excavations continued.  The Chair of the Greek Cypriot House Sub-
Committee on Cultural Heritage, Christodoulos Taramountas, claimed that Prof. 
Özgünel had been officially ‘black-listed’ at the World Archaeological Congress (cf. 
Hadjicostis, 2004; incidentally, I have not found any corroborating source).  Yet the 
excavations continued. 
Alongside legal problems, there were professional and personal ones.  ICOMOS’s 
Cyprus National Committee (2001: 14; 13; 13) noted that Prof. Özgünel had ignored 
the ‘rights’ and ‘lawful interests’ of the Cypriot and French excavators, and had 
‘“t[aken] possession” of the sites’.  Twenty-four years after he had been displaced 
from his home and his archaeological site, Karageorghis had been dispossessed of his 
site.  That painful event does not change the ethical or legal arguments over this 
case; however, it may help to explain the difference between archaeologists’ 
responses to the conflict and other cultural heritage professionals’ responses.  The 
(Greek Cypriot and international) archaeological community was dispossessed in a 
way other cultural heritage workers were not; and that may be yet another cause of 
the Greek Cypriot archaeological community’s unique refusal to cooperate with 
anyone on anything in northern Cyprus, which stands in contrast to Greek Cypriot 
historians’, anthropologists’ and architects’ intercommunal work.  Nonetheless, that 
refusal is not only limiting unethical and illegal archaeological work, but also 
limiting ethical, legal conservation and rescue, and thereby harming both Cypriot 
archaeology and the Cypriot archaeological profession, as it did through the 
punishment of Turkish Cypriot archaeological rescue at Akanthou/Tatlısu. 
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4.b.iii. International excavation at Galinoporni/Kaleburnu 
 
While hiking around Galinoporni/Kaleburnu on 1st July 2004, two academics 
stumbled upon metal objects on top of the hill of Vasili/Kraltepe; it is on the south-
east facing coast of the Karpas Peninsula in Famagusta District (see map 3a).  The 
English literature lecturer and the music lecturer told their archaeologist colleagues 
at Eastern Mediterranean University.  The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
Department of Antiquities and Museums (TRNCDAM) and the northern Cypriot 
Eastern Mediterranean University (EMU) recovered 26 bronze artefacts, the largest 
Late Bronze Age hoard ever found on the island.  In July 2005, with (German) Fritz 
Thyssen Foundation (FTS)72 funding, the Turkish Cypriot antiquities department, 
Turkish Cypriot and German archaeologists at the Eastern Mediterranean Cultural 
Heritage Research Center (DAKMAR)73 at EMU, and German archaeologists at the 
Technical University of Freiberg (TUBAF)74, the Free University of Berlin75, and the 
Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen (EKUT)76, its Curt-Engelhorn Centre for 
Archaeometry (CEZA)77 began the excavation at Galinoporni-Vasili/Kaleburnu-
Kraltepe (King’s Hill).  (Since the beginning of the dig, archaeologists and 
archaeology students from Australia, Britain, the Czech Republic, Iran, Nigeria, the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine and the United States have 
also worked on the site or its material.)  In August, southern Cypriot cultural 
heritage workers started a campaign to end the excavation, to boycott and blacklist 
anyone involved in any way. 
Here, I will explore the different interested parties’ ethical and legal arguments 
for the excavation, and the boycott and black list.  While conducting my research, I 
                                                 
72 Fritz Thyssen Stiftung (FTS). 
73 Doğu Akdeniz Kültür Mirasını Araştırma Merkezi (DAKMAR). 
74 Technische Universität Bergakademie Freiberg (TUBAF). 
75 Freie Universität Berlin. 
76 Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen (EKUT). 
77 Curt-Engelhorn Zentrum für Archäometrie (CEZA). 
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discussed this problem with archaeologists and other cultural heritage workers, in a 
range of settings from formal one-on-one interviews to informal group 
conversations.  Some people spoke as institutional representatives; some people 
spoke as colleagues (but may have changed their opinions in front of me or others); 
and some people spoke as friends (and, similarly, may have changed their opinions).  
Using those discussions in an examination of the ethical dilemmas, however, would 
present its own ethical dilemmas: some encounters began as research discussions but 
became friendly chats (and vice versa); and being a member of the archaeological 
community, my research subject was of obvious professional interest to my circle of 
friends, and our research experiences were topics of conversation.  I would not wish 
to use material where the consent of the informant was unclear; and I will not 
“professionalise” my “off-duty” chats with friends.  Nonetheless, there are a few 
public sources; and I may use material from clearly-defined research discussions. 
Furthermore, some cultural heritage workers – on both sides – learned of my 
research interests and, unasked, gave me copies of correspondence between 
professionals who attacked or defended the King’s Hill project.  Obviously, using 
these papers presents problems, too, because not all of the correspondence was 
public, or written by the cultural heritage workers who gave me access to it.  
Indeed, one erased personal information ‘so it can’t be traced’, pointedly told me ‘I 
don’t know where you got this’, then wryly smiled that it was ‘quite an ethical 
dilemma you have there’.  I will try to solve the problem by addressing it as the 
product of somewhat distinct sections of the cultural heritage professional 
community.  Those sections of the community do not precisely reflect the partitions 
of the Cyprus Conflict; they are somewhat different from the groups that produce 
nationalist archaeologies and histories.  So, I will not characterise them as 
“Hellenist” or “Turkist”.  Instead, I will present “Cyprus-based pro-excavation”, 
“Cyprus-based anti-excavation”, and their associated “international” communities of 
opinion; I have anonymised them to protect my informants and the correspondents.  
Where possible, I have shown (possibly) revealing differences in the groups’ 
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behaviours, and the (possible) reasoning behind those differences; for example, the 
international anti-excavation community’s public protestations and the international 
pro-excavation community’s private commiserations.  I have preserved their errors 
of fact and citation – for example, the claim that Galinoporni had been recognised as 
an archaeological site since Hogarth found some tombs there in 1888, when Baker 
had found those tombs in 1879 (and Hogarth had summarised Baker’s findings).  
Following archaeologist Kristin Romey’s (2007: 60) precedent for use of this 
material, I will quote private statements when revealing, and cite public statements 
where possible.  Afterwards, I will correct their claims and sources, analyse their 
opinions’ legal validity, and attempt to work out an ethical solution consistent with 
international law and Cypriot cultural heritage work ethics. 
 
4.b.iii.1. Cyprus-based anti-excavation opinion 
 
What follows is the collated opinion of the large, loud, Cyprus-based community 
against excavation, as I heard it from government officials and cultural heritage 
professionals, and “overheard” it from their correspondences with the pro-
excavation community: 
 
Galinoporni is an archaeological site, or collection of sites, which has been 
known since 1888 at the latest (when British archaeologist David Hogarth (2008 
[1889]: 74-76) observed tombs in the village of Galinó-porni).  Since 1974, the site 
has been in the occupied part of Famagusta district, and subject to UNESCO and 
ICPCPEAC conventions and recommendations on archaeological work in occupied 
territories.  Unavoidably, archaeology in occupied territories is political; and any 
resulting (free or compulsory, explicit or implicit) recognition of a secessionist 
regime is a political act, for which the archaeologist(s) must accept the professional 
consequences. 
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While Eastern Mediterranean University is built upon property stolen from 
Greek Cypriot refugees, it is tolerable that northern Cyprus-based academics teach 
and research archaeology, and it is tolerable that they and others publish northern 
Cyprus-based academics’ work (upon legally-produced and legally-accessed source 
materials).  Nevertheless, cultural heritage workers must not conduct any 
archaeological work in northern Cyprus.  Even if archaeologists requested an 
excavation to salvage cultural heritage, the Turkish Cypriot authorities would only 
permit an excavation to get false legal legitimacy from the archaeologists’ 
acknowledgement of the authorities’ political control.  (If the Turkish Cypriot 
authorities were sincere, they would not have refused to share information about 
the mass graves of missing persons.)  In addition, the Republic of Cyprus 
Department of Antiquities cannot monitor, inspect, or otherwise visit any 
excavations in northern Cyprus, because the puppet regime of the illegal pseudo-
state demands ‘the show of a passport’ for Greek Cypriot archaeologists ‘to visit 
[their] own homes... and [their] archaeological sites’.  The King’s Hill project is 
‘arrogant’, and is in ‘blatant violation’ of both ‘international law and scholarly 
ethics’.  Moreover, other ‘hints’ lead anti-excavation opinion to perceive a hidden 
agenda. 
 
In accordance with the International Conventions of 
UNESCO (1954 [sic], 1970 and 1972), the three major 
safeguards of the world’s cultural and natural heritage, it is 
illegal to conduct excavations or any other archaeological 
fieldwork in the occupied territory of the Republic of Cyprus. 
 
The only legally recognised state on the island is the Republic of Cyprus.  United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions 365 and 367 recognise that the Republic of 
Turkey invaded and occupied 38% of the Republic of Cyprus; United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 541 requires ‘all States not to recognize any Cypriot 
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state other than the Republic of Cyprus’; and United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 550 again requires ‘all States... not to facilitate or in any way assist the 
aforesaid secessionist entity’.  In Cypriot archaeological affairs, the competent 
national authorities are the Republic of Cyprus Department of Antiquities.  Only the 
Department of Antiquities may license archaeological excavation, artefact collection 
in archaeological survey, material sampling, and the export of archaeological 
materials.  Until the excavations at Galinoporni, only the University of Ankara had 
violated those laws, through its excavations at Salamis; and those excavations had 
been ‘denounced, not only at international fora but also at the UNESCO General 
Conference, as a blatant violation of scholarly ethics and of the [1956] New Delhi 
recommendation (Section VI)’. 
Cyprus-based anti-excavation opinion recognises that the ICPCPEAC’s Second 
Protocol to the Hague Convention permits rescue excavations in occupied 
territories, but reminds that it must be ‘in close cooperation with the competent 
national authorities of the occupied territory’ (1999: Art. 9, Para. 2); in addition, that 
opinion states that only UNESCO and/or its agents may do cultural heritage work in 
occupied territories.  Thus, lacking the permission of the Republic of Cyprus 
Department of Antiquities, the King’s Hill project is illegal under both Cypriot and 
international law.  Consequently, it is a misappropriation of cultural property, and 
therefore a ‘serious violation’ of the Second Protocol (ICPCPEAC, 1999: Art. 15, 
Para. 1(e)).  Moreover, the King’s Hill project is not a rescue excavation, because it is 
a large, long-term, international dig.  Furthermore, even if it were a rescue 
excavation, pro-excavation opinion could not appeal to the ICPCPEAC’s (1999) 
Second Protocol, because Turkey is not a signatory to that protocol.  Cyprus-based 
anti-excavation opinion points out that the 15th General Assembly of the 
International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) ‘condemn[ed]... the 
illegal excavations and the change of names’ at Galinoporni.  (It also notes that the 
erasure of the Greek-language name was part of the destruction of the intangible 
heritage of Cyprus.) 
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Hence, it is illegal for the King’s Hill project or any associates to excavate 
archaeological materials, to take samples of archaeological, archaeobotanical, 
archaeozoological, geological, or mineral materials, to export any finds or samples, 
and to produce any derivative work from the illegal data.  In addition, Cyprus-based 
anti-excavation opinion warns that anyone ‘using the illegal airport in the occupied 
part of the island... will find difficulties coming back to Cyprus’ as they will ‘have 
used an illegal port of entry’.  There will be ‘serious repercussion[s]’ for all 
archaeologists and institutions involved in the King’s Hill project, and for all 
archaeologists of the same nationalities as the archaeologists involved (unless they 
denounce their compatriots).  Their permits for the export and/or study of Cypriot 
archaeological materials will be withdrawn; they will be forced to return previously 
licensed materials in their possession; they will be denied permission to publish 
present or future analyses of previously-studied materials.  Cyprus-based anti-
excavation opinion holds that German colleagues deserve to be singled out and 
recognised for their contributions to the campaign, which were some of the 
strongest of all of the international protests. 
 
4.b.iii.2. International anti-excavation opinion 
 
What follows is the collated opinion of the equally large, loud, international 
community against excavation, as I heard it from cultural heritage professionals, and 
“overheard” it from their correspondences with the pro-excavation community.  To 
be clear, I have only quoted authors of published sources from their published 
works; they may not agree with the other claims that constitute the majority 
opinion of the anti-excavation community.  According to international anti-
excavation opinion: 
 
Anti-excavation internationals ‘fully support’ their Cyprus-based colleagues (and 
genuinely believing in the cause, or fearing the black list, the international anti-
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excavation community tends to show its support publicly).  They include 
international archaeologists who believe that, had the King’s Hill Project 
‘approached the legitimate competent national authorities at the University of 
Cyprus [sic]’ before the excavations, ‘some discreet and acceptable “diplomatic” 
solution could have been found that would have resulted in some sort of legitimacy’.  
Association with the excavation is ‘academic suicide’, and all associates will be 
pariahs for years.  It is illegal and unscholarly – and against regional archaeological 
tradition – to conduct any archaeological excavation in occupied territories.  Since 
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is not recognised, its Department of 
Antiquities and Museums is not recognised either; thus, the northern Cypriot 
antiquities department cannot constitute the competent national authorities referred 
to in the ICPCPEAC’s Second Protocol (1999: Art. 9, Para. 2); thus it cannot license 
archaeological work.  Archaeologists are ‘political pawn[s]’ in the TRNC’s battle for 
de facto recognition; and excavations establish a precedent for that practical 
recognition. 
International anti-excavation opinion believes that pro-excavation opinion uses 
international law selectively, because it appeals to Article 9, Paragraph 1(b) of the 
Second Protocol to defend rescue archaeology in Turkish-occupied territories, when 
the Turkish occupying forces have violated Article 9, Paragraph 1(a) of the same 
protocol through illicit export of archaeological materials, and Article 15, Paragraph 
1(c-e) through systematic destruction of Greek cultural heritage.  As archaeologist 
Ioannis Georganas (2005) phrased it, 
 
The [individuals and institutions associated with the King’s 
Hill project] are in direct breach of the International 
Conventions of UNESCO (1954 [sic], 1970 and 1972).  
According to the latter, it is illegal to conduct excavations or 
any other archaeological fieldwork in the occupied territory 
of the Republic of Cyprus. 
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International anti-excavation opinion believes that cultural heritage workers 
associated with the King’s Hill project should be denied licences for archaeological 
research abroad as well as in Cyprus; and they should be refused publication of their 
archaeological research; indeed, they should be ‘banned from publishing and 
publicizing the results of the digs’.  Anyone enabling or otherwise facilitating their 
work would be condoning the King’s Hill team’s law-breaking.  International 
archaeologists, but foremost German archaeologists, wish to acknowledge their 
continual, friendly collaboration with the Republic of Cyprus Department of 
Antiquities and the University of Cyprus Department of Archaeology. 
 
4.b.iii.3. Cyprus-based pro-excavation opinion 
 
What follows is the collated opinion of the small, quiet, Cyprus-based 
community for excavation, as I heard it from government officials and cultural 
heritage professionals, and “overheard” it from their correspondences with the anti-
excavation community.  Again, to be clear, I have only quoted authors of published 
sources from their published works; they may not agree with the other claims that 
constitute the majority opinion of the pro-excavation community.  According to 
Cyprus-based pro-excavation opinion: 
 
The King’s Hill is a new archaeological site in Kaleburnu.  As soon as it was 
found, the site became endangered: it has suffered ‘considerable damage’ from 
looting; and it continues to suffer ‘heavy erosion’.  This legal and professional dig 
salvages an endangered cultural heritage site; it also supports and trains the local 
cultural heritage professional community.  The Cyprus-based pro-excavation 
community is ‘not interested in politics’, and sees ‘no legal or moral problem’.  On 
the contrary, the other side, the ‘purely politically motivated’ Greek Cypriot 
archaeological community, has ‘refused’ to see the good of the project; its refusal to 
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work in occupied territories is a political act, and an unethical acceptance of the loss 
of the site.  Pro-excavation opinion says that the illegal excavations are the looters’ 
thefts, not the archaeologists’ digs, which prevent the site’s looting.  Contrary to 
anti-excavation opinion’s belief that the King’s Hill project is a ‘political pawn’ in 
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’s games, pro-excavation opinion believes 
that ‘cultural heritage [i]s a pawn’ in the Republic of Cyprus’s ‘political games’. 
In Eastern Mediterranean University attorney Kaya Arslan’s view, northern 
Cyprus is a ‘de facto, independent, democratic entity’ (2005: 2), not an 
‘invaded/occupied territory’ (2005: 10).  Yet even if it were, rescue excavation in 
occupied territory would still be legal under Article 9 of the ICPCPEAC’s (1999) 
Second Protocol to the Hague Convention (Arslan, 2005: 10).  According to Arslan, 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 365 (1974d), 367 (1974e), 541 
(1983) and 550 (1984) do not contradict the Turkish Cypriot community’s ‘right of 
self-determination... based on... the 1960 Constitution’, which recognises communal 
‘autonomy [competence]’ over questions of religion, education, culture and personal 
status (2005: 2; cf. ROC, 1960: Art. 87).  As Arslan (2005: 3) observed, the United 
Nations Secretary-General has called upon ‘all States... to eliminate unnecessary 
restrictions... isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development’ 
(UNSG, 2004: 2). 
Cyprus-based pro-excavation opinion thinks that, ‘[a]ccording to international 
law’, it was not necessary to ask the Republic of Cyprus Department of Antiquities 
for permission, because its permission would have been ‘worthless’ in the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus.  Government and academic archaeologists in the 
south were quietly asked about excavations in the north, but the southern Cypriot 
archaeological community did not consider it.  The King’s Hill project works ‘in 
close co-operation with the Department of Antiquities of Northern Cyprus as the 
competent authority’ under Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the ICPCPEAC’s Second 
Protocol, which ‘explicitly allows rescue excavations in occupied territories’ and has 
been ‘legally binding’ upon the Republic of Cyprus since before the recovery of the 
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hoard and the excavation of the site.  The ‘local Cypriot authorities’ license the 
excavation.  Cyprus-based pro-excavation opinion points out that Cypriot and 
international archaeologists can freely visit Kaleburnu and inspect the work.  
International colleagues have been ‘threatened’ that, if they entered the island 
through the north, they would not be able to enter the island again; however, the 
Council of the European Union’s (EUC, 2004) Green Line Regulation requires the 
Republic of Cyprus to allow entry to anyone who has the right to enter it (even if 
they entered the island through the north).  So, anti-excavation opinion’s ‘legal 
arguments... are not applicable’. 
 
4.b.iii.4. International pro-excavation opinion 
 
What follows is the collated opinion of the even smaller, quieter, international 
community for excavation, as I heard it from cultural heritage professionals, and 
“overheard” it from their correspondences with the anti-excavation community: 
 
Pro-excavation internationals ‘fully agree’ with their Cyprus-based colleagues 
(though, in fear of the black list, they tend to affirm this agreement in private).  
They note that the change in the official name was not a political act: the original 
name of the village was (Ottoman) Turkish, Kaleburnu (kale burnu, the fortress of 
the cape) (cf. Goodwin, 1978: 312); in fact, the official Greek-language name of the 
village was a corruption of the Turkish-language name, intended to ‘insult’ the 
villagers, Galinoporni (galíni pórni, the tranquil prostitute)78. 
 
4.b.iii.5. Factual accuracy and legal validity of archaeological opinion 
 
Historical toponymist Jack Goodwin (1978: 312) did identify and translate 
“Kaleburnu” as the original name of the village, which had ‘prob[ably]’ been Turkish 
                                                 
78 Γαλήνη πόρνη. 
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Cypriot throughout its existence; but he did not translate the Greek-language 
corruption, “Galinoporni”.  The “correct” corruption was in the local dialect: it was 
not the Greek Greek for “tranquil prostitute (pórni (with an omicron))”79, but the 
Cypriot Greek dialect for “tranquil morning (porní (with an omega, from proiní))”80.  
Nonetheless, the novel corruption is now a popular translation; indeed, it was the 
first one I was told in the village, by the laughing villagers (in Greek).  The Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus has changed some Greek-language place-names in 
artificial ways that appear to be deliberate attempts to erase the memory and 
evidence of the Greek Cypriot community; but it is difficult to conceive of the 
TRNC’s (and the King’s Hill project’s) official use of the original name of the village, 
in the historic language of the village, as a crime against culture. 
Galinoporni/Kaleburnu has been known as an archaeological landscape since at 
least 1879 (when not David Hogarth but British traveller Samuel Baker (2003 
[1879]) documented ruins and tombs in and around the village of Gallibornu); 
categorising it as one site or many is a theoretical game.  For example, Paul Åström 
(1960: 123) published a tomb ‘from Galinoporni’, found ‘outside the village’, ‘on the 
mountain slope’, ‘before reaching the Moslem cemetery’, which could be understood 
to have mentioned one site or five: the tomb could be an isolated burial site; 
Kaleburnu village could be a site of inhabitation; the area outside the village could 
itself be a locale, a place between the village and the mountain; the zone on the 
mountain slope could be a particular site of action (e.g. herd-grazing); the Muslim 
cemetery could be another burial site (or part of a single funereal landscape); and/or 
the Galinoporni/Kaleburnu area could be a single archaeological landscape. 
The Cyprus-based anti-excavation community considered the King’s Hill Project 
to be ‘excavations... at the site of Galinoporni’, while the Cyprus-based pro-
excavation community considered the project to be ‘excavating the Late Bronze Age 
site of Kaleburnu-Kraltepe/Galinoporni-Vasili’.  So, when the pro-excavation 
community stated that ‘the place was never registered as an archaeological site’ 
                                                 
79 Πόρνη. 
80 Πωρνή/Πρωινή. 
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before the academics found the hoard and the King’s Hill Project excavated the site, 
the outraged anti-excavation community perceived at least wilful ‘ignorance’, if not 
calculated ‘disrespect of the scholarly field of Cypriot archaeology’.  (These 
miscommunications increased not only the points of disagreement, but also the 
intensity of the personal and professional conflict.)  Yet no earlier evidence of 
archaeology specifically on King’s Hill has been presented, so the project’s excavated 
site must be assumed to be a new archaeological site. 
 
After the Green Line was opened in April 2003, Greek Cypriot parliamentarian 
Tassos Mitsopoulos insisted that showing a passport to enter northern Cyprus ‘under 
no circumstances constitute[d] recognition’ (cited in the Cyprus Mail, 2003b); 
indeed, Mitsopoulos argued that crossing the border was precisely ‘disput[ing] the 
division’ of the island (ibid.).  (Demonstrating that the Greek Cypriot public agreed 
with Mitsopoulos, by July 2008, the majority of the Greek Cypriot community had 
visited northern Cyprus (Pissa, 2008).)  So, the Republic of Cyprus Department of 
Antiquities can visit, inspect and monitor excavations in northern Cyprus.  
Furthermore, as discussed earlier, missing persons’ exhumations and the Nicosia 
Master Plan show that, when politically convenient for the states and the relevant 
professional communities, bicommunal archaeological and other cultural heritage 
work is possible, even in the secessionist territory of northern Cyprus.  The situation 
is more complicated for foreigners, however.  It is true that the Council of the 
European Union’s (EUC, 2004) Green Line Regulation protects internationals’ legal 
right to freedom of movement; but they may still find professional ‘difficulties’ if 
they enter the island through the north.  I and others have been repeatedly asked 
about our port of entry, and warned that if it had been in northern Cyprus, ‘we 
could not have helped you’. 
As for the recovery of missing persons’ remains, in the past, the Greek Cypriot 
authorities had engaged in ‘fabrication’, a ‘partial falsification of reality’, in its 
presentation of the information to its own community (Sant-Cassia, 2007: 90; 91); 
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the authorities prolonged missing persons’ families’ suffering to promote the state’s 
agenda.  The year after the (accurate) criticism of the Turkish Cypriot authorities’ 
uncooperativeness, both sides began collaborating on internationally-supervised, 
bicommunally-run forensic archaeological exhumations. 
 
It is relatively easy to examine the anti-excavation claim that the 15th General 
Assembly of ICOMOS condemned the King’s Hill project as illegal: it is not true.  
Indeed, even though the text was proposed by the (Greek) Cypriot National 
Commission of ICOMOS, the resolution neither categorised the excavations at 
Galinoporni as illegal, nor condemned them; it only ‘[c]ondemn[ed]... the name 
change of Gallinoporni [sic]’ (ICOMOSGA15, 2005: Art. 7).  Neither the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), nor the 
UNESCO advisory International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), have 
declared the excavation either legal or illegal (Romey, 2007: 60; 62). 
It is far more difficult, however, to assess the validity of the general claim that it 
is illegal to conduct archaeological fieldwork in the occupied north of Cyprus.  Anti-
excavation opinion attacks the dig as illegal according to the ICPCPEAC’s 1954 
Convention, and UNESCO’s 1970 and 1972 Conventions and 1956 
Recommendation; pro-excavation opinion defends the dig as legal according to the 
ICPCPEAC’s 1999 Protocol.  UNESCO’s 1972 Convention Concerning the 
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage never once mentions 
excavations or occupied territories.  It is difficult to find any relevant clause: Article 
6, Paragraph 1 ‘fully respect[s]’ state sovereignty over its cultural heritage sites; but 
the same paragraph simultaneously ‘recognize[s]... the duty of the international 
community’ to protect those sites.  UNESCO’s 1970 Convention on the Means of 
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of 
Cultural Property does not mention occupied territories.  Apart from recognising 
archaeological materials as cultural heritage, the 1970 Convention’s only reference 
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to archaeological excavations is Article 5(d), in which states commit to undertake 
excavation where necessary for the ‘protection’ of cultural heritage. 
As already mentioned, Article 5, Paragraph 1 of the ICPCPEAC’s 1954 Hague 
Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 
limits occupying powers to ‘support[ing] the competent national authorities of the 
occupied country’.  Article 5, Paragraph 2 of the 1954 Convention requires that, 
‘should the competent national authorities be unable to take such measures [to 
preserve cultural property], the Occupying Power shall, as far as possible, and in 
close-co-operation with such authorities, take the most necessary measures of 
preservation’; but the Convention does not define acceptable measures of 
preservation.  Article VI, Paragraph 32 of UNESCO’s 1956 New Delhi 
Recommendation on International Principles Applicable to Archaeological 
Excavations explicitly cautions against archaeological excavations in occupied 
territory.  As northern Cyprus-based underwater archaeologist Matthew Harpster 
(2008: 7) observed (when looking at the 1954 Convention), these post-Second World 
War laws and recommendations presume a ‘minimal degree of co-operation’ 
between the groups in conflict, where cultural property protection staff have 
diplomatic-style ‘immunity from the surrounding political conflict’. 
Anti-excavation opinion may be correct in saying that archaeologists in Turkish-
occupied territory cannot use international laws that the Republic of Turkey does 
not recognise.  However, equally, anti-excavation opinion cannot ignore or distort 
international laws that the Republic of Cyprus does recognise.  When the anti-
excavation community acknowledges the existence of the ICPCPEAC’s Second 
Protocol to the Hague Convention, the community states that Article 9, Paragraph 2 
is inapplicable anyway, because it only ‘permits excavations “in close co-operation 
with the competent national authorities of the occupied territories”’; but that 
opinion is an apparently deliberate distortion of the law.  Article 9, Paragraph 2 
states that rescue excavations in occupied territories should, ‘unless circumstances 
do not permit, be carried out in close co-operation with the competent national 
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authorities’ (ICPCPEAC, 1999: Art. 9, Para. 2 – emphasis added).  Like the 1954 
Convention, the 1999 Second Protocol still presumes the authorities’ willingness to 
co-operate when circumstances do permit, and when it refers to circumstances 
permitting or not permitting an action, it means military circumstances. 
In fact, this is made clear earlier in the Protocol, in Article 6, which states the 
conditions under which cultural property may be destroyed as a matter of military 
necessity: a junior officer can make the decision instead of a senior officer, ‘where 
circumstances do not permit otherwise’; and the force must forewarn the military 
targets in the cultural property, ‘whenever circumstances permit’.  It is also made 
clear later, in Article 13, which states the conditions under which cultural property 
under enhanced protection may be destroyed as a matter of military necessity: the 
‘highest operational level of command’ must give the order, and the targets must be 
forewarned, ‘unless circumstances do not permit, due to requirements of immediate 
self-defence’.  Thus, since the competent national authorities of Cyprus refuse to 
cooperate, archaeologists do not require their cooperation for rescue excavations in 
the north. 
At the same time, the Cyprus-based pro-excavation community cannot distort 
the international laws it wants to use in its defence (specifically, Article 9, Paragraph 
2 of the 1999 Second Protocol).  The ‘competent national authorities of the occupied 
territory’ are not the ‘local Cypriot authorities’, and the required ‘close co-operation’ 
is not between the archaeologists and the occupying power.  This claim is 
particularly absurd because, as discussed, that paragraph requires the occupying 
power’s ‘co-operation’ with those authorities, which (within the Cyprus-based pro-
excavation community’s logic) would be itself.  Furthermore, if the pro-excavation 
community insists upon interpreting that paragraph as rule for the relationship 
between archaeologists and occupying powers, then (il)logically it is stating that it 
would conduct archaeological excavation without the cooperation of the occupying 
power if ‘circumstances do not permit’. 
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The legality of any excavation in the north is dependent upon the validity of the 
excavation’s claim to be rescue.  Unfortunately, the King’s Hill excavation’s claim is 
disputed (even within the anti-excavation section of the archaeological community; 
some believe in the ‘necessity of rescue excavation at Galinoporni’, but others do 
not).  The Republic of Cyprus Department of Antiquities refuses to inspect the site; 
and the boycott prevents international archaeologists from inspecting the site.  
Furthermore, even after the excavation, the black list prevents any examination of 
its necessity, because the black list prevents peers from reviewing any publication of 
the excavation (either during the publication process or after any publication’s entry 
into public record).  Thus, currently, it is practically impossible to work out the 
validity and legality of the King’s Hill excavation at Galinoporni/Kaleburnu. 
Whether or not it is legal, the excavation is boycotted.  Since the Fritz Thyssen 
Foundation (FTS) froze its funding after the first season, and Eberhard Karls 
University of Tübingen withdrew its offer of funding, the King’s Hill project has 
only received funding from the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Eastern 
Mediterranean University.  All other potential funding bodies know that they must 
‘help to avert’ any ‘possible harm’ to other archaeologists: they must avoid the 
project to avoid their own and other archaeologists’ guilt by association and 
collective punishment.  As it is impossible to work out the legality of the excavation, 
so it is impossible to work out the ethics of its boycott.  However, the precautionary 
principle not to ease or enable work of uncertain legality is different from a choice 
to hinder or prevent legal cultural heritage work, or to exclude cultural heritage 
workers not proved guilty of any crime.  Hence, it is necessary to explore the 
blacklisting of archaeologists who have worked in northern Cyprus. 
 
4.b.iii.6. Martin Bartelheim, Işık Atay, and blacklisting 
 
In 2006, one of the King’s Hill project’s archaeologists, Dr. Martin Bartelheim, 
was expecting an archaeology lectureship from Oxford University (with 
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encouragement to continue work on the project).  At the same time, Oxford 
University was expecting a million-pound donation from the (Greek Cypriot refugee 
family) A. G. Leventis Foundation.  Ultimately, Bartelheim got not a job contract but 
a pre-written confession that he ‘apologise[d]’ for working on the King’s Hill project 
and promised ‘no longer [to] work on this site or anywhere else in northern Cyprus’, 
‘not [to] prepare or be associated with any publication... nor... any other work on 
these results’ (cited in Romey, 2007: 62).  Bartelheim refused to sign the confession, 
and was still searching for a job in 2007 (though he is employed now). 
In 2009, one of the project’s students, a Turkish graduate of Eastern 
Mediterranean University, Işık Atay, applied for work experience at the A. G. 
Leventis Gallery of Cypriote Antiquities in the Museum of Mediterranean and Near 
Eastern Antiquities (Medelhavsmuseet), Stockholm, Sweden.  Museum curator Dr. 
Kristian Goransson rejected his application because the Medelhavsmuseet ‘cannot in 
any way be associated’ with ‘excavations... considered illegal by UNESCO’ (cited in 
Cyprus Today, 2009).  As already noted, UNESCO has not commented upon the dig; 
and UNESCO/ICPCPEAC law has not been interpreted convincingly by either side. 
It must be remembered that both of these cases are examples of archaeologists 
not proved guilty of any crime, applying to do lawful work and get lawful training.  
Yet in both cases, they were excluded because of their association with 
archaeological work in northern Cyprus.  Together, these cases show that it is, if not 
impossible, at least very difficult for the northern Cypriot archaeological community 
to maintain contact with the international archaeological community.  
Archaeologists must choose (if they are allowed any choice at all) to work either in 
northern Cyprus (and Turkey) or in the rest of the world (including Turkey).  
Together, Bartelheim’s and Atay’s cases demonstrate that the archaeological 
community will hinder (and if possible, prevent) any archaeological fieldwork in 
northern Cyprus, even if it is legal rescue excavation. 
Apart from its immediate harm to Cypriot cultural heritage, the black list harms 
the Cypriot cultural heritage profession.  While it does not automatically and 
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completely prevent expert teaching, training and (non-invasive) archaeological 
research in northern Cyprus (e.g. by Turkish Cypriot archaeologists who choose not 
to migrate in order to work), isolation does severely limit the northern Cypriot 
community’s access to education, skills, technology, and staff.  Moreover, it deters 
legal rescue archaeology, and limits the ability of the archaeologists to do the rescue 
work.  Furthermore, it deters the Turkish Cypriot community (especially already-
under-represented groups) from training in cultural heritage, and thus threatens the 
functioning of an effective cultural heritage professional community in northern 
Cyprus.  Critically, the membership of the black list is not limited to archaeologists 
who have conducted invasive archaeological fieldwork in northern Cyprus. 
When responding to Eastern Mediterranean University Department of 
Archaeology and Art History claims that archaeologists in southern Cyprus suffered 
‘political pressure not to share data or collaborate in any way’ with archaeologists in 
northern Cyprus (paraphrased by Romey, 2007: 60), then antiquities director Pavlos 
Flourentzos implicitly admitted it.  Flourentzos dismissed the indiscriminate 
blacklisting and general boycott as not being the ‘main point’ (2007: 8), which was 
that universities in northern Cyprus were unlicensed, and therefore unlawful.  
Indeed, in the article that elicited Flourentzos’s reply, Kristin Romey (2007: 60) had 
published former antiquities director Vassos Karageorghis’s private threat to German 
archaeometallurgist Ernst Pernicka: his laboratory work for the King’s Hill project 
would have ‘serious repercussion[s] not only on [his] university [Tübingen], but also 
on all German archaeologists working in Cyprus and Greece’.  The same year, the 
Medelhavsmuseet published Karageorghis’s (2007) memoirs of a Lifetime in the 
Archaeology of Cyprus; and the boycott and black list became undeniable facts in 
the public record.  In his memoirs, Karageorghis (2007: 118) recorded how an 
unnamed French archaeologist, who had worked at Enkomi before the invasion, 
wrote a letter to the Turkish Cypriot antiquities director after the invasion, and was 
therefore internationally blacklisted.  The French archaeologist required (and, years 
later, received) Karageorghis’s personal ‘consent’ to be allowed to work in Greece 
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(ibid.).  Notably, the French archaeologist’s blacklisting was an ‘example to other 
prospective “profiteurs”’ (Karageorghis, 2007: 118 – emphasis added): the boycott is 
also a punishment for archaeological thought crimes. 
Theoretically, pre-1974 excavations in northern Cyprus, which could not rescue 
their finds, samples and notes before the north’s occupation, and thus have not been 
able to use their research materials since 1974, face a novel ethical dilemma: to 
publish their sites (necessitating official cooperation with the Turkish Cypriot 
authorities in order to study their research materials in northern Cyprus or to 
transfer their research materials out of northern Cyprus to the south or abroad); or 
to refuse to lend legitimacy to the Turkish Cypriot authorities (necessitating the 
non-publication of their data and thus being responsible for the effective destruction 
of the site).  However, that is not a practical dilemma.  Firstly, the Republic of 
Cyprus has politically and financially supported, and participated in, archaeological 
and other cultural heritage work in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (e.g. 
the Committee on Missing Persons, and the Nicosia Master Plan): so, there is no 
need to choose; if the Republic of Cyprus Department of Antiquities permitted, the 
foreign archaeological teams could use the same methods to conduct their work.  
Secondly, if any foreign archaeological team chose to ignore the boycott, they would 
be blacklisted themselves: the Department of Antiquities (and all other associated 
individuals and institutions) would withdraw their excavation and research licences 
to access their research materials; thus, they would be under a legal obligation not to 
publish their sites. 
 
4.b.iv. Academic publication, academic citation 
 
One of the primary reasons for non-partisan archaeologists to compromise 
themselves is the academic black list of cultural heritage workers who have 
somehow contradicted the wishes of the Hellenist archaeological community.  
Naturally, the black list is not normally acknowledged, let alone studied.  First of all, 
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its primary victims are themselves blacklisted, and even if the blacklisters cannot 
prevent the publication of blacklistees’ work, they can demand that blacklistees’ 
published ‘work should not be cited’ (Şevketoğlu, 2000b: 55).  Moreover, would-be 
publishers and citers of blacklistees’ work have been warned that they ‘risk l[o]sing 
permission to do their own work in Greece and Southern Cyprus’ (Şevketoğlu, 
2000b: 56).  To be crystal clear, I have not discussed, or tried to discuss, the black list 
with any of my cited sources.  The following sources have not even acknowledged 
the existence of a black list.  However, there are very few comments upon the 
process of citation, and I personally find it instructive to compare archaeological 
citation practice with other cultural heritage professions’ citation practices; I 
personally believe that institutional practice reflects community understanding. 
Bernard Knapp and Sophia Antoniadou (1998: 34n1) ‘could never support or 
substantiate any details emerging from northern Cyprus’, and did not cite (and, thus, 
did not address) any official Turkish Cypriot sources in their study of Archaeology, 
Politics and the Cultural Heritage of Cyprus.  In a study of the Manipulation of 
Roman Archaeology in Politically Fractured Landscapes, Jody Gordon (2008: 12n31) 
did include official Turkish Cypriot sources, ‘because it is only possible to explain 
the political manipulation’ by citing official sources; but ‘[d]ocuments produced by 
the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”’ were listed separately from the rest of 
the bibliography (Gordon, 2008: 34).  Knapp and Antoniadou did cite a Turkish 
Cypriot community source on the destruction of cultural heritage in northern 
Cyprus (i.e. Yaşın, 1982, cited by Knapp and Antoniadou, 1998: 24), but Yaşın’s 
(1982) articles had been cited in official Greek Cypriot sources (e.g. ROCPIO, 1997: 
5; 21; 29; 32; 34; 36; 37; 56; 61; 62; 66-67; 70; 71), and it is difficult to judge how 
much that made these “illegal” sources acceptable, and how much it made these 
originally Turkish-language sources simply accessible. 
Either way, that material had been critically filtered: the material was reduced to 
the selection the Greek Cypriot administration found it politically beneficial to 
translate.  So, the Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office (ROCPIO, 1997) 
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translated extracts of Yaşın’s (1982) articles on Turkish Cypriot looting in northern 
Cyprus after the Turkish invasion in 1974, but it did not report on Greek Cypriot 
paramilitaries’ looting and burning of Yaşın’s home in Nicosia in 1963 (affirmed in 
Durduran, 2001; Hussein, 2009).  More generally, the Greek Cypriot administration 
did not relay politically inconvenient reasons for neglect of cultural heritage in 
northern Cyprus, like poverty making conservation and restoration unaffordable, 
and academic and professional isolation – the boycott and black list – making work 
difficult or impossible (cf. Şevketoğlu, 2000b: 56). 
Strongly discouraged from conducting fieldwork research into the treatment of 
cultural heritage in southern Cyprus, greatly limited in researching that treatment in 
northern Cyprus, independent archaeologists were reduced to library research; but, 
unable to access contrary (Turkish-language) community sources and informally 
banned from citing contrary (English-language) official Turkish Cypriot sources, 
archaeologists could only reproduce official Greek Cypriot narratives.  It was not 
like this in other disciplines.  In conversation, archaeologists and historians 
commented upon historians’ relative freedom to cite Turkish Cypriot sources, and 
even to work with Turkish Cypriots.  Once, when I mentioned CAARI without 
clarifying the acronym (the Cyprus American Archaeological Research Institute), 
one anthropologist explained to another, ‘you know, the place where the Turkish 
Cypriot books are locked in a cupboard’.  Unlike Knapp and Antoniadou (1998), 
anthropologist Julie Scott cited official Turkish Cypriot sources (cf. 2002: 107n34; 
n36; 109n43; n44; n45; 110n49), and semi-official ones (cf. 2002: 114n66); so did 
political scientists Costas Constantinou and Mete Hatay (cf. 2010: 1).  And unlike 
Gordon (2008), neither Constantinou and Hatay nor Scott showed any concern to 
defend or explain their citations. 
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4.b.iv.1. Copping out81 
 
Some archaeologists made concessions, and self-censored their concessions from 
their publications; but their concessions preserved their data and their ability to do 
the censored work in any peaceful future.  In addition, a few of them told me about 
their compromises (always on condition of anonymity, sometimes on condition of 
not mentioning even anonymised versions of them in my work).  Thus, relatively 
unfree archaeologists managed to resist nationalist intimidation indirectly; and that 
nationalist intimidation was documented. 
For example, once, I prefaced a question with, ‘since we’re not in the conference 
now I can ask you this’, then I asked about archaeological evidence of remaining 
residents’ destruction of a refugee community’s cultural heritage.  Unfortunately, I 
do not have permission to examine that case study, and can only state that 
nationalist locals explained to archaeologists that ‘we’ do not talk about it, and that 
the archaeologists ‘copped out’ and complied. 
 
4.b.iv.2. Pirate publication 
 
One source I found elsewhere was Turkish Cypriot poet Mehmet Yaşın’s (1982) 
series of articles on looting and destruction-by-development in Perishing Cyprus82.  I 
had read and used English-language extracts published in Greek Cypriot propaganda 
(e.g. Mehmet Yaşın, 26. Nisan-17. Mayıs 1982, translated and republished in 
ROCPIO, 1997: 37; 62; 70; 71; cf. Hardy, forthcoming).  But when I tried to find the 
complete original Turkish-language newspaper articles, I learned that, in 1989, the 
Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office had translated and published a 
‘pirate edition’83 of Yaşın’s articles in a booklet (Mehmet Yaşın, 6th December 1989: 
                                                 
81 To cop out is to make a concession (parachoro (παραχωρώ); ödün vermek). 
82 Tükenen Kıbrıs. 
83 ‘[K]orsan yayın’ (Mehmet Yaşın, 6. Aralık 1989: Basın Açıklaması). 
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Press Statement; cf. ROCPIO, 1989a); the English-language extracts were from the 
pirate edition. 
In a press statement on 6th December 1989, Yaşın said that: 
 
This pirate book, which does not belong to me, has been 
distributed to the world’s libraries in my name.  I protest the 
Greek Cypriot Press and Information Office responsible for 
my publications being used so disrespectfully.84 
 
Unable to access Yaşın’s (1982) own work, I had to choose between using the 
ROCPIO’s (1997) translation, and excluding some of the rare, absolutely reliable 
information that I had.  Agreeing with Yaşın (and exceptionally appalled by the 
Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office’s continued pirating of Yaşın’s 
work after his protest), I have refused to use any of the illegitimately-published 
material. 
 
                                                 
84 ‘Bana ait olmayan bu korsan kitap, benim adıma Kıbrıs’taki ve dünyadaki kütüphanelere 
dağıtılmıştır. Yayınlarımın böylesine saygısızca kullanılmasından sorumlu olan Kıbrıs Rum Basın ve 
Enformasyon Dairesi’ni protesto ediyorum’ (Mehmet Yaşın, 6. Aralık 1989: Basın Açıklaması). 
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5. The subversion of scholarship 
 
When the Turkish Cypriot administration made the 1983 Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence, Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration began a ‘co-
ordinated worldwide campaign’ to undo it (Joseph, 1997: 53).  In 1985, semi-official 
Hellenist institutions produced the first comprehensive propaganda about cultural 
destruction (cf. CPCHC, 1985); and, in 1986, official Turkist institutions responded 
(cf. TRNCSCS and TRNCDAM, 1986).  Since then, each side has operated a cottage 
industry of official and semi-official books, articles, museums and exhibitions, and 
websites, produced by government ministries and municipalities, village and refugee 
associations, and other nationalist individuals and groups.  All of those official and 
semi-official works distinguished themselves from non-partisan work by subverting 
scholarship.  They claimed to present the whole problem but consciously showed 
one unrepresentative part, or neglected relevant actions and events – even if they 
used the relevant sources fairly, they still narrated misleading histories to the public.  
They excluded, or even avoided collecting, (potentially) inconvenient data – thus 
manipulating their information to enable them to write politically convenient 
histories.  They simply misstated facts; or they actively misrepresented 
archaeological, historical and/or community sources (by commission or omission) – 
thus falsely claiming that sources produced certain evidence or proved certain 
interpretations.  Here, I wish to explore how these cultural heritage workers 
subverted scholarship, and how their unscholarly behaviour influenced the cultural 
heritage profession and its work. 
These problems are manifested in the official Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus book about the Cultural Heritage of Northern Cyprus: its Protection and 
Preservation (TRNCSCS and TRNCDAM, 1986), and in the official Republic of 
Cyprus (ROCPIO, 1989b) book about the Destruction of the Cultural Heritage in the 
Turkish-Occupied Part of Cyprus (as well as many other official and semi-official 
interpretations on both sides).  However, those documents’ institutional authorship, 
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their “popular” style of citation, and their lack of discussion of their own and others’ 
sourcing of information and narration of history, may mask responsibility and hide 
the process of the manipulation of academic and public understanding.  Thus, first, I 
will explore international journalist Michael Jansen’s work, because it is exemplary 
of the subversion of scholarship.  Afterwards, I will examine other professional and 
community cultural heritage practices, which further demonstrate the corruption of 
knowledge and understanding of the Cyprus Conflict, and hence the community 
capacity to resolve the conflict. 
Apparently impartial and investigative, Jansen has presented her book in the 
British Parliament, and at an event partly organised by the New York Foreign Press 
Association; she has testified at the European Parliament’s Public Hearing on the 
Protection of the Cultural Heritage in Cyprus; and she has published in international 
journals (e.g. Jansen, 2008).  She has reported on the illicit antiquities trade for 
Archaeology magazine for at least twenty years.  Her book was favourably reviewed 
by a cultural heritage expert in the Friends of Cyprus Report (Clark, 2006: 56-58); 
her work was discussed in (albeit Hellenist) community newspapers, magazines and 
blogs (e.g. grhomeboy, 2006; Klok, 2007; Yiannis, 2006), and that discussion was 
reproduced in international academic conversations (e.g. Meadows, 2006).  Indeed, 
initially, I myself unquestioningly accepted Jansen’s interpretation of Dalibard’s 
report and UNESCO’s censorship (e.g. Hardy, 2008a; cf. Hardy, 2009c). 
Jansen (literally) wrote the book on looting and destruction of cultural heritage 
in Cyprus; at least, it was the only book not published by official or semi-official 
institutions.  Nonetheless, when she wrote it, she had lived in southern Cyprus since 
1976, had help from Greek Cypriot archaeologists, art historians, politicians and 
diplomats (2005: xiii-xiv); she also used maps and photographs provided by the 
Greek Cypriot Department of Antiquities and Department of Lands and Surveys, and 
the Press and Information Office (2005: figs. 1-30), including two ‘[p]repared 
specially… by the Cyprus Department of Antiquities’ (2005: figs. 2-3), as she had 
had one ‘produced by the Cyprus Antiquities Department at [her] request’ for her 
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review of the Hellenist catalogue of the Plundering of a 9000-year-old Civilization 
(1986: 316), to which antiquities director Karageorghis (1985) had contributed; 
former antiquities director Sophocles Hadjisavvas ‘reviewed the text’ of her book for 
her (2005: xiv).  As Republic of Cyprus spokesperson Kypros Chrysostomides (2006) 
observed, editor and publisher Prof. Theofanis Stavrou ‘has used a prominent 
academic forum at the university of Minnesota to spread Mrs. Jansen’s and other 
people’s passionate message for the protection, preservation and respect of our 
cultural heritage’. 
Any last doubt of Jansen’s position is dispelled by her patrons: the American 
Hellenic Institute (AHI), the American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association 
(AHEPA) and the Embassy of the Republic of Cyprus sponsored her 2006 speech to 
the United States National Press Club (NPC); the Onassis Foundation and the 
Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations sponsored her 2006 speech to 
the New York Foreign Press Association (FPA); and the Government of the Republic 
of Cyprus sponsored her 2007 article in an international policy journal, Europe’s 
World.  Unfortunately, Michael Jansen can only be considered a Hellenist source. 
 
5.a. The bowdlerisation of Jacques Dalibard’s UNESCO reports 
 
As mentioned earlier, after the Turkish invasion in 1974, UNESCO visited a 
sample of sites around the island, then appointed an Advisor for the Cultural 
Heritage of Cyprus to help with cultural property conservation and restoration.  The 
advisor, Canadian restoration architect Jacques Dalibard, inspected a set of sites in 
1975 and submitted a report.  (It had some inevitable flaws: for example, a ‘friendly 
policeman’ told Dalibard that rain had washed out a road, so he did not visit, and 
thus did not record, the newly pillaged Monastery of Antifonitis (Fielding, 1976b: 
13); but it was as thorough as possible in the circumstances.)  UNESCO suppressed, 
then published Dalibard’s research, very heavily-edited, in 1976.  The original report 
became a legend: its suppression has been cited in general histories of Cyprus and 
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global histories of the censorship of historical thought.  Telling Cyprus’s history – 
unfortunately without citing even an anonymous source – in 1997, Christopher 
Hitchens (1997: 113) wrote that UNESCO kept the report ‘confidential – in the hope 
of avoiding a rupture with Turkey’ (but, apparently, not with Greece or the Greek 
Cypriot administration).  Previously an Amnesty International monitor, historian 
Antoon de Baets followed Hitchens.  Citing him when presenting a global history of 
the censorship of historical thought in 2002, de Baets (2002: 146) grounded Cyprus’s 
place in that history in UNESCO’s suppression of information about the ‘many 
Christian and Hellenic monuments… destroyed and archaeological sites desecrated’ 
(but, apparently, not Islamic or Ottoman monuments).  They are a couple of 
examples of the continuing influence of the suppression of the report upon public 
discourse; notably, they are both genuinely, demonstrably independent authors; 
however, their works were incidentally biased.  Yet, remarkably, contemporary 
accounts of the suppression explicitly stated that Dalibard’s report had been 
‘suppressed for fear of upsetting both Greeks and Turks’ (Fielding, 1976a: 13).  The 
Committee for the Protection of the Cultural Heritage of Cyprus only blamed 
‘probably’ Turkish pressure (Leventis, 2000: 150); and deliberately misrepresenting 
the newspaper article quoted above, the Republic of Cyprus Press and Information 
Office only reminded its readers of the ‘Turkish Cypriot’s calculated disregard for 
the truth’ (Fielding, 1976a: 13, cited in ROCPIO, 1997: 53); but still, neither of those 
source’s brief comments would fully explain contemporary public understanding.  
Another figure appears to have been key to the presentation and promotion of the 
suppressed report, and to its influence upon academic and popular public 
understanding. 
Journalist Michael Jansen first accused UNESCO of ‘giving the [Turkish Cypriot 
and Turkish] looters and smugglers both license and immunity’ in 1986 (Jansen, 
1986: 315; she attributed her opinion to Fielding’s (1976a: 13) newspaper article).  In 
her recent book, Jansen (2005: 27) said that Dalibard’s original report’s ‘contents still 
remain a carefully guarded secret to all but the few who manage to obtain a copy’.  
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Jansen included the original report in her bibliography (2005: 75), and spoke with 
authority about what would have happened if it had been publicised (2005: 27-28), 
so it seems that she was one of the few who did manage to obtain a copy.  Like most 
people, I did not; but I did have a copy of the censored one, and Jansen got 
worryingly simple details about the censored report wrong.  For example, Jansen 
said that Dalibard’s censored report was five pages long (2005: 28), but the part on 
northern Cyprus was over six pages long, and the whole was nine pages.  She said he 
spent two months on the island (Jansen, 2005: 24), but he spent more than three 
there (Dalibard, 1976: 1).  Jansen said that ‘there was massive pillage and destruction 
in the north and none in the south’ (2005: 45); but even the one-and-a-half pages 
about southern Cyprus in Dalibard’s censored report recognised that the fourth-
holiest Islamic site in the world (in Larnaca District, just to the south-west of 
Larnaca itself (see map 5)), Hala Sultan Tekke, had been damaged (1976: 2), and 
recorded that Ömeriye Mosque was in ‘very bad condition’ and Bayraktar Mosque 
had been ‘totally vandalized, the minaret pulled down, the windows blocked, the 
roof in a state of collapse’ (1976: 3).  The numerical mistakes could be dismissed as 
forgetfulness or thoughtlessness; but the claims about destruction are different.  
Jansen’s representation was not a result of the problems inherent in doing this kind 
of fieldwork research, and it was not a result of poor or lazy scholarship; others had 
done the fieldwork research, and she had studied their results in detail.  Her 
representation could only be a deliberate misrepresentation of the facts.  Jansen 
(2005: 27) alleged that UNESCO ‘bowdlerized [censored]’ Dalibard’s original report, 
and the loss of 90% of the text demonstrates that it did; but she bowdlerised both his 
original report and even the already-censored one. 
More than two decades after the alleged “bowdlerisation” of his report and 
“exposure” of UNESCO’s appeasement of Turkey, Dalibard discussed the events, but 
neglected to mention either of those things.  He explained that he had had ‘to go 
from one side to the other and try to convince the armies’ – note the plural – ‘… not 
to blow up the heritage buildings…. and to stop the looting and all these things’ 
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(Dalibard and Donaldson, 1999 – emphasis added; notably, Dalibard explained this 
years before Jansen published her revised, extended study, which still did not even 
acknowledge the destruction documented by Dalibard three decades earlier).  Yet 
Jansen’s representation of Dalibard’s work and its treatment is now more influential 
than his own. 
 
5.b. Ymenus van der Werff and Robin Cormack’s downplayed PACE report 
 
When Michael Jansen exclaimed that there had been no destruction in southern 
Cyprus, she had been using UNESCO’s investigation to criticise the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe’s one.  Jansen (2005: 45) believed that because 
PACE’s Senator Ymenus van der Werff and Consultant Expert Robin Cormack also 
inspected cultural heritage sites in southern, as well as northern, Cyprus, their 
report ‘would lean over backwards to minimize criticism of the Turkish side’ (as she 
felt the UNESCO report had done). 
Yet Jansen appears to have leaned over backwards to minimise criticism of the 
Greek side: Michael Jansen cited John Fielding’s work as support for her argument, 
even when Fielding had stated in his opening paragraph that Dalibard’s report had 
been ‘suppressed for fear of upsetting both Greeks and Turks’ (Fielding, 1976a: 13 – 
emphasis added; see fig. 1).  Similarly, Jansen must have read Fielding’s (1976a: 13) 
one-page report, in which he casually referred to ‘the 103 Turkish villages destroyed 
by Greeks’ as if it was an uncontroversial fact; but Jansen (1986) did not even 
acknowledge it as an allegation. 
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Figure 1: Fielding’s (1976a: 13) opening paragraph. 
 
Jansen judged that ‘the two situations [north and south] were not in any way 
comparable’, dismissed ‘Cormack[’s]... show of even-handedness’, and concluded 
that ‘[b]y taking a balanced approach,… [they] played down Turkey’s role’ in the 
looting and destruction of Cypriot cultural heritage (Jansen, 2005: 48; 50; 51).  
Jansen must have read van der Werff’s (1989) and Cormack’s (1989) report, to have 
been able to quote and cite it so substantially (Jansen, 2005: 48-51).  Yet, apart from 
restoration of possibly decaying, possibly damaged mosques and Ottoman buildings 
noted by both van der Werff and Cormack, van der Werff observed that Ktima 
Paphos’s New Mosque85 ‘had been entirely razed’ (1989: 11) and that Evdimou 
Mosque had to be ‘virtually… rebuilt’ (1989: 13).  (Van der Werff (1989: 13) also 
reiterated that Ömeriye Mosque’s minaret was ‘damaged’.)  Again, Jansen did not 
acknowledge this destruction in southern Cyprus.  Indeed, by denying that any 
destruction had taken place, she implicitly denied that these specific acts of 
destruction – ones she knew UNESCO and PACE recognised – had taken place. 
Possibly the most shocking of Jansen’s active distortions – as opposed to her 
chronic silence about destruction of Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage – is her 
representation of Senator van der Werff’s opinion.  Jansen parsed van der Werff 
thus: 
 
                                                 
85 New Mosque (Yeni Cami, or Camii Jedid); also known as the Great Mosque (Büyük Cami), but 
there is another, standing mosque in Ktima Paphos also known as the Great Mosque 
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Most of this damage has occurred in the north and is the 
result of looting[.]… evidently linked with the highly 
professional international market in illegally exported art.  
After early opportunist raids during the unsettled period 
following 1974, more organised looting of selected targets 
seems to have taken place between 1977 and 1982….  Some 
damage was however clearly caused for no other purpose than 
destruction (van der Werff, 1989: 11, cited in Jansen, 2005: 50 
– original ellipses). 
 
Jansen’s ellipsis following ‘1977 and 1982’ erased: 
 
Public opinion, through the Turkish Cypriot press, is now 
increasingly aware of the problem.  The south is also 
vulnerable as the theft of the Leda and Swan mosaic from the 
Paphos museum shows.  Unfortunately, the international art 
market is now well aware of the existence of a well-funded 
market in the south for items coming from the north (van der 
Werff, 1989: 11). 
 
She had passed over the parallel trade in antiquities from southern Cyprus, and the 
Greek Cypriot administration’s equal inability to suppress it.  She cannot be accused 
of hiding Greek Cypriot collectors’ involvement in the trade, as she had 
acknowledged it earlier, even if she did present it as reactive and patriotic (2005: 19-
20), rather than proactive and greedy.  Nevertheless, the end of her quotation should 
have been: 
 
Some damage was however clearly caused for no other 
purpose than destruction.  In the south, we visited the site of 
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the main Paphos mosque that had been entirely razed and 
saw damaged graves (van der Werff, 1989: 11). 
 
She had distorted a condemnation of pre-1974 Greek Cypriot destruction of Turkish 
Cypriot cultural heritage to make it sound like a condemnation of post-1974 Turkish 
Cypriot destruction of Greek Cypriot cultural heritage.  That is an appalling and 
inexcusable traducing of sources. 
 
5.c. The corruption of scholarship 
 
Initially, it appeared that Michael Jansen’s most recent work was different from 
her previous writings: having previously criticised others for ‘taking a balanced 
approach,… [which] played down Turkey’s role in the plunder, pillage, and 
destruction of the heritage of the island’ (Jansen, 2005: 51), she began her 
presentation to the American National Press Club by discussing the treatment of 
cultural heritage on both sides of the island (cf. Jansen, 2006).  Yet, Jansen (2006) 
summarised the Cyprus Temples project’s results thus: ‘a majority of mosques in the 
south are in fair to good repair while most churches and monasteries in the north…. 
have been looted of icons and stripped of wall paintings and mosaics’.  Very 
simplistically, statistically, this may have been true.  The Cyprus Civil Engineers’ 
and Architects’ Association and Chamber of Cyprus Turkish Architects’ website, 
Cyprus Temples (www.cyprustemples.com), features 96 of 115 mosques in southern 
Cyprus, and many were in fair to good condition.  However, despite unpublished 
sites, and uninformatively or incorrectly recorded sites, the Cyprus Temples project 
still identified 16 mosques and tekkes that had been reduced to ruins or razed to the 
ground. 
Ktima Paphos’s 1902 New Mosque ‘was demolished on 9th March, 1964….  The 
site is now a park and parking place’ (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007no).  Turabi Tekke 
‘was pulled down and a gasoline station was built’ in its place (CCEAA and CCTA, 
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2007cq).  Kantou’s Muslim shrine86 ‘is vanished’, replaced with a ‘car mechanic 
workshop’ (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007mi).   ‘Nothing exists’ of Goshi/Koşşi Mosque 
anymore: ‘[i]t was demolished before 1974’ (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007hc).  
Phalia/Gökçebel Mosque ‘no longer exists. Probably demolished after the village was 
abandoned’ (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007dc).  Kidasi Mosque ‘does not exist any more’ 
either (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007mw).  Loukrounou/Olukönü Mosque’s place was 
known, but it was ‘[n]ot found’ there (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007oz), as Fasli/Faslı and 
Magounda/Yakacık Mosques ‘[c]ould not be found’ (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007ql; 
2007tf).  The only remains of the mosques of Deneia/Denya, Pano 
Koutraphas/Yukarı Kutrafa, Korakou/Coracı, and Flasou/Flâsu are ‘ruins’ (CCEAA 
and CCTA, 2007el; 2007em; 2007en; 2007eo); and a local Greek Cypriot specifically 
told me that Korakou/Coracı Mosque had been ‘destroyed’.  In Maroni/Marova, ‘the 
mosque, the school…. are all ruins’ (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007kp); Tremithousa 
Mosque is ‘a ruin’ (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007ot).  Hasan Ağa Masjid and Tekke had a 
mosque, a masjid, a tekke, a medrese, a hamam, and other buildings, but the only 
things left are the hamam and one of the mosque’s interior walls (CCEAA and 
CCTA, 2007nu).  There was also partial destruction: for instance, Polis-tis-
Chrysochou Mosque’s ‘minaret and [its] stone stairs... do not exist’ any more 
(CCEAA and CCTA, 2007qj); and Famagusta’s Sinan Paşa Mosque’s minaret was ‘half 
demolished’ (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007bb). 
There are many understandable reasons for absences, errors, or confusing 
information in these data.  For example, the Cyprus Temples project did not know 
the location of the mosque in Aksylou/Aksu and was ‘[u]nable to find’ it (CCEAA 
and CCTA, 2007tr).  Fortunately, an elderly Greek Cypriot local showed it to me: it 
was painted blue outside and gutted inside (see figs. 2 and 3). 
                                                 
86 The bicommunal architectural survey did not list individual cemeteries, only buildings associated 
with cemeteries, like cemetery churches; so this cemetery must have been a shrine. 
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Figure 2: Aksylou/Aksu Mosque exterior – note the new blue paint. 
 
 
Figure 3: Aksylou/Aksu Mosque interior – note the old green paint. 
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Accordingly, even in the bicommunal team’s outstanding work, there were errors 
that hid other destruction.  For instance, Evdimou/Evdim Mosque was said to be in 
‘[v]ery [g]ood’ condition (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007tl), when it had been demolished 
then ‘virtually… rebuilt’ (van der Werff, 1989: 13).  Similarly, Nicosia’s Tahtakale 
Mosque was ‘restored’ (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007ar), when it had been restored from 
the ‘ruins’ of the destroyed mosque (Greek Cypriot refugee, cited in Papadakis, 2005: 
145).  While the team recognised that all of (now inaccessible) Tymbou/Ercan’s 
Kırklar Tekke’s ‘lodging rooms had been demolished’, they observed that the 
mosque’s ceiling had ‘fallen in’ (seemingly naturally) by 1987 (CCEAA and CCTA, 
2007np); apparently, they were unaware that the mosque had been burned in 1958 
(cf. Yüksel, 1958: 1).  Tophane Masjid in Nicosia-within-the-Walls was said to be in 
‘[g]ood’ condition, though its ‘Map [sic – mihrap] seems to have been demolished’ 
(CCEAA and CCTA, 2007ao).  Koilani/Ceylan Mosque was generally said to be in 
‘[f]air’ condition, though its minaret was ‘partially ruined’ and its mihrab was 
‘missing’, while its façade was categorised first as in ‘[f]air’ condition, then as in 
‘[r]uin’ (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007mu); similarly, Zuhuri Tekke and Mosque’s 
structure was said to be in ‘[v]ery [g]ood’ condition, though the top half of the 
minaret was ‘missing’ (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007cp).  Souskiou/Susuz Mosque’s 
decoration was said to be in ‘[f]air’ condition, but the photograph showed half of the 
mihrab’s decoration was missing (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007cw).  And Nicosia’s Nebet 
Khane Masjid ‘[m]ight be demolished’, but its site had been inaccessible to its 
inspector (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007ap).  These and other problematic records make 
it difficult to use the Cyprus Temples project as a near-complete religious cultural 
heritage survey, or to use its findings to assess untrustworthy sources. 
Nonetheless, without considering the categorisation of harm as “significant” or 
“severe” damage, “severe damage” or “partial destruction”, Jansen had apparently 
reviewed records documenting the complete destruction of 16 Islamic/Turkish 
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Cypriot cultural heritage sites, and significant harm to 7 sites87; yet she only 
acknowledged that a minority of mosques were not in ‘fair to good repair’ (Jansen, 
2006).  Particularly in light of Jansen’s explicit recognition of the looting of 
Orthodox Christian/Greek Cypriot buildings, her omission of the razing of 
Islamic/Turkish Cypriot ones is telling.  It is consequently unsurprising that Jansen 
evidently did not visit harmed Islamic/Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage in southern 
Cyprus.  Nevertheless, it is worth acknowledging some of the archaeological and 
historical evidence that both Michael Jansen and her sources excluded from their 
public and private narratives.  Contemporary news reports confirmed that in 1964, 
unknown persons ‘wrecked’ Trapeza/Beşparmak’s mosque (Fellows, 1964: 3); and 
Greek Cypriot paramilitaries – Nikos Sampson’s right-wing nationalist Green Berets 
and Dr. Vassos Lyssarides’ left-wing nationalist Red Berets – first ‘damaged’ Sellain 
t’Appi/Selçuklu’s mosque, then reduced every building to ‘burning ruins’ (British 
United Press, 1964: 1; see also Spiegel, 1964: 55).  Although site visits to flat earth or 
a mass of ruined buildings could have been uninformative to Jansen, dissident 
Turkish Cypriot journalist Hasan Karaokçu’s (2003) reports documented the razing 
of Agios Epifanios/Aybifan Mosque, and the ruination of Agios Sozomenos/Arpalık 
Mosque.  (I have visited both villages, but photographs of the razed ground are 
uninformative.) 
It is apparent that Jansen, and her archaeologist informants and editors, either 
did not show, or did not look for, the archaeological evidence either (or the 
community explanation of the lack of visible evidence).  I could not find 
Anglisides/Aksu Mosque when I visited the village, but one Turkish Cypriot refugee 
has testified how local Greek Cypriot nationalists ‘pulled [it] down’ ‘stone by stone’ 
(Denizaksulu, 2008a), and built a playground in its place (Denizaksulu, 2008b).  
Similarly, another Turkish Cypriot refugee has described how Kato Deftera/Aşağı 
Deftera Mosque was ‘totally demolished’ (Halil, 2008a), Kolossi/Yunus Mosque was 
                                                 
87 As shown above, my research has established that at least 19 of the 96 southern Cypriot mosques 
had been completely destroyed, and 7 significantly harmed (excluding Bayraktar and Ömeriye 
Mosques, which were harmed by Turkish Cypriot paramilitary attacks (Levent, 2008)). 
165 
 
‘completely destroyed’, and Softades/Düzova Mosque was ‘razed’ (Halil, 2008c).  As I 
surveyed the cropmarks in the grass, a local Greek Cypriot confirmed to me that 
Arediou/Aredyu Mosque had been ‘demolished’ (see fig. 4).  If Jansen and/or her 
archaeologist informants and editors had visited, they would have found the remains 
of Eliofotes/Alifodez’s mosque (see fig. 5), which was either ‘demolished’ during 
‘road improvement’ in 1977 (Goodwin, 1978: 283), or ‘demolish[ed]’ as ‘a danger and 
an eyesore’ in the 1980s (Constantinou and Hatay, 2010: 13). 
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Figure 4: a cropmark outline of the mosque razed to the ground in Arediou/Aredyu. 
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Figure 5: the ruins of Eliofotes/Alifodez Mosque. 
 
My fieldwork and library research (including the Cyprus Temples project’s 
corrected records) have established that at least 29 of the 115 southern Cypriot 
mosques have been completely destroyed (while the Church of Cyprus Synodical 
Committee for Monuments and Art (CCSCMA, 2009) lists 19 of the 505 northern 
Cypriot churches as ‘demolished’).  Thus, Jansen (2006) may have been correct in 
stating that ‘most’ northern Cypriot churches have been significantly harmed, 
whereas the ‘majority’ of southern Cypriot mosques have not; yet more southern 
Cypriot mosques have been destroyed than northern Cypriot churches (indeed, 
more than 25% of those mosques, less than 4% of those churches).  The absence of 
this information from archaeologists’ information on destruction, and from Jansen’s 
history of cultural heritage in conflict, cannot even be blamed on the boycott and 
the black list, or excused by the Turkish military occupation.  Even while Greek 
Cypriots could not access northern Cyprus, Greek Cypriot cultural heritage workers 
managed to document destruction of Christian cultural heritage there (e.g. CPCHC, 
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1985; 1998; ROCPIO, 1997); yet they failed to document destruction of Turkish 
Cypriot cultural heritage in their own free areas; indeed, as I will show later, Greek 
Cypriot archaeologists produced work exclusively about Islamic cultural heritage 
that still did not acknowledge any destruction (e.g. ACA, 1990; 2008), and so could 
only be described as denial by omission.  Jansen’s semi-official history of cultural 
heritage destruction demonstrates the manipulation of publicly accessible 
information, the exclusion of politically inconvenient data, what can only be 
considered the refusal to collect inconvenient data, and the unscholarly distortion of 
professional texts. 
 
5.d. The growth of a myth 
 
Presenting evidence of ‘ethnic cleansing’ of (Greek) Cypriot cultural heritage 
(Hadjisavvas, 2000: 13), then Director of the Republic of Cyprus Department of 
Antiquities Sophocles Hadjisavvas (2000: 14) alleged that Cyprus’s only World 
Heritage Site (in 1974), ‘the famous Paphos mosaics were bombed, even though no 
battles were fought with the invading army in that area’.  As international law Prof. 
George Tenekides (1985: 48) observed (in a publication that noted the Pafos mosaics’ 
bombing), such deliberate destruction of cultural heritage, in an act of international 
violence, is illegal under the ICPCPEAC’s 1954 Hague Convention and UNESCO’s 
1972 World Heritage Convention. 
One international archaeologist challenged that ‘it was all out in the open, to 
begin with, but it’s become this big myth’.  It is possible to identify a few of the 
points in the spread of the myth.  Already in the Annual Report of the Director of 
the Department of Antiquities (ARDA) for the year of the Turkish invasion, then 
antiquities director Vassos Karageorghis (1974: 3) relayed that ‘the mosaic floors of 
the Roman Villa of Dionysos at Kato Paphos… suffered damage as a result of 
[Turkish army] bombing’ (see also Karageorghis, 1974: 10; 21; figs. 29-36).  Cyprus 
Museum Curator and antiquities department archaeologist Kyriakos Nikolaou 
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reported ‘considerable damage as a result of bombing and machine gunfire from 
Turkish aircraft’ in the American Journal of Archaeology (1976a: 361) and ‘severe 
damage as a result of bombing by Turkish aircraft’ in the international 
Archaeological Reports (1976b: 34; see also Nikolaou, 1981: 49).  In the CPCHC’s 
original catalogue, Greek Cypriot presidential under-secretary Stavrou (1985: 35) 
repeated the allegation; and both the Committee itself (CPCHC, 1994: 83), and then 
antiquities director Sophocles Hadjisavvas (2000: 14), maintained the myth in later 
editions.  At some point, the myth became part of public memory.  For example, 
historian Christopher Hitchens (1997: 21) averred that ‘[o]ne has to recall the 
Turkish shells that fell on the mosaic floor’.  There is an explanation for how the 
mosaics were bombed despite the Greek Cypriot National Guard not fighting the 
Turkish Army near them.  The international archaeologist explained that, in fact, 
the damage to the Paphos Mosaics ‘happened during the coup… it was done by 
coupists, but they say, “oh, it was the Turks”’.  Due to a loophole only closed by the 
ICPCPEAC’s Second Protocol to the Hague Convention (1999: Art. 22, Para. 1), an 
act of intracommunal violence (or negligent destruction) was not against the letter 
of the ICPCPEAC’s 1954 Convention, but it was still against the spirit (cf. UNESCO, 
1999). 
It is possible to find motives for the myth.  UNESCO helped the Department of 
Antiquities to restore the site (Karageorghis, 1975: 3), and the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) funded the entire project (Karageorghis, 1977: 
18).  Accordingly, the United Nations might not have been quite so generous if they 
had known the collateral damage had been inflicted by Greek Cypriot nationalist 
extremists long backed by the very administration appealing for their help.  
Nonetheless, that would be a big myth for a small sum.  The only apparent 
alternative motive would have been simply to mask (albeit accidental) cultural 
heritage damage from Greek Cypriot intracommunal violence, thus to absolve Greek 
Cypriot forces of responsibility and (literally) to produce evidence of Turkish ethnic 
cleansing of the Greek Cypriot community. 
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5.e. The restoration and reuse of Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage 
 
Here, I will examine the ethics of Greek Cypriot cultural heritage workers’ 
restoration of, and public education about, Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage in 
southern Cyprus.  The Republic of Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot community make 
a lot of political capital out of their impartial conservation and restoration, their care 
for both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot, both Christian and Islamic historic 
sites.  And they make even more political capital because of their perceived 
innocence, their professional treatment of Turkish Cypriot Islamic sites, unlike and 
despite provocative Turkish/Turkish Cypriot behaviour in the north.  There, the 
Hellenist cultural heritage community allege, the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus, and the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish settler communities, wilfully neglect 
and actively violate Christian/Greek Cypriot cultural heritage sites.  However, the 
treatment of cultural heritage on both sides of the Green Line is far more complex.  
Not only are the ethics of contemporary cultural heritage work questionable, but 
also public education about those sites and their treatment is deceptive; and that 
unscholarly cultural heritage work actually inhibits or prevents professional and 
community protection of cultural heritage. 
Once, in discussion with a Greek Cypriot archaeologist, I noted that ‘we 
discussed the (103) villages that were abandoned between 1963 and 1974, but I have 
been unable to find a list of those sites’, and asked, ‘do you know which villages the 
103 are?  Has any record been made of those sites?’  The archaeologist explained that 
‘the Department of Antiquities does not have such information’.  Another Greek 
Cypriot archaeologist complained that archaeologists were ‘simply not allowed to 
become involved with abandoned… [Turkish Cypriot] villages in the free area’, 
because they were controlled by the Republic of Cyprus Turkish Cypriot Properties 
Management Service (ROCTCPMS).  Yet Greek Cypriot cultural heritage 
professionals have restored Islamic/Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage in the south; 
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and they have produced public education material about Islamic/Turkish Cypriot 
cultural heritage on the island (e.g. ACA, 1990; 2008).  Through the treatment of 
religious and secular Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage, it is possible to establish 
Greek Cypriot cultural heritage workers’ freedom to act; hence, it is possible to 
identify areas where ethical archaeologists are unable to act, and where irresponsible 
cultural heritage workers do unprofessional work, and narrate histories that mislead 
scholarly and public communities. 
 
5.e.i. The rebuilding of Evdimou/Evdim Mosque, and the misdirection of its history 
 
As I noted before, in a tangible example of the more difficult-to-document 
problem of the perversion of scholarship, the bicommunal architectural survey team 
recorded Evdimou Mosque’s structure, façade, roof, interior and decoration in 
‘[v]ery [g]ood’ condition (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007tl); but it had had to be 
‘virtually… rebuilt’ first (van der Werff, 1989: 13).  The history of the mosque’s 
destruction has been buried beneath its rebuilding.  Greek Cypriot cultural heritage 
workers have not only conducted restoration in a way that prevented neutral 
cultural heritage workers from seeing damage to and destruction of mosques; they 
have also written supposedly scholarly publications in a way that misled the 
academic community and the public by omission or commission. 
In the first edition of its book, Muslim Places of Worship in Cyprus, the 
Association of Cypriot Archaeologists spoke of the Greek Cypriot administration’s 
‘maintenance’ of ‘abandoned’ mosques (ACA, 1990: 10), without any 
acknowledgement of any deliberate damage or destruction; and amongst many other 
photographs of many other mosques, the ACA printed three decontextualised 
photos of the restored Evdimou Mosque (ACA, 1990: 32 – figs. 55-57), implicitly 
suggesting that it had been maintained in that state, rather than rebuilt to it.  In the 
third edition of the book, the ACA spoke of ‘maintenance’ of ‘unattended’ mosques 
(in ‘abandoned’ villages), admitting not only ‘natural damage due to the passage of 
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time’, but also deliberate damage due to ‘random acts of vandalism’ (ACA, 2008: 21).  
A child graffiti tagging the wall of a mosque, or throwing a pebble through an 
abandoned building’s window, is a “random act of vandalism”.  A semi-literate bigot 
scrawling ‘fuck Torkey [sic – Turkey]’88 on the wall of Evdimou Mosque is vandalism 
(see fig. 6).  A nationalist mob or a paramilitary gang demolishing a mosque is not 
“vandalism”: it is destruction. 
 
 
Figure 6: “fuck Turkey” graffiti on the wall of Evdimou/Evdim Mosque. 
 
Moreover, the third edition of the book cannot be played down or dismissed as a 
publication of a private professional faction: it was ‘[p]ublished by the Press and 
Information Office, Republic of Cyprus… in cooperation with the Association of 
Cypriot Archaeologists’ (ACA, 2008: back cover).  The authors of the texts are 
unknown, but at least now, the Administrative Council of the Association of Cypriot 
Archaeologists includes antiquities department archaeologists.  Written by Greek 
                                                 
88 ‘Gamo tin Torkia [sic - Tourkia] [γαμώ την Τορκία [sic - Τουρκία]]’ 
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Cypriot archaeologists, published by the Greek Cypriot administration (in Arabic, 
English, Greek, Russian, and Turkish, and possibly other languages), the book was 
an attempt to establish and control an academic and public history of the treatment 
of Islamic/Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage.  It must be remembered that, due to the 
international archaeological boycott of Turkish Cypriot publications, these Greek 
Cypriot texts are normally the only texts available in libraries.  Again, the third 
edition of the book presented three decontextualised photos of the restored Evdimou 
Mosque (ACA, 2008: 57 – figs. 91-93).  Naturally, it is difficult to know how many 
other mosques’ damage and destruction has been hidden this way.  But it is known 
that this restoration was so complete and so careful that the Cyprus Temples 
project’s bicommunal architectural survey team, which was looking for damage and 
destruction, found none.  Indeed, the architects and civil engineers who inspected 
the mosque did not even note that it had been restored.  It could not have been an 
accident. 
As long ago as 1931, in the Athens Charter for the Restoration of Historic 
Monuments, the First International Congress of Architects and Technicians of 
Historic Monuments (FICATHM) deemed that, for ‘ruins, scrupulous conservation is 
necessary, and… the new materials used for this purpose should in all cases be 
recognisable (FICATHM, 1931: Ch. 6, Para. 2).  And in 1964, the Second 
International Congress of Architects and Technicians of Historic Monuments 
(SICATHM) passed the International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration 
of Monuments and Sites (the Venice Charter), which explicitly stated that: 
 
Replacements of missing parts must integrate harmoniously 
with the whole, but at the same time must be distinguishable 
from the original so that restoration does not falsify the 
artistic or historic evidence (SICATHM, 1964: Art. 12). 
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(That was approved by the International Council on Monuments and Sites 
(ICOMOS)89 in 1965.) 
Manifestly, the restoration of Evdimou Mosque violated both the 1931 Athens 
Charter and the 1964 Venice Charter.  Indeed, although the antiquities department 
did not control the restoration of Evdimou Mosque, Greek Cypriot cultural heritage 
professionals did the work, and such restoration contradicted the antiquities 
department’s principle that a monument should be an ‘open book’, so that ‘someone 
can read the history of the monument and consequently the history of Cyprus’ (cited 
in the Financial Mirror, 2010).  Subsequently, both as “independent archaeologists” 
and as “state representatives”, Greek Cypriot archaeologists presented the 
immaculately-restored Evdimou Mosque as implicitly merely “maintained”.  This 
constituted a perversion of scholarship, an adulteration of knowledge with implicit 
misrepresentation.  The restoration perverted the results of the bicommunal 
architectural survey; and that directly polluted academic and public knowledge, and 
indirectly polluted them too, through Jansen’s (e.g. 2006) misrepresentations, which 
infected Hellenist newspapers (e.g. Yiannis, 2006), which in turn infected not only 
Hellenist community conversations (e.g. grhomeboy, 2006), but also professional 
discussions (e.g. the Museum Security Network, cf. greek_news, 2006); there have 
even been bicommunal community conversations that (seemingly spontaneously) 
combined the bicommunal architectural survey and Michael Jansen as sources (e.g. 
CY, 2006). 
 
5.e.ii. The restoration of mosques in Episkopi/Yalova and Polis/Boli, and the 
conversion of mosques in Klavdia/Alaniçi 
 
The Republic of Cyprus Department of Antiquities is responsible for the 17 
southern Cypriot mosques that are listed monuments (11 of which were originally 
churches, converted into mosques under Ottoman rule).  When they restored 
                                                 
89 Its establishment proposed by UNESCO and approved by SICATHM, ICOMOS is an international 
NGO, and an official world heritage adviser to UNESCO. 
175 
 
Episkopi/Yalova Mosque, antiquities department staff revealed historic Christian 
frescoes; consequently, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
(PACE) judged that the building was ‘hardly… suitable’ for use as a mosque in any 
future bicommunal Episkopi (van der Werff, 1989: 13; this was because of a 
traditional objection to iconic art on religious objects and buildings).  The 
restoration of Klavdia/Alaniçi Mosque and Polis/Boli Mosque also exposed Christian 
art.  Furthermore, despite Hellenist complaints about conversion of churches (e.g. 
CPCHC, 1985; 2000; ROCPIO, 1997), Klavdia Mosque has been converted into a 
museum (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007ha). 
Despite the Venice Charter having insisted that ‘revealing’ older phases of the 
building could ‘only be justified in exceptional circumstances’ (SICATHM, 1964: 
Art. 11), the exposure of Christian art was and still is antiquities department policy.  
As one of the archaeologists responsible for the 17 listed mosques explained, ‘[t]he 
aim is not to eliminate any part of our history, on the contrary, all the phases of the 
monuments must be visible’ (cited in the Financial Mirror, 2010).  Yet given its 
contradiction of international cultural heritage restoration ethics, and its prevention 
of Islamic practice at the site, this antiquities policy more closely resembles a 
statement of the site’s “natural” Christianity.  It could ultimately constitute a 
violation of the displaced Turkish Cypriot community’s right to religious freedom. 
 
5.e.iii. The reuse of Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage in Goshi/Koşşi and 
Petrofani/Esendağ 
 
There are two other examples of the treatment of Turkish Cypriot cultural 
heritage in southern Cyprus; they are very different, but equally instructive.  After 
the war of 1974 and the displacement of communities left on the “wrong” side of the 
Green Line, Greek Cypriot refugee and economist Dr. Iakovos Aristidou encouraged 
resettlement of southern Turkish Cypriot homes ‘as much to prevent them being 
destroyed as to house refugees’ (paraphrased in the Times, 1976: 13).  Unfortunately, 
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for many reasons, that frequently did not happen; whole villages have decayed or 
been destroyed.  For example, I could not tell which ruin had been which building 
in Goshi/Koşşi; but a Turkish Cypriot refugee identified the mosque’s ruin and 
observed its use as a ‘burn [sic – barn]’ (Halil, 2008b).  It must be remembered that 
the village was already destroyed when the Greek Cypriot economic migrants 
arrived: the farmers did not know and could not have known that they had reused 
the remains of the mosque (see fig. 7).  The Greek Cypriot farmers were innocent 
victims of the Cyprus Problem; but economically trapped, they were forced to 
contribute to the disappearance of Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage.  Contrarily, the 
Greek Cypriot National Guard chose to use the village as a military exercise site (see 
fig. 8), and thus will have wilfully contributed to the ruination of the village.  (To be 
clear, any damage would be the responsibility of the Guard as an institution, not of 
the guardsmen as individuals.)  Due to the bureaucratic division of labour, the Greek 
Cypriot antiquities department had no power to protect either the unlisted mosque, 
or the vernacular architecture of the village. 
After the Turkish invasion, all but six of about a hundred Turkish Cypriots fled 
from Petrofani/Esendağ to nearby enclaves; an unspecified ‘group of nationalists’ 
massacred the remaining six (Drousiotis, 2009).  Although the shared mosque-and-
school building survived (see fig. 9), the Greek Cypriot nationalist extremists looted 
all of the homes, which decayed to ruins afterwards, and were then converted into 
sheep-folds and goat-pens (see fig. 10).  Again, cultural heritage workers had no 
power to protect anything.  In this case, however, the surviving mosque had 
political value.  The Cyprus Temples project made a point of observing that the 
village was ‘in ruins’, but recorded the very good condition of Petrofani/Esendağ 
Mosque (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007kj).  So, Hellenist sources were able to restrict 
their discussion to religious heritage, ignore the explicit recognition of damage to 
tens of domestic buildings, and count the treatment of the one mosque towards that 
well-treated “majority” in the south, which so contrasted with the treatment of 
“most” churches in the north. 
177 
 
 
 
Figure 7: the ruins of Goshi/Koşşi Mosque, reused as a barn by Greek Cypriot 
farmers. 
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Figure 8: the ruins of a home in Goshi/Koşşi, reused as a military exercise site by the 
Greek Cypriot National Guard. 
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Figure 9: the surviving mosque-and-school building in Petrofani/Esendağ. 
 
 
Figure 10: ruined buildings reused as sheep folds and goat pens in Petrofani/Esendağ. 
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5.f. Desecration, conversion and reuse of Greek Cypriot cultural heritage 
 
There is no question whether or not there has been damage and destruction of 
Christian/Greek Cypriot cultural heritage in northern Cyprus.  International cultural 
heritage organisation Europa Nostra (1987: 1) has recognised ‘damage and 
destruction’ in northern Cyprus, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe has admitted ‘evidence of destruction’ and ‘desecrat[ion]’ (van der Werff, 
1989: 7; 8), and the European Parliament (EP, 1988) has found ‘continued 
destruction and pillaging’.  Thus, the significant questions are who is doing it and 
why, and how cultural heritage workers are dealing with the destruction in practical 
work, and research and educational publications.  The Greek Cypriot archaeological 
community narrates a monolithic history of destruction, wherein an 
interchangeable Turkish state, Turkish army, Turkish Cypriot administration, and/or 
Turkish settler community wilfully neglects and aggressively violates 
Christian/Greek Cypriot cultural heritage in northern Cyprus. 
As noted in the discussion of the archaeological boycott and black list, the 
Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage professional community lacks staff, materials, 
expertise, and ultimately the legal or political freedom to conduct adequate cultural 
heritage work.  As may be expected in occupied territories, where ultra-nationalist 
extremist organisations continue to operate quite freely, neither cultural heritage 
professionals nor local communities can act similarly freely.  Nevertheless, 
archaeological and historical study, and community research produce a convoluted 
picture of neighbouring communities acting very differently from each other, of 
veneration misunderstood as violation, and of protection misunderstood as 
desecration.  At the same time, circumstantial material evidence corroborates an 
emerging understanding that the systematic looting and destruction of cultural 
heritage in northern Cyprus has not been a Turkish state programme, but an ultra-
nationalist Turkish deep state campaign; it has been an attempt to create and 
perpetuate conflict and division in Cyprus, and thus to establish ultra-nationalist 
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control there.  This historical understanding is key, because the false nationalist 
construction of history reinforces community division and conflict, and thereby 
intercommunal non-cooperation; and non-cooperation facilitates the looting and 
destruction of Cypriot cultural heritage.  The cultural heritage of Cyprus is evidence 
of historic coexistence in Cyprus, of the reality of heterogeneous community in the 
past, and of the possibility of heterogeneous community in the future; thus, the false 
nationalist narrative of history encourages behaviour that destroys evidence for 
alternative narratives, and in facilitating looting and destruction, it becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy. 
 
5.f.i. From joking to destruction in Agia Eirini/Akdeniz, Ardana/Ardahan, 
Davlos/Kaplıca, Flamoudi/Mersinlik, and Gerani/Yerani 
 
In Agia Eirini/Akdeniz (on the west coast of Kyrenia District (see map 4), the 
formerly Turkish Cypriot majority mixed community’s ‘sick joke’ had been that they 
‘hadn’t known they were supposed to dislike each other until they got the “news” on 
radio [and] TV [television]’ (Goodwin, 1978: 136).  However, Turkish Army 
‘pressures’ drove out the last Greek Cypriot villagers in 1976 (ibid.); and the Church 
of Agia Eirini ended up gutted and ruined, its altar and iconostasis removed and its 
interior reused as a store (see fig. 11).  This history supports the official Greek 
Cypriot narrative of the Cyprus Conflict. 
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Figure 11: the wrecked and reused interior of the Church of Agia Eirini in Agia 
Eirini/Akdeniz. 
 
Yet the different treatments of churches in three evacuated Greek Cypriot 
villages, each within 10kms of the others (on the north-west facing side of the 
Karpas Peninsula in Famagusta District (see map 3a)), illustrate the range of damage 
and destruction; they hint at an equal range of (publicly unknown) actors, motives 
and logics.  In Davlos/Kaplıca, the Church of Agios Georgios has been ‘desecrated’ 
(ROCPRUN, 2001a: 20), but left ‘almost undamaged’, while its cemetery has been 
utterly ‘demolished’ (Fielding, 1976b: 13); meanwhile, outside Davlos, the Chapel of 
Agios Sozomenos has had its doors, windows and roof tiles ‘removed’, and its altar 
‘demolished’ (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007ke).  In Ardana/Ardahan, the Church of 
Agios Georgios has been ‘desecrated’ (ROCPRUN, 2001a: 17), while the Chapel of 
Agios Demetrios was left standing, but ‘empt[ied]’ and its altar ‘fouled with human 
excrement’ (Fielding, 1976a: 13; also cited in ROCPIO, 1997: 24).  The Church of 
Agios Georgios in Flamoudi/Mersinlik has been ‘converted into a mosque’ 
(ROCPRUN, 2001a: 27), while the cemetery chapel (and its graveyard) has been 
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completely destroyed (see fig. 12; see also ROCPIO, 1997: 31).  Similarly, recently, in 
equally nearby but formerly Greek Cypriot majority mixed Gerani/Yerani, the 
Church of Agios Georgios has been ‘converted into a mosque’ and the Chapel of 
Panagia Evangelistria has been ‘desecrated’ (ROCPRUN, 2001a: 19), while the 
Church of Agia Katerina and its cemetery have been first ‘desecrated’ (ROCPRUN, 
2001a: 19), then ‘completely destroyed’ (Christou, 2008a). 
 
 
Figure 12: the ruins of the cemetery chapel and graveyard in Flamoudi/Mersinlik. 
 
5.f.ii. Interpreting documented facts: conversion as restitution in Melanarga/Adaçay 
 
In 2001, the Republic of Cyprus Permanent Representative to the United Nations 
complained that under a state policy of ‘Turkif[ication]’, the Church of Agios 
Polychronios in Melanarga/Adaçay had been ‘desecrated’ (ROCPRUN, 2001a: 1; 23; 
it is in the middle of the Karpas Peninsula (see map 3a)).  (Again highlighting the 
unreliability of the Cyprus Temples project’s records, they listed the church in good 
condition in every way (CCEAA and CCTA, 2007pk).)  Then at some point between 
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2001 and 2007, the church was converted into a mosque (see the loudspeaker in fig. 
13).  Yet at least the conversion was neither a state act of Turkification, nor a 
nationalist action of the local community: Agios Polychronios was converted 
because the old mosque had been destroyed during the conflict (see fig. 14).  Indeed, 
when the local community converted the church, they left its Christian architecture 
intact (see the bell in fig. 13), which contradicts the official Greek Cypriot 
insinuation of desecration and Turkification.  Further complicating the situation in 
Melanarga, the Turkish government has committed to building a new mosque 
(Ernur, 2009), which will enable the local community to undo its temporary 
conversion of the church. 
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Figure 13: the Church of Agios Polychronios after its conversion into a mosque in 
Melanarga/Adaçay – note the bell and the loudspeaker. 
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Figure 14: the old mosque of Melanarga/Adaçay after its destruction. 
 
5.f.iii. Interpreting documented facts: desecration and consecration in 
Davlos/Kaplıca, and Morphou/Güzelyurt 
 
Like so many others, the gutted Chapel of Agios Sozomenos in Davlos/Kaplıca 
has become a site of romantic dedications; but exceptionally, its graffiti hints at yet 
more divisions within Cypriot society, through the anonymous red crossings-out of 
Serkan and Murat’s pink paintings and inscriptions.  Serkan and Murat are both 
male names, and their wall-writings are the only pink wall-writings on the chapel, 
indeed, on any wall on the island that I witnessed; explicit LGBT90 graffiti, like ‘gay 
pride, wake up’91, in the old town of Nicosia was written in green and black (see fig. 
15), and even ‘pink triangle’ was written in red (see fig. 16).  (It is possible that both 
of the names were written by one lovestruck female graffiti artist, which would also 
be exceptional; but it is unlikely in the context.)  On the west wall, were painted 
                                                 
90 Lesbian/Gay/Bisexual/Transgender. 
91 ‘Gay Pride ksypnate [Gay Pride ξυπνάτε]’. 
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Serkan’s name and an address to ‘my baby’92 (see fig. 17).  On the south wall, were 
painted Murat’s name and a heart pierced by an arrow, a love-struck heart, with an 
“M” on the plaster above left and what looks like the top of an “S” below right (but 
most of the plaster missing) (see fig. 18).  (In addition, there was the first letter of an 
unfinished but nonetheless crossed-out word to the right of Murat’s name tag, 
which was a “B”; the word may have been another inscription to “my baby”.) 
 
 
Figure 15: a colour-saturated photograph of ‘gay pride, wake up’ graffiti in the old 
town of southern Nicosia. 
 
                                                 
92 ‘Bebişim’; the term is only used romantically. 
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Figure 16: a colour-saturated photograph of ‘pink triangle’ graffiti in the old town of 
southern Nicosia. 
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Figure 17: a colour-saturated photograph of the inscription of Serkan’s name and the 
address to ‘my baby’ upon the Chapel of Agios Sozomenos in Davlos/Kaplıca. 
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Figure 18: a colour-saturated photograph of the inscription of Murat’s name and the 
painting of a love-struck heart on the Chapel of Agios Sozomenos in Davlos/Kaplıca. 
 
So, the inscriptions to Serkan and Murat are very suggestive of homosexual love; 
moreover, neither of their names, but all of their romantic declarations, were 
crossed out in red.  It appears that it was neither Serkan nor Murat at the end of the 
romance, but someone else, a homophobe, who wanted to deny the relationship, 
who crossed out its public statements.  This apparent conflict within northern 
Cypriot society does have a relevance to study of the treatment of cultural heritage 
(beyond being a material expression of a social division).  This is not merely further 
evidence of how nonsensical and unjust are accusations of collective guilt, the 
conflating and blaming of moderate members of a community with the extremist 
elements who repress those moderate insiders as well as all outsiders. 
Religious Cypriots may perceive any and all graffiti on religious buildings as 
sacrilege, especially the graffiti of people of other faiths; but it is clear from the 
content of this graffiti that it was not intended to desecrate the Greek Cypriots’ 
chapel, but to consecrate the Turkish Cypriots’ or Turkish settlers’ love.  It may 
seem like a meaningless difference, but it is a significant distinction: it may still be 
mindless vandalism, but it is not mindful aggression; and that applies to much of the 
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(name-)tagging that scars many of the disused buildings on both sides of the Green 
Line. 
Similarly, there are official Greek Cypriot propaganda photographs of damage to 
an unspecified ‘chapel in the area of Morphou’ (ROCPIO, 1997: 64; 65; thus, near 
the west coast of Nicosia District (see map 7)), including the apparent smashing or 
ripping out of a window, which had left the interior of the church permanently 
exposed to weather and animals; and graffiti.  However, the graffiti in the second 
photograph is a couplet from a famous Turkish poem by Sait Faik Abasıyanık.  Next 
to the void of that destroyed window, the graffiti artist had appealed to his or her 
readers, ‘beauty will save the world, everything begins with the love of one person...  
5.10.87 MA’93 (see fig. 19).  Turkist nationalists had considered Greek Cypriot 
Christians outside their moral universe, had neither venerated their sacred sites nor 
respected their religious beliefs, and had violated the Greek Cypriot site.  Yet a 
Turkish Cypriot or Turkish settler had considered Greek Cypriot Christians to be 
part of their moral community, had venerated the church and/or shared values of 
respect for churches as sacred places, and had empathised with the victimised 
community.  Thus, the Turkish Cypriot or Turkish settler had used the only means 
available – graffiti – to reprimand the Turkist nationalists on their own terms, with 
reference to Turkish culture, Turkish values, which themselves exalted respect, love, 
community. 
Intriguingly, the head of the University of Cyprus Department of Turkish 
Studies and Middle Eastern Studies, Prof. Ioannis Theocharides, has stated that 
‘most’ of his department’s graduates – cultural heritage workers trained in Turkish 
language, history and literature – worked ‘for the Foreign Ministry, the Press and 
Information Office, or at research centres’ (paraphrased in the Cyprus Mail, 2003a).  
So, it is possible (if not probable) that the Republic of Cyprus Press and Information 
Office knew the meaning of the graffiti when it published the photograph, but chose 
not to translate the graffiti for its readers.  Regardless, the meaning of the graffiti 
                                                 
93 ‘Dünyayı güzellik[ler] kurtaracak / Bir insanı sevmekle başlayacak herşey...  5.10.87 MA.’ 
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shows the complexity of a phenomenon that cultural heritage workers reduce to 
“damage”, and reveals the resistance of a community to destruction and division. 
 
 
Figure 19: a Turkish Cypriot/Turkish settler appeal that ‘beauty will save the world’ 
in a Greek Cypriot church in Morphou/Güzelyurt (cropped from © ROCPIO, 1997: 
65). 
 
5.f.iv. Clues to the perpetrators of destruction in Agridaki/Alemdağ 
 
At some sites of destruction, there is convincing circumstantial evidence of the 
perpetrators of the crimes.  By not recognising, or not reporting, this evidence in 
any of its cultural heritage publications, the Greek Cypriot cultural heritage 
community does not merely simplify, but significantly misrepresent the conflict; 
and through this misleading public history, cultural heritage professionals lead 
Cypriot communities into conflict.  For example, the Republic of Cyprus Press and 
Information Office noted that ‘[n]ot a single object ha[d] been left inside’ an 
unnamed church (possibly Agios Gordios) in Agridaki/Alemdağ (ROCPIO, 1997: 25; 
it is in the western half of Kyrenia District (see map 4)); and its Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations petitioned that Agios Charalambous Church 
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had been ‘desecrated’ (ROCPRUN, 2001a: 9).  Unknown persons have removed the 
bells of both churches, gutted their interiors, and wrecked their altars (e.g. figs. 20 
and 21); but there may be clues to the identity/identities of the perpetrators. 
The interior of Agios Charalambous is a massive palimpsest of graffiti, but two 
paintings stand out from the name tags and the notes that ‘Esat waz ‘ere [was here]’.  
There is a (Turkish) Nationalist Action Party/Nationalist Movement Party ‘MHP’94 
inscription and MHP flag drawing (see fig. 22); and there is a ‘Komando’ graffito and 
Turkish flag painting (see fig. 23), with an ambiguous red flag painting on their left, 
which appears to have been an unsuccessful attempt at another MHP flag.95  The 
MHP are ‘ultra-nationalists’, ‘extremists’ with a ‘paramilitary’ wing, the Grey 
Wolves96 (Lee, 1997); and at least elements within them have been part of a ‘Turkish 
secret army’, sometimes called the “Counter-Guerrilla”97 or the “Deep State”98, which 
operates outside and beyond the control of the Turkish state, and which has 
undertaken ‘special operations in Cyprus’ since 1984 (Ganser, 2005: 226; see also 
Çelik, 1994). 
Thus, this desecration appears not to have been any act of the Turkish state, or of 
the Turkish Cypriot or Turkish settler community; it appears to have been an act of 
a Turkish ultra-nationalist paramilitary, in an attempt to violate Greek Cypriot 
cultural heritage, thereby to fuel conflict between the communities on the island, 
thereby to perpetuate Turkish control of the north and Turkish nationalist 
suppression of the moderate Turkish Cypriot and Turkish settler communities.  
Critically, by not explaining this to the Greek Cypriot and international 
communities, by instead blaming the Turkish state and/or the Turkish settler 
community, Greek Cypriot cultural heritage workers themselves fuel false conflicts 
between communities on the island, and reinforce the Cyprus Problem.  In the 
                                                 
94 Milliyetçi Hâreket Partisi (MHP). 
95 We know that the desecration of the church occurred by 1st July 1999, because the ‘komando’ 
painting is post-dated by the note on top of it: ‘Öz Bodrumlu / 78/2/Ş.120 / Date 01.07.99 / I love you / 
Turkey’95 (see fig. 23). 
96 Bozkurtlar. 
97 Kontrgerilla. 
98 Derin Devlet. 
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following example, I will present corroborating evidence for a reappraisal of 
communities’ roles in the conflict, and thus for a rewriting of cultural heritage 
workers’ public education about the desecration and destruction of cultural heritage. 
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Figure 20: the bell has been removed from the Church of Agios Gordios(?) in 
Agridaki/Alemdağ. 
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Figure 21: the gutted interior of the Church of Agios Gordios(?) in 
Agridaki/Alemdağ. 
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Figure 22: the Nationalist Action Party/Nationalist Movement Party’s ‘MHP’99 
inscription and MHP flag drawing in the Church of Agios Charalambous in 
Agridaki/Alemdağ. 
 
                                                 
99 Milliyetçi Hâreket Partisi (MHP). 
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Figure 23: a saturated photograph of the ‘Komando’ graffito and Turkish flag 
painting inside the Church of Agios Charalambous in Agridaki/Alemdağ. 
 
5.f.v. Overturning received wisdom: conversion as protection in a Cypriot village 
 
There is a church in one northern Cypriot village, which has been converted 
into a mosque, but which I cannot identify in any way.  Its caretaker spoke to me in 
confidence, and someone could work out his identity if I gave any details unique to 
him, the mosque, or the village.  Touring cultural heritage sites, I visited this 
mosque.  I met and talked with its caretaker while he showed me around, then, once 
I had earned his trust, he took me to a secluded spot to talk more openly.  The detail, 
consistency and risk of the caretaker’s revelation convinced me of its truth.  He was 
a non-nationalist Turkish settler.  His settler community had previously lived in 
villages in Turkey with Christian sites.  When that community arrived on Cyprus, in 
the first wave of settlement in 1975-1976, local Turkish Cypriot nationalists had 
damaged and/or destroyed Greek Cypriot places in the village.  The Turkish settlers 
were appalled and resolved to save one church by converting it into a mosque, 
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which they subsequently did.  (There is circumstantial evidence for these politics 
amongst Turkish settlers.  I will not say whether or not this village was used in his 
study, but Mete Hatay (2005: viii-ix) revealed that, historically, the majority of 
settler communities supported the non-nationalist opposition rather than the 
nationalist government in northern Cyprus.  Thus, Turkish settlers would have 
tended to support this settler community’s act.) 
So, contrary to the left-wing Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot myth that they 
had lived together happily until foreign powers split them apart, local nationalist 
extremists of each community had tried to eliminate the memory of the other 
community, and the possibility of coexistence with it.  And, contrary to the right-
wing Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot myth that (Cypriot) Greeks/Christians and 
(Cypriot) Turks/Muslims were eternal enemies, they could live together happily.  
Exquisitely, the Turkish deep state transferred the Turkish Muslim settlers to 
northern Cyprus to secure its hold on the territory, but when they arrived, the 
settlers disproved the deep state’s myths, countered its urbicide, and preserved the 
built environment essential to the re-establishment of heterogeneous community.  
In the final example, I will identify an internal northern Cypriot conflict, which has 
incidentally caused the destruction of Greek Cypriot cultural heritage. 
 
5.f.vi. Overturning received wisdom: Greek Cypriot collateral damage in Turkish 
Cypriot-Turkish settler struggles in Kato Kopia/Zümrütköy 
 
Kato Kopia/Zümrütköy had been an approximately 1,198-member Greek Cypriot 
village (Goodwin, 1978: 441), which would have had about 240 homes; it is on the 
northern side of the Green Line, in the western half of Nicosia District (see map 7).  
After the Greek Cypriots’ evacuation, Turkish Cypriot refugees settled the 
abandoned village; and before 2003, about 60 Greek Cypriot homes had been 
destroyed.  Neither the Greek Cypriot community nor Greek Cypriot memory had 
been the target, however; in fact, the destroyed Greek Cypriot homes had been 
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collateral damage in struggles between the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish settler 
communities.  As a Greek Cypriot refugee explained to me: 
 
Our ancestral home was bulldozed some years before the 
checkpoints were open. The TCs [Turkish Cypriots] who live 
in the adjacent houses told us they had demolished all houses 
that to them seemed old in[ ]order to prevent mainland 
settlers from being moved there. My cousin who has been to 
the village several times told me that he estimates about a 
quarter of the houses have met a similar fate. 
 
The Greek Cypriot community recognises and highlights the tensions between 
the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish settler communities, because those tensions 
support the official Greek Cypriot displacement of all blame for the Cyprus Problem 
onto Turkey, and its demand for the expulsion of Turkish settlers; but in none of its 
publications has the Greek Cypriot cultural heritage community ever acknowledged 
that any of its cultural heritage has been destroyed by Turkish Cypriots in their 
attempts to prevent Turkish settlement.  The absence of this information in Greek 
Cypriot cultural heritage workers’ narratives may be because they have not gathered 
it in the first place; however, that itself would a reflection of their non-cooperation 
with their Turkish Cypriot colleagues, their refusal to conduct site visits in northern 
Cyprus, and also an apparent choice not even to gather such information from Greek 
Cypriot refugees in southern Cyprus.  This wilful avoidance of complicated data – 
inconvenient truths – which may confuse or disprove the established history is 
unscholarly; and the consequent reproduction of nationalist narratives contributes 
to the reproduction of nationalist conflicts.  Now, I will turn to explore the ethics of 
archaeologists’ and antiquities police’s efforts to combat the illicit antiquities trade. 
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6. Cypriot antiquities rescue from the Turkish deep state 
 
Since the Greek-backed EOKA-B coup and the TMT-supported Turkish invasion 
of 1974, Greek Cypriot officials have estimated the theft of ‘several dozen’ wall 
paintings and mosaics and ‘15,000-20,000 icons’ (Georgiou-Hadjitofi, 2000: 225), and 
possibly ‘more than 60,000 ancient artefacts’ (Hadjisavvas, 2001: 136), from northern 
Cyprus.  Yet the structure of the illicit antiquities trade after 1974 was created 
before then, critically between 1963 and 1974.  Thus, I will show how the 
intercommunal conflict and the illicit antiquities trade evolved together; and the 
methods and consequences of cultural heritage professionals’ responses.  I will show 
how Greek Cypriot archaeological policy has incidentally contributed to Turkish 
nationalist criminal networks’ domination of the northern Cypriot illicit antiquities 
trade since 1974. 
 
6.a. The early history of the illicit antiquities trade 
 
The digging up and collecting of Cypriot antiquities has a much longer history, 
however.  An ‘alarmingly lively’ antiquities trade developed in Cyprus under late 
Ottoman rule, driven by foreign officials collecting antiquities, and driving local 
patriots like Demetrios Pierides to try to collect and keep antiquities on the island 
(Leriou, 2008: 3).  Ironically, British consul Pierides introduced antiquarianism to 
his vice-consul, Robert Hamilton Lang (Goring, 1988: 8), who then excavated 
without permission and collected thousands of antiquities.  Worse, Lang introduced 
antiquities collecting to the notorious American consul, Luigi Palma di Cesnola, who 
then dug up or bought tens of thousands of illicit antiquities, smuggling and selling 
thousands of artefacts to the Metropolitan Museum, the British Museum, the 
Louvre, and even the Ottoman Museum of Constantinople (Myres, 1974 [1914]: 
xvii), the museum of the very state from which he had taken the artefacts. 
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These problems continued during the British administration of the Ottoman 
territory.  For example, underfunded British Museum and Cyprus Museum 
archaeologist Max Ohnefalsch-Richter funded himself by selling his own excavated 
artefacts and others’ looted antiquities (Brönner, 2001: 198; Fivel, 1996: 29).  Also, 
during the same period, two accidentally found silver hoards, later named the first 
and second Lambousa treasures (after the ancient site on the northern coast of 
Kyrenia District, just to the north-east of Karavas (see map 4)), were semi-legally or 
wholly illegally traded by Greek Cypriot antiquities dealers, and illegally smuggled 
off the island by foreign antiquities collectors.  The British Museum ‘turned a blind 
eye to the manifest impropriety’ and bought part of the first Lambousa Treasure 
(Merrillees, 2009: 13), while the Metropolitan Museum of Art accepted part of the 
second Lambousa Treasure as a donation from an American antiquities collector 
(Merrillees, 2009: 3-4). 
By the early Twentieth Century, the illicit antiquities trade had become a 
‘widespread evil’ (Markides, 1914: 3); but before the outbreak of violence in 1955, 
the British colonial administration had established the Department of Antiquities, 
thus ending the ‘treasure-hunting’ of the Cyprus Museum Committee (Wilfrid 
Jerome Farrell, cited in Merrillees, 2005: 197), and Cypriot society had become 
‘increasingly favourable to the protection’ of its cultural heritage (Megaw, 1951: 3).  
Indeed, after the outbreak of violence, (employment and) the increased security 
activity actually nearly stopped illicit excavation (Megaw, 1955: 4).  Nevertheless, 
within a decade, intercommunal violence, destruction of community places and 
looting of archaeological sites exploded together. 
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6.b. Theft and rescue of antiquities, 1963-1974 
 
6.b.i. Impoverishment and looting 
 
Former United Nations peacekeeper and political geographer Richard Patrick 
(1976: 79) observed that after the outbreak of intercommunal violence in December 
1963, and the consequent mass displacement of 25,000 members of the Turkish 
Cypriot community, their ‘abandoned homes were looted and often burned-out 
ruins’.  Both sides refusing to acknowledge any responsibility for the troubles, 
neither side tried to re-establish the burned neighbourhoods and villages, and with 
them the previous, bicommunal society; so, the Turkish Cypriot community 
languished in ever greater poverty. Development specialist Prodromos 
Panayiotopoulos (1995: 23) stated that: 
 
By 1965 nearly half of all Turkish Cypriots were crammed in 
Gaza-Strip fashion, into a minuscule 1.6 per cent of the island’s 
land-mass (Attalides 1979: 90). Many were living in over-
crowded and squalid conditions in the ghettoes of old Nicosia 
and were dependent on mainland Turkish aid as their only 
means of economic survival. 
 
The enclaved Turkish Cypriots were trapped, both by the Turkish Special 
Warfare Department-backed Turkish (Cypriot) Resistance Organisation, TMT, that 
controlled those enclaves, and by the Greek Cypriot administration and 
paramilitaries that controlled everywhere outside, and sometimes blockaded the 
enclaves themselves. Because there was a market for it, one of the enclaved Turkish 
Cypriots’ means of subsistence was selling antiquities. And because they controlled 
the enclaved Turkish Cypriots’ access to the market, and the market’s access to the 
looted antiquities, one of TMT’s funding sources was the illicit antiquities trade. 
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Enclaved Turkish Cypriots were looting and selling antiquities to be able to 
subsist, but TMT were trading and smuggling antiquities to be able to fight; and 
according to then antiquities director Vassos Karageorghis (2007: 102), the looted 
antiquities ‘were bought mainly by Greek Cypriots and by diplomats’. 
Karageorghis (1964: 4) acknowledged that the ‘anomalous conditions in the 
island did not make it possible to achieve’ the elimination of the illicit excavation of 
and trade in antiquities. In fact, those conditions made it possible to industrialise the 
illicit antiquities trade. Sites and museums within the enclaves were inaccessible to 
the Department of Antiquities (Karageorghis, 1964: 3). Journalist Michael Jansen 
(2005: 19) recorded ‘widespread’ looting, theft, smuggling and dealing in and around 
the enclaves. Journalist Peter Hopkirk (1971: 4) said that thousands of tombs had 
been looted. 
 
6.b.ii. Antiquities, heroin, and terrorism 
 
It is not clear whether, before 1974, TMT fighters were smuggling and dealing 
themselves, or whether they were taxing or taking bakşiş (bribes) from smugglers 
and dealers. (Certainly, members of the Turkish National Intelligence Organisation, 
MİT, were looting and trading antiquities (Jansen, 2005: 20; 23; see also Aşkın, 
2006).)  Either way, by buying artefacts from the enclaves, antiquities dealers and 
collectors outside – notably, Greek Cypriot antiquities dealers and collectors – were 
incidentally funding Turkish Cypriot TMT’s terrorism against both the Turkish 
Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot communities, managing to make a terrible situation 
even worse. 
Antiquities smuggler and dealer Michel van Rijn (1993: 25) stated that Greek 
Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios III collected ‘icons…. which must have 
been looted from churches’. He should know: Makarios did not prosecute one of van 
Rijn’s icon restorers for theft of icons, but instead employed him as his own icon 
restorer, and van Rijn’s dealing and smuggling operation was, in his words, ‘allowed 
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to continue’ (1993: 26). Whether protection was given by the upper levels of the 
state, for whom some of van Rijn’s gang worked, as van Rijn (1993: 26; 2003) 
claimed, or whether protection was given by the lower levels of the state, who knew 
that some of van Rijn’s gang worked for their superiors, the result was the same: his 
international operation continued for another two decades (van Rijn, 2003). 
One of Michel van Rijn’s suppliers was Aydın Dikmen, a Turkish smuggler of 
both antiquities and drugs (Jansen, 2005: 21). Since the Turkish heroin trade is 
largely controlled by elements within the Turkish National Intelligence 
Organisation (MİT) (Nezan, 1998: 13), and the greatest smuggler of Cypriot 
antiquities, Dikmen, was also a smuggler of heroin, it is reasonable to assume that 
the Turkish antiquities trade was and is also largely controlled by elements within 
MİT. Indeed, Dikmen’s Turkish Cypriot dealer and smuggler, “Tremeşeli” Mehmet 
Ali İlkman, was first a TMT fighter and then a MİT officer (Jansen, 2005: 20; 23; see 
also Aşkın, 2006). Thus, there was and still is a dual heroin-and-antiquities trade in 
Cyprus, controlled by the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot deep state(s). 
 
6.b.iii. A silent accord with greedy collectors 
 
Later antiquities director Sophocles Hadjisavvas (2001: 135) said that the illicit 
antiquities trade was ‘so intense that there was even close collaboration between 
Turkish [Cypriot] looters and Greek [Cypriot] mediators and collectors’.  
Remarkably, given the structure of the Turkish Cypriot part of the trade, the 
collaboration of Greek Cypriot collectors was the policy of the Department of 
Antiquities and the rest of the Greek Cypriot administration. Karageorghis (1999b: 
17) revealed that, with the Ministry of Communication and Works’ ‘agreement’, the 
Department of Antiquities established a ‘“silent accord”, allowing [Greek] Cypriots 
who had access to the Turkish [Cypriot] enclaves to buy’ looted antiquities (see also 
Karageorghis, 2007: 102). In fact, the Department of Antiquities itself collaborated. 
In his memoirs, Karageorghis (2007: 102-103) explained that: 
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During the period from 1970 to 1974, under the pretext of 
supervising the work of the UNESCO experts at St. Sophia, I 
would often cross the “border” in the car of [UNESCO 
conservator Dr.] Carlo Musso…. I bought for the Cyprus 
Museum a good number of important objects [‘illegal 
antiquities’]…. I did not pay cash…  I would bring them a 
government cheque from the Central Bank. 
 
Not only were Greek Cypriot collectors and dealers incidentally funding TMT’s 
terrorism, but also the Greek Cypriot administration was doing so, and the 
Department of Antiquities was underwriting the looting of archaeological sites. 
Disastrously, in yet another attempt to reduce the illicit antiquities trade, in the 
second half of 1973, the Department of Antiquities declared an amnesty on 
antiquities collections (Karageorghis, 1973: 4), such that collectors could not only 
declare their antiquities to the state without being prosecuted for acquiring them, 
but they could even keep them. 
 
After the amnesty, the Department of Antiquities put on record ‘the prompt 
collaboration of the collectors’ (Karageorghis, 1974: 5). It was unsurprising. During 
the amnesty, antiquities looting and trading had increased. According to Hadjisavvas 
(2001: 135), ‘greedy’ antiquities collectors had used the amnesty to expand their 
collections, and more than a thousand greedy people had taken the opportunity to 
begin collections, too. Karageorghis (1999b: 17) had noted that the ‘most important’ 
collections formed under the “silent accord” and registered during the amnesty were 
the Severis Collection in Nicosia, the Pierides Collection in Larnaca, and the 
Hadjiprodromou Collection in Famagusta. 
Hadjisavvas (2001: 135) did not say which ‘well-known collector in the 
Famagusta District’ had hired looters ‘to obtain rare antiquities of a specified date’. 
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Ownership of looted artefacts had been temporarily legalised, but looting of artefacts 
had not, and any collection formed by looting would, thus, still be illegal; but 
nothing happened to that unidentified collector. Indeed, after the Turkish invasion, 
the Department of Antiquities complained that ‘a number of important registered 
collections of Antiquities’ had been looted (Karageorghis, 1975: 3). In some cases, it 
was complaining that thieves had been robbed of their stolen goods. 
 
6.c. Greek Cypriot government policy and Turkish Cypriot organised crime since 
1974 
 
When the Turkish Special Warfare Department-directed invasion established 
the Turkish military occupation of northern Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot deep state 
survived and was institutionalised: before 1974 president of the Turkish Cypriot 
Communal Chamber and vice-president of the Republic of Cyprus, after 1974 TMT 
leader Rauf Denktaş became president of the autonomous Turkish Cypriot 
administration, then of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (and later of the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus); TMT itself was reformed as the Turkish 
Armed Forces’ (TSK) local auxiliaries, the Turkish Cypriot Security Forces 
Command (GKK); and they had their own auxiliaries in the Civil Defence 
Organisation (SST) (Akıncı and Düzel, 2007; Irkad, 2000; Kanlı, 2007). 
Antiquities looting and trading continued after 1974 as well. Since the only 
economy was the black market and the export trade, inactive archaeological sites 
were looted across the North (Pollis, 1979: 98). Again, most of the Turkish Cypriots 
who looted did so because they were poor, but the trade was still controlled by the 
Turkish/Turkish Cypriot deep state. Instead of funding TMT’s fight against Akritas 
or EOKA-B, however, the illicit antiquities trade funded the repression of everyone 
in the North.  Moreover, despite the apparent challenges, the bicommunal nature of 
the northern Cypriot illicit antiquities trade survived the partition of the island (van 
der Werff, 1989: 7; van Rijn, 1993: 27). 
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According to official Greek Cypriot estimates, ‘several dozen’ wall paintings and 
mosaics and ‘15,000-20,000 icons’ have been stolen (Georgiou-Hadjitofi, 2000: 225), 
and between ‘several thousand’ (Georgiou-Hadjitofi, 2000: 225) and ‘more than 
60,000’ (Hadjisavvas, 2001: 136) artefacts have been looted from northern Cyprus. 
As Hadjisavvas (2001: 136) observed, there are a ‘large number’ of Cypriot 
antiquities in international auctions, some of ‘obviously illegal provenance’; and as 
art journalist Peter Watson (2006: 94) explained, publicly auctioned antiquities are 
only ‘a fraction’ of the market, primarily used to ‘set prices’ for the larger 
underground market, and by some dealers to ‘“launder” illicit objects’.  It is that 
antiquities market that drives and funds the looting of the cultural heritage of 
Cyprus. 
Furthermore, churches have been ‘demolished’ (CCSCMA, 2009) and, strikingly, 
there is evidence that the Turkish Deep State has used money from its heroin-and-
antiquities trade to pay for “contracts” to destroy cultural heritage sites (e.g. 
Armenian Genocide memorials in France, cf. Nezan, 1998: 13).  Moreover, they 
have looted well-known artefacts, which they knew they could not sell elsewhere, 
with the ‘expect[ation] that the Cyprus government’ – or a proxy – ‘would buy 
[them] back’ (Herscher, 2001: 148 – original emphasis; see also Van der Werff, 1989: 
11). 
Both the Greek Cypriot antiquities department and cooperative Greek Cypriot 
individuals (and later Greek Cypriot foundations), like A. G. Leventis (and his 
Foundation), have bought back looted antiquities from dealers (Karageorghis, 1990: 
6; 1998: 15; 2000: 217).  Indeed, there is evidence that Greek Cypriot ‘officials had 
already had dealings with Dikmen’ (Hofstadter, 1994: 62), long before they used the 
German police to catch him. 
Since 1974, there have also been clandestine activities, the Greek Cypriot secret 
service employed to “rescue” artefacts and smuggle them from the areas under 
Turkish Cypriot administration to the areas under Greek Cypriot administration. 
This became public knowledge when agent Stephanos Stephanou was caught by 
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Turkish Cypriot police, during their raid on Turkish Cypriot antiquities smugglers 
(Christou, 2007a; 2007b); Stephanou had been ‘retrieving’ icons and artefacts for 
Church and State (Christou, 2007c; 2007d).  In the final section of the thesis, I will 
explore this case in detail. 
This research has shown how the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot 
paramilitaries’ conflict caused the explosion of looting on the island, and enabled the 
Turkish/Turkish Cypriot deep state’s use of the illicit antiquities trade once it had 
exploded.  It has also shown how the Greek Cypriot administration, Greek Cypriot 
archaeologists and Greek Cypriot private antiquities collectors’ collaborative 
“rescue” of looted artefacts actually funded the looting between 1963 and 1974 (as 
well as more generally funding the fighting). 
Moreover, the evidence has demonstrated that the structure of the trade has 
remained fundamentally the same since 1974.  The Church-and-State, collector-and-
archaeologist collaboration has ultimately funded those Turkish nationalist 
extremist organisations destroying Greek Cypriot homes and churches, and 
repressing Turkish Cypriot resistance. 
More evidence needs to be gathered to understand the communities’ roles in the 
trade, and to expose clandestine antiquities acquisition and its human cost; but the 
most important response to the available evidence is for archaeologists and collectors 
to stop funding looting and destruction by “rescuing” looted artefacts. 
 
6.d. Undercover rescue of looted antiquities, 1974-2010 
 
Arrested during a Turkish Cypriot police raid on Turkish Cypriot antiquities 
smugglers on 18th November 2007, sixty-four-year-old Greek Cypriot Stephanos 
Stephanou had been detained without charge for two weeks when he had a fatal 
heart attack on 1st November (Christou, 2007c).  This tragic case appears to involve: 
theft, illicit trading and smuggling of antiquities; illegal undercover antiquities 
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police work; deep state criminal activity; possible police brutality; and a cover-up by 
Church and State. 
 
6.d.i. The detention and death of Stephanos Stephanou 
 
Turkish Cypriot police must notify detained suspects’ families ‘at the earliest 
possible time’ (CATRNC, 1985: Ch.  2, Art.  16, Para.  4); but they did not notify 
Stephanou’s relatives, and he was only allowed to contact his family on 22nd 
October, four days after his arrest.  As antiquities smuggling is a serious crime, 
Turkish Cypriot police were legally able to detain Stephanos Stephanou without 
charge. 
Yet the (Turkish Cypriot) Kıbrıs Star (2007a) newspaper and Bayrak Radio and 
Television Corporation (BRTK, 2007)100 reported that they charged Galip Arnavut, 
Mehmet Asvaroğlu and Turgut Göztaşı with antiquities smuggling, then held them 
for three days; and the Kıbrıs Star (2007b) later reported that, on 20th October, they 
also charged Yılmaz Göktaşı and Atalay Hiçkorkmaz with antiquities smuggling, 
then held them for three days. 
Nevertheless, all the charged Turkish Cypriot smugglers were released 
afterwards; only Stephanou remained.  Turkish Cypriot police caught Stephanou 
with three people already suspected of antiquities theft and smuggling (whom they 
arrested), with illicit antiquities, and with three photographs of illicit antiquities on 
his own mobile phone, but they did not arrest or charge him (Christou, 2007a; 
2007d).  Instead, Turkish Cypriot police held Stephanou as a ‘flight risk’ (someone 
likely to flee Turkish Cypriot police jurisdiction if released on bail). 
The family contacted then Greek Cypriot Communist Party (AKEL) leader 
Demetris Christofias, who personally guaranteed left-wing Turkish Cypriot 
President Mehmet Ali Talat that Stephanos Stephanou would return to northern 
Cyprus for his trial, but Christofias could not win Stephanou’s release.  The family 
                                                 
100 Bayrak Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu. 
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asked Stephanou’s DIKO Party comrade, then Greek Cypriot President Tassos 
Papadopoulos, for help.  Apparently, he then put his aide, peace envoy Tasos Tzonis 
on the case, but nothing happened. 
When the family went to the Greek Cypriot police, they found out that the 
Cyprus Police had known and contacted the United Nations Force In Cyprus 
(UNFICYP) about Stephanou’s detention on 18th October (Christou, 2007d).  Thus, it 
is inconceivable that the Greek Cypriot leadership did not also already know about 
the former politician and former consul’s detention when the family asked for its 
help.  If the Greek Cypriot government or police did try to secure Stephanou’s 
release, it did it very quietly, and equally unsuccessfully.  As a member of his family 
commented, ‘[e]veryone knew and they did nothing, but they’ll say they tried’ 
(Christou, 2008b).  Still, UNFICYP did not secure Stephanou’s release either.  
Nevertheless, UNFICYP were trying to secure the release from Turkish Cypriot 
custody of someone believed to have tried to steal and smuggle cultural heritage 
from northern Cyprus. 
 
Heart disease sufferer Stephanou had to be taken to hospital at least twice during 
his detention, and he may have been taken for treatment for violent injuries.  The 
last time his family saw him conscious, Stephanou had told them that ‘his entire left 
side was severely bruised and he could neither walk nor breathe in comfort….  [H]e 
was in great pain’ (Christou, 2007d).  His daughter, Katerina Liasis, relayed that 
Stephanou had said that ‘he had been “beaten heavily and interrogated”’ (Brennan, 
2008).101  After he slipped into a coma, the family tried to get him to a specialist in 
southern Cyprus, but the Turkish Cypriot police first refused, then agreed but, ‘as 
soon as the okay was given’, the Turkish Cypriot Ministry of the Interior told the 
family that Stephanou had died (Christou, 2007d). 
 
                                                 
101 Turkish Cypriot media claimed that Stephanou had had cancer, and Turkish Cypriot police 
claimed that he had caught pneumonia and died of septicaemia, but the (multiple) post-mortems 
disproved these claims (Christou, 2007d). 
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6.d.ii. Denial 
 
After the initial police raid, both communities’ media reported that a Greek 
Cypriot had been arrested, but not whom or why (Christou, 2007a); and according 
to Cyprus Mail journalist Jean Christou, even that was not widely reported in Greek 
Cypriot media.  Christou (2007c) noted that there had been ‘no comment from the 
[Greek Cypriot] government’, that ‘his detention received no attention or 
condemnation in the government-controlled areas’.  Christou (2007d) believed that 
Greek Cypriot officialdom had been ‘strangely quiet’.  Neither the government nor 
the police even told the family about the official inquest (Christou, 2008b); they 
found out by accident. 
 
6.d.iii. Illicit antiquities trading, illicit antiquities police work 
 
Greek Cypriot media had claimed that Stephanou was an antiquities expert 
(Christou, 2007d), ‘retrieving icons and other artefacts looted’ in northern Cyprus 
(Christou, 2007b).  (Greek Cypriot) Antenna TV reported that a former police 
officer, who had recruited Stephanou ‘to help return stolen Greek Cypriot artefacts 
to the Church’, said that he ‘was working under cover for the state’ (cited by 
Christou, 2007c).  Christou (2008b) judged that ‘[a]ll of the evidence’ suggested 
Stephanou was recovering antiquities ‘on behalf of the Church and state’.  His 
daughter, Katerina Liasis, said that ‘the church had sent him’ to meet ‘his contact 
[who] was the son of a Turkish general’ (ibid.). 
Both the public information and my personal sources suggest that the Greek 
Cypriot state was recovering antiquities from the Turkish deep state.  Daughter 
Liasis believed Stephanou was caught in a Turkish/Turkish Cypriot criminal 
counter-sting operation against the Greek Cypriot police sting operation.  It seems 
like the Turkish Cypriot police arrested all of them in good faith, but the Turkish 
deep state used its power to free Arnavut, Asvaroğlu and Göztaşı (and later Göktaşı 
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and Hiçkorkmaz), while the Greek Cypriot administration did not use its knowledge 
to free Stephanou. 
The fact that Greek Cypriot undercover antiquities police were caught in Turkish 
Cypriot police raids on antiquities smugglers challenges former Greek Cypriot 
antiquities director Vassos Karageorghis’s (2000: 217) claim that the Greek Cypriot 
administration must ‘salvage’ artefacts, and undermines colleague Maria 
Anagnostopoulou’s (2000: 37) assertion that ‘an official state, Turkey, plunders… 
Cyprus’ (see also Leventis, 2000: 146).  The plunderers are Turkish and Turkish 
Cypriot nationalist gangs, which form a Turkist deep state, which operates outside 
and beyond Turkish state control.  Thus, when Turkish Cypriot journalist Kutlu 
Adalı reported the Civil Defence Organisation’s ‘illegal raid’ of St. Barnabas’s 
Monastery, the Turkish deep state assassinated him, and no-one was held 
responsible (Irkad, 2000). 
 
6.d.iv. Illegal undercover antiquities police work 
 
This has not been discussed at all in the media coverage of the Stephanou case.  It 
is possible that they are simply unaware; and it is possible that Stephanos Stephanou 
was unaware; but it is impossible that the state was ignorant of the fact: in Cyprus, 
undercover antiquities police work was, and is, illegal.  In 2008, the police had 
specifically requested the legalisation of undercover police work on ‘[i]llegal trading 
in cultural goods, including antiquities and artefacts’ (cited by J. Theodoulou, 2008).  
But it was ‘unanimously rejected by Parliament’ (J. Theodoulou, 2008).  If the state 
was using Stephanou for undercover police work, it was breaking its own law.  
Embarrassment and fear of prosecution would be powerful incentives for Church 
and State to deny, or to avoid confirming, their involvement in the matter.  I have 
had independent confirmation that Stephanou was indeed conducting undercover 
police work. 
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6.d.v. The “Syriac Bible” 
 
When I first read that Stephanou had been trying to recover an early Bible 
(Christou, 2008b), I assumed it was just one of the many Hellenic and Byzantine 
artefacts looted from northern Cyprus (Christou, 2007a; 2007b).  But after I blogged 
about the Turkish Cypriot police’s recovery of a Syriac Bible (cf. Hardy, 2009a), I 
was contacted by a very well-placed Greek Cypriot source.102  Over several 
exchanges, the well-placed Greek Cypriot told me that 
 
That bible was what lured… Stephanos Stephanou into the 
north after he had worked with police to catch a gang of TC 
[Turkish Cypriot] smugglers by posing as a buyer in the south.  
He was tricked. 
 
The well-placed Greek Cypriot detailed that, 
 
The [Greek Cypriot] CID [Criminal Investigations 
Department] had him posing as a businessman interested in 
antiquities.  The team of smugglers that got arrested 3 years 
ago by the police rea[l]ised that [Stephanou] was behind the 
setup and 2 years later they placed another call to him telling 
him about an ancient bible. 
 
But as I will show in a moment, it was not that Bible.  Greek Cypriot police had 
warned Stephanou and his partner ‘not to cross again because they “would be 
killed”’ (Christou, 2008b).  Yet the well-placed Greek Cypriot told me that 
Stephanou ‘called the CID t[o] inform them that he’[d] got another project and they 
                                                 
102 I have independently confirmed his access to this information. 
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told him that he’[d] need to go alone to determine whether all this [wa]s for real’.  
So, despite Stephanou’s police handler warning him, the police had sent him. 
Moreover, it was probably not for real; Stephanou probably died trying to save a 
fake.  According to Aramaic and Syriac scholars and translators, there are ‘a large 
number of fake Syriac manuscripts’ (Taylor, 2009), a ‘consistent pattern of forgeries’ 
(Caruso, 2009), from Turkey.  There are a couple of photographs of the supposedly 
ancient Syriac Bible found in Cyprus (see China Daily, 2009; Ktisti and Bahceli, 
2009), which was dismissed at least as a post-medieval reproduction (e.g. Caruso, 
2009), if not a modern copy (e.g. Hunter, 2009), or an outright forgery (e.g. Taylor, 
2009); and it was a far better work than the Bible offered to Stephanou.  I have not 
had physical access to Stephanou’s Bible, and I have not heard of any scientific 
analysis of his Bible; but from Stephanou’s photographs, it looks like gold marker 
pen writing on black sugar paper.  If it was a modern forgery, and if Stephanos 
Stephanou was caught in a Turkish deep state counter-sting, it is possible that the 
fake Bible was made specifically for the counter-sting. 
Regardless, this story exposes the consequences of stolen and looted Cypriot 
antiquities’ rescue: apart from the individual tragedy of Stephanou’s death, the 
money goes to, and thus partially funds the activities of, the Turkish deep state, 
which include the murder of Greek Cypriot police agent Stephanou when he tried 
to rescue looted antiquities, and the assassination of Turkish Cypriot dissident 
journalist Kutlu Adalı when he exposed paramilitary looting (cf. Irkad, 2000).  
Perversely, the Greek Cypriot state’s purchasing of looted antiquities from northern 
Cyprus is incidentally funding both the Turkish deep state’s continued looting, and 
its repression of Turkish Cypriot resistance in northern Cyprus. 
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7. Conclusion: the responsibilities of archaeologists 
 
Having explored the conduct of bicommunal work under international law, the 
practice of rescue archaeology in the occupied areas (under a secessionist 
administration), the production of professional and public archaeological knowledge 
through work and publication (under the boycott), and the efforts to combat the 
illicit antiquities trade, it is possible to tease out the connections between those areas 
of cultural heritage work and to recommend ways to proceed towards more 
responsible archaeology in conflict zones. 
It was clear how, in Greek Cypriot archaeologists’ legal attempts to assert the 
recognised legal authorities’ control over all archaeological work, they prevented 
legal, ethical Turkish Cypriot conservation work, and thus shared responsibility for 
the consequent decay of the unprotected sites.  As other cultural heritage 
professions’ work demonstrated, that closing down of work was unnecessary and 
counter-productive; furthermore, its disempowerment of the Turkish Cypriot 
archaeological community will have long-term negative effects for the cultural 
heritage that both sides value. 
As demonstrated by the arguments over the legality and ethics of archaeological 
excavations in northern Cyprus, archaeologists on both sides of the Green Line 
misinterpreted international law to promote their own freedom to work and to 
disempower the archaeologists on the other side of the border.  This conduct 
devalued international law and archaeological ethics, and soured what weak 
relations there were between the two archaeological communities.  Trust both 
within and between the communities was damaged or destroyed, and the 
indiscriminate use of the boycott and the black list again impaired the functioning of 
the Turkish Cypriot archaeological community.  Moreover, the use of the black list 
to prevent publication of work not proved illegal, which thus made it impossible for 
the archaeologists’ professional peers to judge their claims and their work, devalued 
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the black list itself; it came to resemble a tool for maintaining professional power, 
rather than a tool for censuring unprofessional conduct. 
The production of archaeological knowledge of the conflict proved worrying.  
Already limited by linguistic barriers between the authors and relevant sources, and 
by political barriers between the authors and their colleagues, much archaeological 
writing unambiguously perverted its sources and histories.  There was simple lack of 
research, but there was also refusal to use available data, refusal to try to access 
potentially contrary data, refusal to share contrary data with colleagues who might 
make it public knowledge, and deliberate abuse and pollution of information already 
in the public record.  The research and narration were so unscholarly as to bring 
into question the professionalism of the authors (or to undermine it completely).  
These false histories not only produce convenient material for nationalist 
propaganda within the community and internationally; but also, since the other side 
is well aware of the treatment of its own cultural heritage, false histories destroy any 
trust between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage 
communities. 
The most troubling aspect of archaeological work, however, was undoubtedly 
looted antiquities’ rescue.  The Cyprus Conflict did spontaneously generate an 
explosion in looting, and an ideal environment for smuggling and illicit trading, and 
for the paramilitary takeover of the illicit antiquities trade.  Yet archaeologists’ 
policies created a destructive cycle of ultimately government-underwritten, 
paramilitary-funding looting of archaeological sites.  In the end, the Turkish deep 
state killed a Turkish Cypriot struggling to expose and end the looting of 
Christian/Greek Cypriot cultural heritage sites, and a Greek Cypriot trying to rescue 
Cypriot cultural heritage before it disappeared into the international art market. 
The only comfort to be taken from all of these examples of practices is in the 
commitment of many archaeologists and communities to respect and coexistence; 
however, they urgently need help.  Undercover antiquities rescue must end 
immediately; and it must be replaced by cooperation between both sides’ 
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archaeologists and police in a united fight against organised crime.  Equally, both 
sides’ archaeologists must follow in the footsteps of historians and architects in 
cooperating to produce true histories that dispel nationalist myths and establish the 
intercommunal historical understanding necessary for any reconciliation and return 
to bicommunal life. 
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Appendix A.  Political legal context: Cypriot state sovereignty 
 
Whether they jumped or whether they were pushed, on 22nd December 1963, 
Turkish Cypriot officials left the government; they set up the Autonomous Turkish 
Administration103.  The constitutional dilemma’s practical implications for cultural 
heritage are now for antiquities trading laws and illicit antiquities trade policing on 
a divided island.  However, the dilemma was produced through political violence, 
including that against community property; and the ending and prevention of that 
violence was only made possible by the resolution of the dilemma. 
Two professors of international law, George Tenekides (1985) and Constantine 
Economides (2000), are prime examples of the Hellenist line on the Cyprus Problem.  
It is worth examining their political legal claims because they made them, as well as 
cultural legal claims, in official cultural heritage propaganda; their interpretation of 
the legal political situation is relevant and instructive.  Neither of them mentioned 
the violent breakdown of the bicommunal state in 1963-1964, or the consequent 
separate ethnic administrations, Turkish Cypriot enclaves and UN peacekeeping 
operation, or even the EOKA-B coup that triggered the Turkish invasion. 
In official cultural heritage propaganda, legal scholar George Tenekides (1985: 
49) stated that ‘[t]he Republic of Cyprus is recognized as sovereign’.  Yet, as public 
international law scholar Stefan Talmon (2002: 40) observed, after intercommunal 
violence broke out and Turkish Cypriots left parliament in 1963, there had been ‘no 
alternative: if the United Nations had not treated the Greek Cypriot rump 
government as “the Government of Cyprus”’, there would have been no legally 
competent state to consent to the UN peacekeeping operation in 1964 (cf. the 
conditions of Article 4 of Resolution 186 (UNSC, 1964)). 
Cruelly, it was precisely the Greek Cypriot para-state’s usurpation of the 
partnership state, and the violence it initiated, which necessitated the United 
Nations’ recognition of the para-state as the legitimate state, in order to reduce the 
                                                 
103 Özerk Türk Yönetimi. 
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Greek Cypriot para-state’s violence, and the Turkish Cypriot deep state’s reactive 
violence.  The United Nations had to legalise the Greek Cypriot para-state’s 
annexation of power before the para-state could and would allow the United 
Nations to intervene to try to restore peace and the partnership state. 
 
279 
 
Appendix B.  Political legal context: aggression, invasion, occupation 
 
Again, official cultural heritage propaganda discussed the political legal context.  
Prof. George Tenekides (1985: 48) acknowledged but did not explain Turkey’s 
‘pretext of… the restoration of “constitutional order”’ (the Greek junta-backed 
Greek Cypriot nationalist extremist paramilitary coup of 1974), but otherwise 
presented the invasion as an unprovoked attack ‘after 10 years of preparation’. 
Notably, that claim would date Turkey’s first plan to invade to 1964, the year the 
Greek Cypriot para-state consolidated its exclusive control of the Cypriot state and 
destroyed Turkish Cypriot villages, neighbourhoods, and mosques.  Moreover, the 
UK and later the UN intervened to restore order and keep the peace, and Turkey did 
not implement its plan to invade.  That claim actually demonstrates that Turkish 
state policy was responsive to events and circumstances, and not merely to Turkish 
nationalist ideology. 
Despite never saying so explicitly, by denying the Turkish justification for its 
invasion, Tenekides implicitly accused Turkey of aggressive war.  He stated that ‘the 
“third parties”…, the guarantor powers, especially Great Britain, the United Nations 
and the Superpowers, did not move dynamically to halt the invader’ (Tenekides, 
1985: 48-49).  Yet the three guarantor powers were Greece, Turkey and the United 
Kingdom; the Greek Junta had supported EOKA-B’s coup; and the United Kingdom 
chose not to intervene.  So, the only state with both the explicit legal right to 
intervene, and the will, was Turkey. 
However, international lawyer Constantine Economides was more direct: 
Economides (2000: 135) explicitly stated that the invasion violated the UN Charter.  
It is interesting to study the words of one prominent judge, Loukis Loukaides; then 
Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic of Cyprus and Member of the European 
Commission of Human Rights, Loukaides was equally direct.  Loukaides alleged 
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‘aggression’ and ‘illegal war’ (1995: 115).104  Indeed, Loukaides claimed that ‘the U.N. 
General Assembly ha[d] expressly demanded “the immediate withdrawal of all 
invading forces from the Republic of Cyprus”’ (1995: 114-115 – original emphasis; 
see fig. 24); but the UN had not.  Loukaides – then a member of the European 
Commission of Human Rights, who later became a senior judge for the European 
Court of Human Rights – did not only change the emphasis of the demand: he 
changed the demand itself.  Predictably, the words Loukaides (1995: 115) felt 
important enough to emphasise, the words he had alleged left ‘no doubt’ that the 
invasion ‘amounted, according to international law, to “aggression”’, were ones he 
had inserted himself.  The United Nations actually demanded ‘the immediate 
withdrawal of all occupation forces from the Republic of Cyprus’ (1983: Art. 8 – 
emphasis added; see fig. 25). 
 
 
Figure 24: Loukaides’ (1995: 115) misquotation of UN Resolution 37/253 (1983). 
 
 
Figure 25: Article 8 of 1983 United Nations Resolution 37/253. 
 
As a legal professional, Loukaides had to know the difference between the two 
statements.  He frequently talked about the two acts of invasion and occupation as 
one compound act of invasion-and-occupation, but he also repeatedly demonstrated 
his knowledge of the legal and political differences between the two acts, for 
example by arguing that Turkey undermined its legal justification for invasion by 
maintaining the occupation after ‘order had been restored’ (Loukaides, 1995: 114) – 
                                                 
104 Not only Hellenists argued this: human rights and international law scholar Prof. Eyal Benvenisti 
accused Turkey of ‘illegal aggression’ (2004: 180), and stated that its invasion was contrary to the UN 
Charter and the Cypriot Treaty of Guarantee (2004: 180n105). 
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more frankly, after the Greek Cypriot coup regime had collapsed.  Moreover, he 
demonstrated his conscious intention to use those specific words by emphasising 
them.  Thus, it appears that Deputy Attorney-General Loukaides deliberately 
misquoted and misrepresented the United Nations’ opinions. 
Loukaides (1985: 114) alleged that the Turkish invasion was ‘forbidden by’ and 
Economides (2000: 135) that the ‘illegal military occupation… [was] established in 
violation of’ Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the United Nations’ Charter; Economides went 
as far as to say that the paragraph ‘outlaw[ed] the use of force in international 
relations’ (2000: 135).  The United Nations’ Charter insists that 
 
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations (UN, 1945: Ch. I, Art. 2, Para. 4). 
 
It does not outlaw any use of force, only those uses ‘inconsistent’ with the aims of 
the UN.  Indeed, Chapter VII, Article 51 specifically legalises ‘individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations’. 
Loukaides stated that ‘any interpretation of the right of “action”’ in the Cypriot 
Treaty of Guarantee ‘as a right to use force, was legally impermissible and the actual 
use of such force was illegal’ (1995: 114).  Yet the United Kingdom, the Kingdom of 
Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus’s Treaty of Guarantee 
insisted that its members ‘guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and 
security of the Republic of Cyprus’ (UK, KOG, ROT and ROC, 1960: 4 – Art. 2), 
while the UK, Greece and Turkey ‘reserve[d] the right to take action with the sole 
aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty’ (UK, KOG, 
ROT and ROC, 1960: 6 – Art. 4).  There are two primary reasons for accepting that 
both of these clauses complied with the UN Charter and gave the right to use force.  
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The first reason is derived from the logic of the law: if those clauses had not given 
the right to use force, they would have been meaningless.  The second reason is 
derived from the logic of former European Commission of Human Rights member 
Tenekides’ argument: if those clauses had not given the right to use force, Tenekides’ 
(1985: 49) complaint that the United Kingdom ‘did not move dynamically to halt the 
invader’ would have been a complaint that the UK did not commit a criminal act of 
aggression. 
Both the United Nations’ Charter’s and the Republic of Cyprus’s Treaty of 
Guarantee’s bans on interference with Cypriot independence would have applied 
equally to the Greek Junta-backed EOKA-B coup.  EOKA-B’s violation of both 
would have established a justification for the Republic of Turkey to intervene to end 
the Greek Junta’s use of force against the Republic of Cyprus’s political 
independence.  Moreover, neither Tenekides nor Loukaides nor Economides once 
mentioned the Treaty of Alliance between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, the treaty in 
which they explicitly agreed that they were acting in ‘conformity with the purposes 
and principles of the United Nations Charter’ and ‘under[took] to resist any attack or 
aggression, direct or indirect, directed against the independence or the territorial 
integrity of the Republic of Cyprus’ (KOG, ROT and ROC, 1960: 289 – Preamble, 
Para. 2; 289 – Art. 2).  Obviously, it did not excuse the human rights abuses during 
the invasion or the abuses and occupation after it, but like the UK, Turkey did have 
a right and a duty to intervene.  As the United Kingdom’s own House of Commons 
Select Committee on Cyprus later stated, 
 
Britain had a legal right to intervene, she had a moral obligation to 
intervene, she had the military capacity to intervene[, but s]he did not 
intervene for reasons which the government refuses to give’ (UKHCSCS, 
1976: x – Para. 22). 
 
283 
 
In fact, the reason was that the United States refused joint UK-US intervention, and 
the United Kingdom feared individual failure, either by its own tactical error or 
through the United States’ interference (O’Malley and Craig, 1999: 184-186).  Yet it 
was only because the third parties “did not move dynamically to halt” the coup that 
there was any invasion to halt.  It was only after the United States rejected the 
Soviet Union’s appeal for joint UK, US and Soviet action to prevent EOKA-B’s coup 
(O’Malley and Craig, 1999: 167), and after the United Kingdom did nothing 
individually, that EOKA-B held the coup.  It was only after the UK rejected Turkey’s 
appeal for joint British-Turkish intervention to end the coup that the UK then had 
to appeal for joint British-American action to prevent a unilateral Turkish invasion; 
and it was only after the United States had rejected the United Kingdom’s appeal 
that Turkey invaded (O’Malley and Craig, 1999: 167; 174; 184-186). 
Like Deputy Attorney-General Loukaides, Prof. Economides was outspoken.  
Economides (2000: 135), who was a Member of the International Law Commission 
at the time, stated that 
 
The armed attack, invasion, capture and occupation of Cypriot territory 
by Turkey constitutes [sic] the most serious violation known of the 
international legal order.  The International Law Commission of the 
United Nations, in its bill on the international re[sp]onsibility of states, 
calls the armed attack an “international crime” (article 19 paragraphs 2 
and 3a), while decision no. 3314 of the 1974 General Assembly of the 
United Nations [UN, 1974b]… considers it “a crime against international 
peace” [article 5, paragraph 2]’. 
 
He made it sound like the ILC or the UN had ruled upon Turkey’s intervention.  But 
a former Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations, Andrew 
Jacovides (2001: 260), complained precisely that the legality of the Turkish invasion 
had not been judged.  In the judgment of Greek Cypriot Titina Loizidou’s case 
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against Turkey at the European Court of Human Rights, Judge Pettiti’s dissenting 
opinion mentioned ‘the United Nations not having designated the intervention of 
Turkish forces in northern Cyprus as aggression’, and noted ‘the Court did not 
examine the question whether that intervention was lawful’ (in ECHR, 1996; see 
also Fuad in ECHR, 2001).  In fact, the International Law Commission (ILC, 2002 
[1996]: 352: Art. 19, Para. 2) had decided that 
 
An internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a State 
of an international obligation so essential for the protection of 
fundamental interests of the international community that its breach is 
recognized as a crime by that community as a whole constitutes an 
international crime. 
 
But that was a generic, draft article on state responsibility.  Economides had quoted 
the ILC’s definition of an ‘international crime’, and the United Nations’ definition of 
a ‘war of aggression’ (cf. UN, 1974b: 144 – Annex, Art. 5, Para. 2), and applied them 
himself.  That could have been an acceptable thing to do, had he done it openly, but 
he had not.  As a Member of the International Law Commission, he may have had a 
greater authority to pronounce upon the article’s application; but he also had a 
greater responsibility to state that it was his personal interpretation, rather than the 
Commission’s official judgement.  Furthermore, the International Law Commission 
itself had deemed Article 19, Paragraph 3 ‘defective’ because, amongst other 
problems, ‘it failed to define crimes; [and] its obscurity made it impossible to know 
what, if anything, was a crime’ (ILC, 1998: 118 – Ch. VII, Para. 243). 
As a Member, Economides must have known this.  If he had poorly phrased his 
personal interpretation, that would have been a careless mistake.  Yet: he repeated 
the phrase ‘the armed attack’, both ‘by Turkey’ and ‘call[ed]… an “international 
crime”’ by the ILC (Economides, 2000: 135 – emphasis added), which made it sound 
as if the ILC had judged that particular armed attack; the term “armed attack” was 
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absent from the clause he cited, Article 19, Paragraph 3a, which warned against ‘a 
serious breach’, ‘such as… aggression’ (ILC, 2002 [1996]: 352 – Art. 19, Para. 3a), 
when according to the United Nations, aggression was not any armed attack but 
specifically ‘[t]he first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter’ 
(UN, 1974b: 143 – Annex, Para. 2), whereas the Turkish invasion was a reactive use 
of armed force to end the Greek Junta’s first use; and, most damningly, (by the date 
of the first edition of the CPCHC’s (1998) book) Commission Member Economides 
chose to cite Article 19, Paragraphs 2 and 3 at the very same time that the 
Commission itself was warning the international community that Paragraph 2 was 
‘problematic’ and Paragraph 3 ‘defective’ (ILC, 1998: 18 – Ch. VII, Paras. 242; 243).  
These points suggest Economides wilfully misused the Commission’s articles on state 
responsibility. 
(The Greek Junta-backed EOKA-B coup constituted aggression in various ways, 
including ‘invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of 
another State’ (UN, 1974b: 143 – Annex, Art. 3, Para. a); ‘use of armed forces of one 
State which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of the 
receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement’ 
(UN, 1974b: 143 – Annex, Art. 3, Para. e); and ‘sending by or on behalf of a State of 
armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force 
against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its 
substantial involvement therein’ (UN, 1974b: 143 – Annex, Art. 3, Para. g).) 
Economides’ misuse of UN Resolution 3314 was in some ways even more 
obvious.  Economides (2000: 135) alleged that ‘decision no. 3314 of the 1974 General 
Assembly of the United Nations, which includes the definition of attack, considers it 
[the Turkish invasion] “a crime against international peace”’.  “Decision” 3314 did 
not include the definition of attack: Resolution 3314 was the definition of attack, 
titled ‘[the] Definition of Aggression’ (UN, 1974b: 142). 
It is also notable that, though Economides inappropriately cited the generic 
Resolution 3314, neither Economides nor Tenekides cited any United Nations or 
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Security Council resolution on Cyprus.  Loukaides, however, cited several, including 
three from 1974, Security Council Resolutions 355 and 360 and United Nations (UN, 
1974a) Resolution 3212.  Conspicuously, the earliest Resolution he cited, 355, was 
not the first after the invasion, but the third.  Resolution 355 was passed on 1st 
August 1974, a week after the coup regime had collapsed and a democratic Greek 
Cypriot administration had returned, so it could be seen to refer only to the Turkish 
invasion forces (although Greek military forces were still on the island and Greek 
Cypriot paramilitaries were still active).  It seems telling that Resolution 355 merely 
asked the United Nations Secretary-General to work towards and report upon the 
‘full implementation of Security Council resolution 353’ without saying what that 
involved (UNSC, 1974b: 8 – Preamble).  (Resolution 360 ‘disapprov[ed]’ of the 
Turkish Armed Forces’ second operation (UNSC, 1974c – original emphasis).)  By 
contrast, the Republic of Cyprus Permanent Representative to the United Nations at 
the time cited initial Resolution 353 (ROCPRUN, 1974: 2). 
Resolution 353 was passed on 20th July, on the day of the Turkish invasion, when 
EOKA-B was still in power.  The Resolution referred to ‘the statement of the 
President of the Republic of Cyprus’ (UNSC, 1974a: 7 - Preamble), in which the 
deposed president had stated that the Greek Junta had converted the Greek Cypriot 
National Guard into an ‘instrument of subversion’ and ‘created and supported the 
terrorist organisation “EOKA B”’ (Makarios, 1974b: 1; 6), then the ‘aggressors’ 
‘callously violated the independence’ of and ‘extended [their] dictatorship’ to Cyprus 
(ibid.: 5; 1; 1), by ‘invasion’ (ibid.: 3; 4; 6; 7).  The Resolution requested ‘the 
withdrawal… of foreign military personnel’ on the island illegally, specifically 
‘including those whose withdrawal was requested by the President of the Republic 
of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, in his letter of 2 July 1974’ (UNSC, 1974a: 7 – Art. 
4), in which Makarios (1974a) had asked Greek Junta President Faedon Gizikis to 
recall the Greek officers in the Greek Cypriot National Guard, which the Junta had 
used to usurp control of the force and to ‘support and direct the activities of the 
terrorist organisation “EOKA B”…. to dissolve the state of Cyprus’.  From the 
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available evidence, it seems that the only reason to cite the later, uninformative 
Resolution 355 would be to avoid citing the earlier, detailed Resolution 353, which 
made it clear that the Greek Junta and its Greek Cypriot para-state had committed 
aggression against the Republic of Cyprus, and that the Turkish state had a legal 
justification for military intervention.  Notwithstanding the legality of the Turkish 
invasion, any and all abuses during and after that invasion were illegal; likewise, any 
and all deep state activity was illegal, though it is important to remember that the 
Turkish government did not control and was not responsible for deep state activity. 
 
